

FOREIGN AFFAIRS




Winter 1979/80

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The Irish Question: A British Problem—*John Hume*
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EDITOR'S NOTE

A Note written when Americans are held captive in Iran, in an epic clash between revolutionary forces and established traditions of international dealing, may be excused for not following our usual practice of discussing editorial policies.

To those of us who cut our teeth in the 1939–41 period of anguished decision in America, there is a similarity to the present overall situation that is both disturbing and ultimately reassuring. Disturbing because, then as now, Americans were spending much of their time airing their differences about how their country got into a most difficult position, how much other countries (and their own leaders) were to be blamed, and so on. Ultimately reassuring because in 1941 the dithering stopped, the country did take hold of its problems, and we emerged united, effective, and with a new consciousness of our strength and what we stood for.

The differences are obvious—the challenge then was monolithic, and debate in the end was terminated by external attack. Today the problems are manifold, and debate on them will not cease, especially in an election year. Yet at least one critical aspect boils down to the same thing—making major adjustments in our national life, and putting illusions (and so far as possible recrimination) behind us.

More than any other single factor, the role of America in the world hinges on our getting on top of our energy situation. Whatever the ultimate possibilities for all kinds of energy sources, the immediate key to this is conservation, a return at least for the time being to traditions of self-denial, sacrifice of personal pleasures, and sharing of burdens that were writ large in the years after 1941 and in the eighteenth century as they have not been recently. The turbulent politics of the Middle East and economic pressures should be as compelling today in this direction as the more obvious threats of those earlier times. And, then as now, I think we shall find that as we learn to work together to a clear immediate goal, a great deal else will fall into place.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries FOREIGN AFFAIRS can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there. The Editors.

Foreign Affairs is published five times annually by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., Editorial Office, 58 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them. Cable address Foraffairs, New York. Payments and inquiries concerning subscriptions should be sent to *Foreign Affairs*, P.O. Box 2315, Boulder, Colorado 80322. Subscription price U.S. \$15.00—Foreign \$18.00 per year. Subscription air mail rates are available upon request. Inquiries concerning permissions and reprints should be sent to the New York office.

Foreign Affairs is a member of The Leadership Network advertising group located at 230 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017. Telephone Robert F. Sennott, Jr., 682-4500, in Suite 321.

Denis Healey

OIL, MONEY AND RECESSION

For about a quarter of a century after the end of the Second World War, the market economies of the non-communist world enjoyed an unprecedented rate of growth, an exceptionally low level of unemployment, and comparatively low inflation. The average growth of the gross national product (GNP) in the advanced industrial nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) from 1951 to 1973 was 4.8 percent a year in real terms. It was not until 1975 that output actually fell in the noncommunist world as a whole—and then by only one percent—whereas before the war there were periods when it fell very dramatically by from five to seven percent. Since 1975, growth has been averaging less than it did from 1951 to 1973—about 3.8 as against 4.8 percent—but there are ominous signs that it may settle down over the next decade to an average significantly lower than the current rate. Moreover, all the evidence is that, in the foreseeable future, the average growth of output in the free world is not going to recover to the level we experienced during those golden years from 1951 to 1973.

Why did we enjoy this uniquely high rate of growth and employment during those postwar years? First of all, the governments concerned accepted the principle of free trade. There has been a very close correlation over the years between the growth of gross domestic product (GDP) in individual countries and the growth of world trade. Free trade was exceptionally helpful to those of the developing countries which operated market economies, until the recent increase in import restrictions in the industrial world following the 1973–74 oil crisis. The second reason was that countries used the techniques of demand management, as taught by Keynes, and that in the immediate postwar period the United States used its big current account surpluses to

The Right Honorable Denis Healey, M.B.E., M.P., was Britain's longest serving postwar Chancellor of the Exchequer, February 1974–May 1979, and is currently opposition spokesman on economic affairs. He has been a Labour Member of Parliament since 1952. This article is adapted from the last of three Russell C. Leffingwell Lectures delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations in October 1979. The whole of the lectures is being published by the Council in the near future under the tentative title, *Managing the Economy*.

finance, through the Marshall Plan, the deficits of those countries which had been damaged by the war and also helped to finance developing country deficits, initially through President Truman's Point Four program by increasing the flow of private investment capital to poor nations.

I think that a third factor—although economists will argue about this—may have been that the postwar Bretton Woods agreement, by maintaining a regime of fixed parities, reduced the uncertainties that inhibit the making of economic decisions and imposed a degree of financial discipline that probably helped keep inflation rates down. But the Bretton Woods system depended on discrimination against the United States, the only country in the system which could never change its exchange rate; America was liable to run a permanent deficit and had to keep her rate of inflation low.

A final factor which contributed to this period of unusual economic prosperity is that the world used cheap energy and exceptionally cheap oil. In fact, the real price of oil fell by half between 1950 and 1970. In recent years it has been easy to forget that it is only 20 years since the United States imposed quotas on imports of oil in order to keep up the price of its domestic oil.

All these factors, which contributed to the very high rate of growth in the postwar period, have now changed or disappeared. There has latterly been a slow accumulation of restrictions on trade, which has been contained only with very great difficulty. The United States soon became unable to carry the burden of financing other countries' deficits, and in 1971 refused any longer to accept the discrimination against it which was imposed by the Bretton Woods system. Finally, the oil-producing countries of the Middle East began to exploit their new political independence of the West just as the West's economic dependence on their oil became absolute; they followed the precedent set by the oil companies and began to manage the world market for oil in their own interest. Thus, the energy problem has now become a dominant factor in the international economy. Let us first try to draw some lessons from its impact over the last six years and then consider its consequences for the world's monetary arrangements.

II

When I became Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1974, I found myself in the middle of a bad-tempered argument between the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the West about whether the crisis the world then faced was due to the

profligacy of the oil consumers or the rapacity of the oil producers. In fact, actions by the OECD countries and by OPEC both made their contributions.

The world inflation of the early 1970s had nothing whatever to do with oil. It was due to the failure of successive American administrations to finance the war in Vietnam out of current revenue; to the exceptional increase in raw material prices because a large number of countries achieved unusually high growth rates at the same time; and to a series of bad harvests. These factors helped lead to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods currency system under an American policy for which Treasury Secretary John Connally adopted the euphemism "benign neglect." The resulting currency instability itself added to inflation. So inflation was already high and rising by the middle of 1973, before the increase in oil prices took place.

The OPEC countries increased the price of oil partly in response to recent inflation in the industrial world, partly to make good the fall in the real price of oil in the previous two decades, and partly to influence Western policy toward Israel. The result was a massive fall in world demand, reflected in the 65-billion-dollar OPEC surplus in the first year, and a massive boost to prices. Nevertheless, some Keynesian and monetarist economists are now disputing fiercely from opposite positions whether wiser policies in the consuming countries might have avoided the deflation of demand and the inflation of prices; the latest annual reports of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the OECD illustrate the range of disagreement on this issue.

In fact, the IMF advised the consumer countries at the beginning of 1974 to meet the reduction in world demand not by removing their deficits through deflation but by financing their deficits through borrowing, so as to recycle the OPEC surplus. But most governments rejected this advice and tried to eliminate their deficits or to run surpluses instead. The result was that countries like Britain and Italy—and later the United States—which took the IMF's advice, had to accept exceptionally high deficits on current account, which led to the depreciation of their currencies and so bred still higher inflation. They finally escaped from this situation only through very painful readjustments. Meanwhile, the world entered a period of great currency turbulence which still persists.

By 1978, the combined surpluses of West Germany, Japan and Switzerland were many times greater than the OPEC surplus. If

there was any deflation of world demand, it was by then due to their behavior, and not to OPEC's. However, the major industrial countries had by then accepted the need for concerted action to reduce the divergence in their economic performances. Following decisions taken at the Bonn Summit of July 1978, Germany and Japan increased domestic demand. As a result, their economies have been growing faster and their surpluses have fallen dramatically—indeed Japan is now running a very substantial overall deficit. Meanwhile, Britain, France and Italy have moved into balance on current account. In fact, by the beginning of 1979 the industrial world was moving steadily toward adjustment, although, because Congress failed to legislate President Carter's energy program, the United States was still lagging well behind the rest in the process.

Before discussing the implications of the second oil shock, which started last December, let us look at some of the unexpected lessons which we should have learned from the first oil shock.

First of all, the private banking system has been more flexible and ingenious in recycling the OPEC surplus than anybody thought possible five years ago. Official financing has played only a minor role in financing the deficits—indeed the facilities available in the IMF have not been fully used. The main reason for this has been the mushroom growth of the Euromarkets. It is ironic to reflect that when the IMF met in Nairobi in the fall of 1973, it was widely believed that the Eurocurrencies would soon disappear because they would be absorbed in paying the higher price of oil. In fact, they have increased at least four times since then. For the industrial countries, the Euromarkets offered a means of avoiding domestic monetary controls, a point which Paul Volcker, the new Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, is deeply conscious of. For the Third World they offered a way of getting loans on fine terms without political conditions. The result has been the accumulation in the Euromarkets of an enormous mountain of debt, which is now growing automatically as countries borrow to finance the servicing of their existing loans. Aggregate borrowing by the Third World from the multinational banks now amounts to some \$190 billion, 70 percent of which must be refinanced or repaid by 1982. In addition, about \$125 billion is owed to governments and multinational organizations like the World Bank.

The second surprise was that the OPEC countries proved capable of increasing their imports so as to absorb their new earnings very much faster than expected. Their overall annual

surpluses dwindled from \$65 billion in the first year to \$5.5 billion four years later. Indeed, few of the individual OPEC countries are still in surplus. The biggest exception is Saudi Arabia, although Saudi Arabia has been absorbing faster than any other country; with three percent of the OPEC population, it now takes 21 percent of OPEC imports. In 1974, many bank economists estimated that by 1980 OPEC's cumulative reserves would have risen to \$500 billion. In fact, they are only \$50 billion bigger now than they were in 1973.

The third surprise—and I must confess it was a great surprise to me—is that many of the non-oil developing countries suffered less than expected. As a group they continue to grow faster than the OECD countries, partly because they are less dependent on oil and partly because they have been able to finance their deficits by borrowing from private banks without the restrictive conditions the IMF would have imposed. In some cases they have had help from OPEC itself. But within the Third World there have been big differences in economic performance between the supercompetitive countries like Korea, Taiwan and Singapore at one extreme and sub-Saharan Africa at the other, with India, well above average, in the middle. A lot of the borrowing carried out by some of the non-oil developing countries has been solely for the purpose of increasing their reserves—thus, despite the oil shocks the total reserves of these countries have risen from \$27 billion to \$62 billion in the last five years. Primitive monetarists have learned a further lesson—I hope—namely that market forces are not strong enough to break the oil cartel.¹

There has been one other unforeseen development over the last five years, although it is unclear how much the oil price increase by itself is responsible. A long period of high inflation with low growth has produced big changes in economic behavior throughout the industrial world. Confidence has weakened dramatically; investment has been unusually low; and the reaction to changes in economic policy has been exceptionally sluggish. In fact, all the instruments of economic policy—fiscal, monetary and exchange-rate policy—have been less effective than was expected. There is also some reason to believe that the sudden increase in the price of energy may be partly responsible for structural changes in our economies, which are resulting in bottlenecks and inflationary pressures at a lower level of economic activity than in the past.

¹ Professor Milton Friedman, for example, predicted in 1974 that OPEC would collapse long before oil reached \$10 a barrel.

But there is still great uncertainty about the nature and causes of these changes, so the economic schoolmen are having a field day in claiming miracles for their own proprietary medicines.

III

Chastened, I hope, by the surprises we had following the first oil price increase, let us now look at the second oil shock this past year.

Slower growth and higher inflation in the consumer countries reduced the real price of oil after 1974. But once recovery was underway, it took only a small cut in output due to the troubles in Iran to send spot prices through the roof. The OPEC price increase last summer inevitably followed. The OPEC countries were, in fact, following the market, a market largely created by Western consumers. And, in fact, up to last summer they were simply restoring the real price of oil to what it had been in 1974. But now we are off on the rollercoaster again.

This time, however, there are some important differences from the first oil shock. First of all, the immediate percentage reduction in world demand is so far much less than it was six years ago. The OPEC surplus looks like being about \$50 billion in the year to July 1980 as against \$65 billion in 1973-74. But that figure is misleading because the dollar is worth less than it was then, and the GDP of the consumer countries is higher. So the impact of the OPEC surplus on demand will be a good deal smaller in relation to current activity than it was five years ago.

On the other hand, governments everywhere are now very much more worried about inflation than about unemployment. Many governments have adopted more restrictive policies in reaction to the current oil price increase than they did in 1974-75. This will mean fiercer competition for less trade. Many governments are also trying to raise their exchange rates through higher interest rates so as to reduce imported inflation, even if that means less activity and more unemployment.

The 1980s look like they will be a decade of competitive exchange-rate appreciations, in contrast to the competitive depreciations of the 1950s and 1960s. In the next few years we may find out whether the new emphasis on monetarist theory produces a greater or lesser shock to business confidence than what happened after the first oil price increase. Partly because of their governments' indifference to the effects of their policy on unemployment, there are already signs that the trade unions in many countries are this time less ready to take the oil price increases on the chin

and that we may have more industrial trouble and higher wage increases than was the case last time.

The third area where the situation differs from the one which prevailed when the first oil shock hit us lies in the relative economic performance of the major consuming countries. On the one hand, the difference in balance-of-payments performance is very much smaller. Britain, France and Italy are all now close to balance, whereas they had a combined deficit of \$20 billion last time. On the other hand, the divergence in inflation rates is much more dramatic now than it was then. In 1973, America and Japan stood at the extremes of inflation performance with a gap of 5.3 percent between them. In 1978, Germany and Italy were the extremes with ten percent between them. By mid-1979 the gap was significantly higher.

There is also a puzzling divergence in savings behavior. In the United States the savings ratio has fallen to about 4.5 percent. In Europe the ratio is still well into the teens—in most cases between 12 and 16 percent.

These differences in performance make the risks of turbulence on the foreign exchanges greater, particularly because the effect of the oil price increase will vary dramatically between countries. It already looks as though America's oil import bill this year will be between \$50 billion and \$70 billion, an increase of between \$8 billion and \$28 billion over 1978. So there are already signs of a flight from money, of which the stupendous increase in the price of gold is only one example. People have been moving not only into other metals but into almost any commodity they can buy. It would be interesting to know how much of Japan's deficit this year is due to the stockpiling of commodities rather than to trade in manufactured goods. Moreover, such speculation in commodity futures is reminiscent of the excesses of 1929.

Another probable difference from the situation after the first oil shock is that the absorptive capacity of the OPEC countries may diminish. Some of the OPEC countries are already in deficit. Others are worried about the consequences for their economic and social stability if they continue their current rates of absorption.

Moreover, it looks as if the deficit of the non-oil developing countries will be very much greater this time. Egypt, Mexico and Malaysia are now oil producers. The former head of the IMF, Johannes Witteveen, has recently stated that the deficit of the developing countries which are still without oil could be as high as \$65 billion next year.² Because parts of the private banking

² Speech at the opening of the AMRO Bank, Tokyo, September 7, 1979.

system are already overstrained by earlier lending, these new deficits may be more difficult to finance, particularly if other countries follow or extend the precedent set by Mr. Volcker and adopt measures to reduce the avoidance of domestic monetary controls through the Euromarkets. It also seems likely that a prolonged period of low growth in the industrial countries will not only automatically reduce their trade with the developing countries but may also strengthen protectionism, particularly against imports of manufactures from supercompetitive countries like Korea and Taiwan.

The picture I have painted so far assumes that the supply and price of oil will respond to the demand for oil. But there are already signs that the oil producers may reduce the supply, partly to conserve the finite supplies of their most precious resource, partly to maximize its price, and perhaps also to exert political pressure. Many of them, which were quite unprepared to deal with some of the consequences of the first oil shock, have been learning fast in the last five years. For example, Britain's exchange rate stayed firm in 1974 and 1975 mainly because some of the Middle East governments did not know where to put their money except in London. They are now as sophisticated as any government in the world in judging exchange rate risks and balancing their portfolios.

Kuwait is typical of the development in OPEC thinking. It has already made a further increase in the price of its oil, and it is now talking of cutting output from 2.2 billion barrels a day to 1.6 billion next year. Mr. 'Ali al-Khalifa, its Minister for Oil, told a seminar at Oxford in September 1979 that Kuwait might progressively reduce the ratio of production to reserves from the current 1 to 25 or 30, to 1 to 100, so that the output of its oil would fall by half over the next five years.

There is a dangerous tendency in some consuming countries to try to cope with such developments by putting excessive pressure on their friends in the OPEC countries. The fate of former Premier Nuri Said in Iraq should be a warning. He was lying dead in the gutter within a short time after being pushed against his better judgment into the 1955 Baghdad Pact. The only certain way by which the consumer countries can discourage the tendency to cut output in the producing countries is to press on faster with conservation and the development of alternative energy supplies so as to present OPEC with the prospect of a fall in the real price of oil in the longer term, which would make it irrational for them to restrict output now.

It is always possible that political changes in an oil-producing country could lead to a sudden cut in output as it did in Iran last year. Armed conflict between two or more cannot be ruled out. The Kurdish problem involves three Middle East countries. Sectarian divisions between Sunni and Shi'ite Muslim sects are already imposing strains in Bahrain, and behind it all there is the possibility of another Arab-Israeli war.

A final danger is that if social and political strains increase in the consumer countries, or if OPEC goes too far in exploiting its monopoly position—particularly for political objectives—then some external intervention in the supplier countries may occur, an intervention which might bring Western countries into direct conflict with the Soviet Union. It is possible to overrate the rationality of governments and peoples, particularly in a democratic country, when they are under severe strain.

IV

One of our greatest difficulties in developing policies for dealing with the energy problem is the great uncertainty about the ultimate size of the world's real oil reserves. This uncertainty will last as long as the oil companies are reluctant, whether for financial or other reasons, to explore for oil without guarantees of production. As a result, the experts differ widely in their estimates. Some of the oil-producing countries are becoming so impatient that they may short-cut the oil companies and develop their own exploration capability. We may then discover it is not so difficult, after all, to find oil, just as after 1976 we found it was not so difficult to pilot ships through the Suez Canal. Monopolies can inflate their expertise as well as their prices.

The way in which the producers have handled the supply and price of oil, and the way in which the consumers have reacted to this, have already reduced world growth and increased inflation. They threaten worse consequences still. There is no sign at the moment of an improvement in the situation. At Tokyo the heads of government made meaningless noises about it—forgotten as soon as uttered. The IMF seemed to ignore it altogether at its fall meeting in Belgrade.

Is it inevitable that we should sit and watch the situation drift, meeting occasionally at massive jamborees of producers and consumers for the ritual exchange of abrasive misunderstandings, or at ill-prepared weekend summits which produce ambiguous communiqués as a substitute for policies? Or do we attempt to create some areas of agreement with the producers based on accepted

mutual interests, so as to establish some patches of relative certainty in this uncertain situation, by eliminating or at least reducing some of the more obvious risks?

One problem, which I think it is reasonable to try to tackle, is the speed of change. Oil is so important in so many ways that sudden changes in its price or supply can inflict great damage on the whole world economy. When change is sudden, the industrial consuming countries cannot hope to meet it by conservation alone. Given the current economic fashion, they will meet it by deflation, and the ever-present risk of further sudden changes will have a damaging effect, both on their economic psychology and their political stability.

The OPEC countries stand to suffer no less from sudden change, which is likely to generate more inflation in their countries, an immense waste of human and material resources, and the accumulation of large stocks of depreciating currency. All of these can be socially and politically disruptive.

The non-oil developing countries from now on will have to bear a disproportionate share of the resulting deficits, will suffer very badly from deflation in the industrial countries, and will risk facing new barriers to their manufactured exports. Moreover, they may find it less easy than before to finance their deficits.

Finally, sudden changes may disrupt what order we still have in international currency arrangements. This is particularly likely if they produce a more rapid move out of the dollar, if the stronger countries refuse to allow their currencies to be used for reserve purposes, and if there is no other reserve system available.

Anybody can devise blueprints for dealing with this situation; the problem is to get governments to accept and act on them. International economic diplomacy is like rowing a boat through treacle. I think the most hopeful area of agreement to aim at would probably involve the consumers accepting regular small increases in price—at least indexed to inflation in the countries which provide OPEC with manufactured goods—in return for some guarantee of output from the producers.

For obvious reasons even this would be very difficult to achieve. The industrial countries are reluctant to forego the potential advantage which the market might provide, although the market for oil is liable to violent disruption. The oil producers are far from united in their attitudes and objectives—and in their ability to guarantee any particular level of output. Perhaps a small group of countries from each side could make a start—for example, the European Community and the Gulf producers. If we could create

even one precedent for such cooperation between producers and consumers, wider agreements might flow from it. If we do not try the situation is certain to deteriorate.

v

Now let me turn briefly to the effect of all this on the international monetary scene.

Even if we make some progress in conservation and in negotiating agreements with members of OPEC, the 1980s are likely to be marked by recurrent shortages in the supply of oil and continued increases in its real price. However wisely the consuming countries adjust their policies to minimize the effect of this on their rates of inflation and economic growth, it is bound to produce major divergences in their balance-of-payments performances. Recent experience suggests that when exchange rates are floating they are affected most of all by the balance of payments on current account, prospective as well as present. That is why sterling rose so much against the dollar in the last twelve months. So the 1980s are likely to be a period of great currency turbulence unless some international action is taken to control the situation.

At present, the dollar is the only major reserve asset available in the world. It now represents 40 percent of the world's reserves (62 percent if Eurodollars are included) as against six percent in the late 1940s. Diversification from the dollar is bound to continue disturbing world currencies until the dollar represents a significantly smaller proportion of the world's reserves. As I said earlier, more and more individuals, and some countries, are moving out of currencies into gold and commodities. Meanwhile, speculation on futures is becoming an important contribution to currency turbulence. From time to time it has pushed the Swiss franc up against the Deutschmark when there was absolutely no underlying economic reason for this to happen. It has also pushed sterling up against other currencies. And it is now moving into commodities, not only gold and other precious metals but into almost anything which can be stockpiled.

This type of speculation in futures can also have striking effects on the internal distribution of wealth. A leading Italian banker recently said that two years ago he could have named at least nine out of the ten richest men in Italy without the slightest difficulty. Now he could not name one: the richest men in Italy today all owe their wealth to speculation in commodity futures with money borrowed from the Euromarkets. No one with any knowledge of financial history can contemplate this type of activ-

ity without foreboding. Governments would be wise to restrict it by collective as well as national action.

Calls for control of the Euromarkets have recently become very fashionable. There is an overwhelming case for parent banks establishing prudential control over lending by their subsidiaries abroad in Eurocurrencies, under supervision by the central banks of both parent and host countries. The banking systems of the world are probably too sophisticated to remain bound by controls which go much further than that. Moreover, some of the types of wider control which are now under discussion could work only by drying up the supply of loans to finance Third World deficits, since there is at present no adequate source of official finance as an alternative. There is urgent need for action by the IMF to create new sources of official finance for their deficits. Otherwise, we could see a series of defaults which would bring the whole international banking system crashing down. Too many banks are now in the situation of a cyclist who has to choose between falling off because he puts the brake on too suddenly, or pedaling slowly over the precipice.

What was so depressing about the IMF meeting in Belgrade, as at the Tokyo Summit in June, was that these problems of international finance do not seem to have been seriously considered, apart from the useful decision to consider the creation of a substitution account. The substitution account is a proposal to replace some of the dollars held by central banks outside the United States with Special Drawing Rights. Great technical difficulties remain to be overcome if such an account is to be made attractive to the banks concerned, unless the United States is to carry the whole burden of guaranteeing its value—in which case America might just as well issue bonds on her own account. Moreover, unless a substitution account rapidly rose to a total of some \$50 billion, and then beyond, it would have little impact on the real problem. Nevertheless, it is the one constructive idea currently in play, and deserves strong support, particularly by countries like Germany and Japan which do not wish their own currencies to assume a reserve role.

One reason for this failure to confront the financial problems appears to be an altogether excessive confidence in the ability of market forces to produce the best of all possible worlds when they are free from guidance or control. But, in fact, there is no free market in currencies, since all over the world currency is regarded as a prime function of government. At the present time, of the 135 world currencies, 95 are pegged in one way or another, and

eight of the rest are in the European Monetary System (EMS).

The inadequacy of regional arrangements, however, is well illustrated by the history of the EMS. Though some see it as the first step toward monetary union, most of the member governments see it as a basis by which they can make the necessary adjustments in their exchange rates with minimum drama. There is no sign of the European Currency Unit (or ECU) developing into a reserve currency or asset. Moreover, such stability as the EMS has so far maintained depends on the stability of the dollar. Since the Deutschmark and sterling (which is part of the ECU basket though Britain does not participate in the exchange rate regime) are both currencies of refuge, the EMS can be disrupted by sharp changes in the value of the dollar in either direction unless its members are prepared to abandon control of their money supply for the sake of intervening to prevent this.

The choice is not between a free market in currencies and international regulation, but between uncoordinated national or regional controls, which may tend to increase turbulence, and some coordinated international control to reduce turbulence. As long as the industrial countries fail to produce the latter, the OPEC countries will use their monopoly power over the supply and price of oil to protect themselves as they think best, and they will be increasingly tempted to use it for political purposes. It was no accident that, because the IMF failed to address itself in Belgrade to the financial implications of the oil problem, OPEC's power was reflected only in attempts to get the Palestine Liberation Organization represented there.

VI

This is not an encouraging picture of the energy and monetary prospects. But it is not an unrealistic one. Again, I do not offer a simple answer to the problem. Anybody can draw up blueprints for a solution, and many people have. The difficulty is to find some line of approach which has a chance of attracting enough interest among the leading governments to produce serious negotiation. Perhaps the most useful advice a spokesman from the Opposition party can give to governments on external financial policy is Kant's categorical imperative: "Act only on the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." What is so bizarre at the moment is that a number of governments really believe it is the moral duty of every country to run a surplus on current account and to make its currency strong, although they know perfectly well that this is

absolutely impossible both in logic and in practice.

To the extent that we cannot get more uniformity in our domestic economic performances, we must aim at a better balance between countries with differing performances. The surplus and deficit countries, and those where currencies are depreciating or appreciating, should adopt complementary policies to produce convergence. Only 16 months ago the major governments accepted the need for complementary policies of this nature. That was the whole basis of their approach to the Bonn Summit. It was successful. The Germans did inject an extra one percent of GDP into demand; as a result their economy is much healthier this year and business confidence greater. Japan followed similar policies with similar results. On the other hand, the deficit countries followed policies to reduce or eliminate their deficits. The industrial world was moving slowly toward convergence at the end of 1978.

This year, however, everybody seems to have relapsed into a moody or cynical fatalism, relieved only in a few cases by a theological faith in the more primitive versions of monetarist theory. One can only hope that governments will at least look at the facts of the situation as it develops and reconsider their policies—or lack of them—if they are visibly failing to improve the situation. The survivors of the Second World War did so, and in three years of confident inspiration constructed our international system which brought unprecedented benefits to the whole of the free world. We desperately need some glimmer of that inspiration today.

George W. Ball

THE COMING CRISIS IN ISRAELI-AMERICAN RELATIONS

A veteran of Middle East negotiations recently said to me: "Trying to help Israel find the way to peace is like pushing a bicycle out of the path of an approaching train while the boy riding it frantically back-pedals."

The metaphor reflects the dangers of the current situation but does not explain them. A major contributing cause is the excessively ingrown and convoluted relations between Israel and the United States. Over the last 30 years these relations have evolved to the point where Israel is more dependent on the United States than ever, and yet feels itself free to take hard-line positions at variance with American views without fear of anything worse than verbal admonition from Washington. The result is to encourage Israeli positions and actions that cannot be in the long-term interest of Israel itself, and to deprive the United States in practice of freedom of diplomatic action on issues that deeply affect its national interest.

The state of the relationship between the two countries has been uneasy for some years. It is now approaching a crisis state, and unless American-Israeli relations are radically redefined—either in a closer or looser direction—the search for an Arab-Israeli peace will be completely thwarted and the interests of both nations increasingly jeopardized.

How did we get into the present situation of "dependence without responsibility"? What can we learn from the past? And, above all, what is the American national interest in the present situation, and how can our support of Israel, and our relationship with Israel, be brought into line with that national interest?

II

To those familiar only with the period since 1967, it may come as a surprise that for nearly 20 years the relations between Israel and the United States were far from being as intricately inter-

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twined as they have become since. Until 1956, America treated Israel not much differently from other friendly states. The rapid decision to recognize Israel in 1948, 11 minutes after Israel had proclaimed statehood, had been made by President Truman against the judgment of others in his government, and when, in Israel's first war, the Arabs promptly attacked the new state, the United States used United Nations machinery to bring about separate armistice agreements between Israel and the four belligerent Arab states, in 1949.

Four years later, Secretary of State Dulles directed the main thrust of his Middle East diplomacy at building a tier of defenses against the Soviet Union. To avoid prejudice to our larger Middle Eastern interests, he refused to provide arms to Israel. The guiding principle of our military assistance in the Middle East—expressed for a time in a tripartite agreement with Britain and France, signed in 1950—was to maintain an arms balance. We took no action to facilitate Israel's armament program until May 1956, when the State Department relinquished NATO priority over French military equipment to permit its diversion to Israel.

On October 29, 1956, Israel attacked Egypt in collaboration with the misbegotten Suez adventure of the French and British. Israeli forces swept across the Sinai Desert. Though America forced a cease-fire through U.N. action and insisted that all parties withdraw, Israel still sought to retain the new lands won by military conquest. On November 7, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion declared in the Knesset that, since Sinai was historically a part of Israel, Israel could not properly be said to have invaded Egypt and that the 1949 armistice agreements and the boundaries they defined were "dead and buried and will never be resurrected." Though such language anticipated that used two decades later by Prime Minister Begin with regard to the West Bank, President Eisenhower reacted far more strongly than have any of his successors, declaring unequivocally that if Israel refused to withdraw from those territories, it would "impair the friendly cooperation between our two countries." Prime Minister Ben-Gurion fell back grudgingly, withdrawing from most of the Sinai but standing fast on Gaza and Sharm-el-Shaikh.

Even though the American Jewish community strongly pressed Israel's case in Washington, Eisenhower was in no mood for haggling. If Ben-Gurion continued intransigent, the President made clear that he would not only suspend public sector assistance to Israel but would also eliminate the extraordinary tax credits and other administrative actions that facilitated private sector

assistance. Although the American Jewish community had enlisted the support of such powerful figures as the Senate Majority Leader, Lyndon Johnson, and the Senate Minority Leader, William Knowland, Eisenhower told the American people in a television speech that "if the United Nations once admits that international disputes can be settled by using force, we will have destroyed the very foundation of the organization. . . . The United Nations has no choice but to exert pressure upon Israel to comply with the withdrawal resolutions." Faced with that iron pronouncement, Ben-Gurion angrily yielded on March 1, and the last Israeli soldiers left the Sinai Peninsula on March 16, 1957.

That was the last time the United States ever took, and persisted in, forceful action against the strong wishes of an Israeli government. Alarmed by the implications of Eisenhower's action, American Jewish leaders thereafter set out to build one of Washington's most effective lobbies, which now works in close cooperation with the Israeli Embassy.

Though it is not the purpose of this article to discuss the detailed operations of that highly successful lobby, its activities cannot be ignored in any discussion of United States relations with Israel. They exert a strong and continuing influence on those relations, contributing in a major way to the constrictions imposed on American freedom of diplomatic action toward Israel. Not only do Israel's American supporters have powerful influence with many members of the Congress, but practically no actions touching Israel's interests can be taken, or even discussed, within the executive branch without it being quickly known to the Israeli government. Whenever actions are even contemplated that might conflict with Israeli policy, emissaries are promptly dispatched from Jerusalem to urge members of Congress to make known their displeasure.

I write this more in admiration than criticism. No matter how well organized the Israeli lobby might be, it would be ineffective were it not for the deep sympathy for Israel that pervades American opinion—a reaction compounded not only by grief at the Holocaust but admiration for the brilliance, courage and resourcefulness of the Israeli people.

That sympathy is reinforced by the fact that, more than most Americans, our Jewish population is admirably civic-minded, contributing, to a degree quite incommensurate with their number, not merely to the financing but also to the exhausting practice of politics. As a group, Jewish people care deeply about our country's policies, work harder, more effectively and more ideal-

istically than others in political campaigns and on congressional staffs and contribute generously of their time and wealth. In addition, they are, of course, extraordinarily talented and articulate, enriching American literature, music and the arts, and playing a major role in American media.

Still, it took some years for Israel to develop a strong political hold in Washington and during that time it had to depend extensively on other sources of help and supply. For a substantial period beginning in the mid-1950s, France provided the bulk of Israel's military equipment in furtherance of a policy that sought, through the arming of Israel, to exert pressure on Egyptian President Nasser and discourage him from helping the Algerian rebels. Through her friendship with France, Israel was able to arrange many projects of economic, technical, political, cultural and scientific cooperation—including a 22-megawatt nuclear reactor at Dimona which may greatly have assisted the building of the small nuclear arsenal that, in the view of the CIA, Israel now possesses. The French aid channel, however, did not long endure. Once General de Gaulle had settled the Algerian conflict in 1962, he turned his attention from colonies to oil, deliberately cultivating the Arab states and, after the 1967 War, halting the flow of arms to Israel.

Well before its relations with France had begun to loosen, Israel had grown closer to America. The Suez affair had largely destroyed Britain's Middle East position, leaving the United States to carry the burden of defending Western interests throughout the area. Since Nasser had turned to the Soviets for arms, Secretary Dulles had written him off as beyond redemption, while, at the same time, shifting American policy toward strengthening Israel against possible Arab encroachments. Adopting de Gaulle's earlier strategy for his own purposes, Dulles decided that a strong Israel could, by holding down the bulk of Egypt's armed forces, restrict Nasser's freedom of action.

The election of President Kennedy in 1960 greatly strengthened America's ties to Israel. When Nasser began to arm Egypt further in connection with the Yemen War, Kennedy inaugurated a new phase in Israeli-American relations by publicly approving Israel's purchase of Hawk surface-to-air missiles. In 1963, he told Foreign Minister Golda Meir in Washington that the United States viewed Israel as an ally, though that alliance has never been confirmed by treaty.

Spurred on by the growing political influence of pro-Israel organizations, the consolidation of relations continued into Presi-

dent Johnson's era. Wishing to offset the increasing armaments Egypt and other Arab states were receiving from the Soviet Union, President Johnson continued and extended a policy of rectifying the military balance between Israel and the totality of Arab states. He agreed to provide Israel for the first time with offensive weapons—large quantities of tanks and fighter bombers—and not merely the defensive equipment previous administrations had authorized. And the United States became Israel's sole source of arms, as well as the most important contributor of economic and financial assistance, both public and private.

But, though by now the United States constantly spoke of Israel as its "ally," Israel rejected the practice of consultation that an alliance relationship normally involves, fiercely insisting on its freedom of decision and action. The events of the spring of 1967 leading up to the Six-Day War highlighted the difficulties of the relationship, on both sides. There is evidence that, in the face of Nasser's buildup and the activity of Palestinian *fedayeen* from Egypt, Israel was looking for an excuse for preemptive action. But equally there can be no question that Nasser forced the issue by recklessly marching troops into the Sinai, requesting the withdrawal of the U.N. peacekeeping force there, and finally closing the Gulf of Aqaba (which was Israel's lifeline) not only to Israeli ships but to all ships carrying "strategic material" to Israel.

In response to these developments, America, in Israel's view, failed to act quickly enough to fulfill the promise implied in statements made by Secretary Dulles in 1956, during the sweeping up after Suez. In order to persuade Ben-Gurion to accept Israeli withdrawal from Sharm-el-Shaikh, Dulles had told him that, since the Gulf of Aqaba comprehended "international waters," the United States was prepared, on behalf of American registry vessels, to exercise the right of free and innocent passage "and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right." Though that language was less than a commitment to secure Israel's rights, the Israeli government tended to regard it as such, and considered America's diplomatic efforts in this direction too slow. Thus, Israel went ahead on its own and launched the war—just on the day before the American Vice President was to arrive in Cairo and Egypt's Vice President was to arrive in Washington. As had occurred in 1956, the United States was caught off guard quite as much as the Arabs by Israel's attack. Israel, for its part, not only felt vindicated by the triumphant outcome of the war but confirmed in the belief that only independent Israeli judgments and actions could assure its security.

Among other army units that entered the combat this time were Jordan's, for, on May 30, 1967, King Hussein of Jordan had visited Cairo and signed a treaty of joint defense there, placing his armed forces under Egyptian command in time of war. For Hussein—and, indeed, for future world peace—that proved a disastrous mistake; though Jordan's forces were easily repulsed by the Israelis, their involvement in the 1967 War provided Israel the occasion to seize East Jerusalem and occupy the West Bank, where its forces have been ever since. In addition, Israel vastly increased the territory under its control by occupying the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and the whole of the Sinai Peninsula all the way to the Suez Canal. Though the Sinai was an empty desert and few lived on the tiny acreage of the Golan Heights, occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip imposed the Israeli Army on what are now more than 1,200,000 Palestinians, while driving out others in a second Palestinian diaspora.

At the time, the Johnson Administration, deeply preoccupied by the struggle in Vietnam, was anxious to avoid entanglement in another faraway conflict. But since, as Majority Leader, President Johnson had opposed Eisenhower's decision in 1956, he was not prepared to press Israel for an immediate withdrawal from the conquered territories. Thus, although the U.N. Security Council, after much labor, finally produced Resolution 242 in December 1967, Johnson tended to accept Israel's continued occupation of the newly conquered territories pending an Arab willingness to make peace.

I know from personal experience that Israel's ambition to retain the West Bank had not then acquired anything approaching its present intensity. While visiting Jerusalem in July 1968, as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, I was authorized by Prime Minister Eshkol to tell King Hussein that, in return for peace, Israel would be prepared to return the West Bank with minor modification to his authority. Hussein, however, was not at the time a free agent. The Arabs had reacted to their humiliating defeat in the 1967 War with the so-called Khartoum Declaration, in which the parties had pledged themselves to "no peace with Israel, no negotiations with Israel, no recognition of Israel and maintenance of the rights of Palestinian people in their nation." Feeling bound by that agreement and fearing Nasser's reprisals, King Hussein was in no position even to discuss a separate peace. It was an unfortunate conjunction, for, had Israel then been able to negotiate the return of the West Bank, the Palestinian issue would by now have been largely forgotten.

What, then, was the state of U.S.-Israeli relations at that time?

Americans had responded with admiration to Israel's brilliant sweep across the desert and its victories on its northern front. It was not merely that we like a winner (we had no sympathy with Hitler in his blitzkrieg against France), but that Israel, a tiny country, had retained its image as the underdog, and Americans have always preferred David to Goliath. Particularly among Israel's friends there was a feeling of euphoria, while support for Israel manifested itself not only in effusive praise but in greatly increased private sector contributions. America's official relations with Israel also drew progressively closer, with our military and economic aid mounting by 1973 to over \$400 million.

The years from 1969 to 1973, then, saw a continued stalemate on any progress toward peace, with Israel dug in against even formal acceptance of any return of the conquered territories so long as the Arabs, and principally Nasser, refused to recognize the state of Israel. The Jarring mission foundered on these issues, as did the abortive Rogers Plan introduced by the United States in late 1969 (after a fruitless attempt to engage the Russians in constructive negotiations).

But along the way, in connection with these developments and the mini-war that raged through much of 1969 and 1970, the Nixon Administration both worked at cross purposes with itself—with Nixon and Kissinger effectively sabotaging the peace negotiations of Secretary Rogers and Assistant Secretary Sisco—and blunted the possible leverage on Israeli attitudes of any withholding of military equipment from Israel. On at least two occasions, such equipment was deferred, but in a halfhearted way and with the Administration finally yielding and failing to follow through. The result was to confirm the Israelis in the belief that in the last analysis the United States would accept hard-line Israeli approaches to peace without throwing into question any of the elements of American support. Though Mrs. Meir, in her memoirs, writes as though she had modified her stands significantly in order to retain full American support, particularly military equipment, she was not seriously asked to give up anything substantial. And one then member of the Israeli government, Menachem Begin, drew—as we shall see below—his own even more emphatic conclusion that Israel could count on the United States to give full aid and support no matter what Israel did.

III

Just as twice before Israel had taken its Arab enemies by surprise, the Arabs in October 1973, began Israel's fourth war by catching it off balance, crossing the Suez Canal and attacking

with a ferocity that astonished the world's military experts. For a few days, Israel seemed in deadly peril and was saved only by America's massive airlift.

The war altered the relative strength of nations in the Middle East to an extent we are only now beginning to comprehend. For the Arabs, it marked the beginning of a new age—not only because their soldiers had demonstrated to the world formidable fighting qualities (thus exorcising their obsession with the humiliation of 1967), but also because the oil embargo, shortly followed by the OPEC price actions, precipitated a major shift in the economic and political power balance in the whole area. Freed of the drive for revenge, the Arab governments could now concentrate on the potential opened for them by their new oil wealth. For the first time since the creation of Israel, they could seriously contemplate peace. The Arab nations no longer insisted on the destruction of Israel; they were now prepared to bargain directly with that state for the relinquishment of territories conquered in 1967.

At the heart of the quarrel was Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Even though the Palestinians were not popular in all Arab quarters, since some Arab leaders resented the intrusion of the Palestinian question, no Arab nation could ignore them. Palestinians were dispersed over the whole map of Araby. Unusually intelligent and educated, many held high places in Arab governments, commerce and industry and they were not prepared to let their Arab brothers forget the unhappy plight of their people. Meanwhile, the problem of the Palestinians had acquired a new focus. Almost three decades had elapsed since the first Palestinian diaspora in 1948 and 1949 and many of those who had fled at that time were now too old to expect to return to their homeland. But the survivors of the 1967 War—people who were driven out or had fled the West Bank and Gaza Strip or who still lived there under Israeli army rule—saw the problem in a different light. What they wanted was an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, as required by Resolution 242, and firm agreement on self-determination for the Palestinians, with the possibility of a separate Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.

Just as the 1973 War changed the mind-set of the Arab leaders, it also caused many Israelis to reexamine their national predicament. Prior to the war, most were becoming increasingly convinced that time was working on their side. If Israel could hold on long enough to the territory it had taken in 1967, the world, they

thought, would ultimately accept the new boundaries as accomplished facts, while the Arabs would have neither the unity nor the competence to dislodge them. But the October War shot that calculation to bits. Since the Arabs had fought better than anyone had expected, the Israelis began to ask themselves whether time was still working on their side—if, indeed, it had ever been. No one could any longer take it for granted that three million Israelis would be able forever to stand off 100 million hostile Arabs—or, for that matter, that a massive American airlift would always be available—while the phenomenal upward march in oil prices increased the danger by assuring the Arabs of unlimited funds for armaments as well as formidable economic leverage. Many Israelis privately expressed the view that some form of political accommodation was necessary just when the key Arab nations, with their pride restored, also adopted a more flexible stance. Serious progress toward a settlement on all fronts seemed possible.

Meanwhile, with a cease-fire announced on October 24, 1973, it became urgent business to separate the hostile forces on the battlefields. With the Egyptian Third Army Corps cut off from supplies and the Gulf of Aqaba blockaded, hostilities might recommence at any moment. Secretary Kissinger undertook to achieve the necessary redeployment by intense activity as guide and intermediary in successive bilateral discussions, first between Egypt and Israel, then Syria and Israel. Time was of the essence since disengagement had been made a condition to lifting the oil embargo.

Up to this point, events had largely dictated the direction of America's Middle East policy, but in mid-1974, after the key disengagement agreements with Egypt and Syria, the situation offered alternatives. One would have been for the Secretary of State to try to work out an agreement with Jordan, which would require that Israel pull back some distance from the Jordan River and would thus raise the sticky Palestinian question. Though Kissinger had little enthusiasm for this prospect, the issue was resolved for him when, in an Arab summit conference at Rabat on October 28, 1974, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was endorsed as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The failure to come to grips with the West Bank problem—when real progress, or even a lasting answer, might have been possible—was surely due also to the resistance of an uneasy Rabin government in Israel.

Thus, Kissinger decided to resume shuttle diplomacy with Egypt, which desperately wanted a truce with the Israelis. The

latter course offered promise of a speedier result, for, outside of the Abu Rudeis oil fields, the Sinai Desert had only military significance and, in spite of the Israeli tendency to equate security with real estate, adequate defense arrangements could be devised. It seemed likely that the relinquishment of at least part of the desert might be arranged fairly quickly through a discrete negotiation that avoided the hard substantive issues, such as the Golan Heights or Jerusalem or the Palestinians, which engaged deep emotions resulting from long-held grievances or from religious passions or from fear. Some also saw advantages in a bilateral deal with Cairo that might divide the Arab world and neutralize Egypt, which contains one-third of the Arab people and has historically posed the greatest military threat to Israel.

Even with Sadat's good will, the negotiation of the Sinai II agreements in 1975 proved a formidable task, breaking down in March, primarily because the Israelis refused to accept anything less than a declaration of full non-belligerency on the part of Egypt. The Rabin government in Jerusalem seemed too weak to agree to a realistic compromise and both Kissinger and President Ford felt angry and frustrated.

Since Kissinger strongly felt and said—at least in private—that the breakdown had been due largely to Israeli intransigence, President Ford ordered a “reassessment” of America's foreign policy toward the Middle East while arms deliveries to Israel were slowed down or in some cases deferred pending the outcome.

At this point the pro-Israeli lobby dramatically intervened, inducing 76 Senators (three-fourths of the Senate) to sign a letter to President Ford, dated May 21, referring to the reassessment and admonishing him to “be responsive to Israel's urgent military and economic needs,” and “to make clear, as we do, that the United States, acting in its own national interests, stands firmly with Israel in the search for peace in future negotiations” As a spectacular demonstration of political muscle achieved by the application of enormous pressure including threats of reprisal, this letter has become a legend even on Capitol Hill where pressure from one interest group or another is an elemental part of the legislative process. Moreover, it was followed by a confirming event later in the summer when the lobby humiliated both Kissinger and King Hussein by inducing the Senate to block the sale of Hawk missiles (a defensive anti-aircraft weapon) to Jordan.

Impressed by such heavy cannonading on the domestic front, Kissinger abandoned any attempt to seek a solution for the substantive problems, letting it be known instead that he was ready to resume the negotiations.

Meanwhile, Israeli leaders had been having second thoughts. If Israel could not obtain from Egypt an explicit non-belligerency declaration but only what Kissinger referred to as its “functional equivalent,” it could still ask a high price from America for its willingness to show flexibility. And what a price it exacted! In a sense, the Sinai II agreement of September 1975 amounted to a vast real estate deal in which the United States bought a slice of the Sinai Desert from Israel for a huge financial and political consideration and then paid Egypt for accepting it.

The commitments that America made consisted, among other things, of the following:

- The U. S. government and the government of Israel would conclude a contingency plan for a military supply operation to Israel in an emergency situation;

- The U. S. government would seek to prevent proposals which it and Israel agreed were detrimental to the interests of Israel;

- The United States would be resolved to maintain Israel’s defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft, and would undertake a joint study of high-technology and sophisticated items, including Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads, with a view to giving a positive response;

- The United States would not recognize or negotiate with the PLO so long as the PLO did not recognize Israel’s right to exist and did not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;

- The U.S. government would consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy with regard to the PLO at the Geneva Peace Conference;

- The United States would, for five years, make oil available to meet all the “normal requirements” of Israel if Israel was not able to obtain it elsewhere, and to provide the funds to pay the costs of imported oil that it might otherwise have obtained from the oil fields it was turning over to Egypt;

- The United States would establish two surveillance stations in the Sinai, managed by 200 U.S. civilians.

These were some of the specific promises, but in addition the United States agreed on “an ongoing and long-term basis” to “make every effort to be fully responsive” to “Israel’s military equipment and other defense requirements, to its energy requirements and to its economic needs.” Though no specific figures were mentioned, this was generally regarded at the time as a commitment for the next ten years, at a general level somewhere around \$2 billion a year.

That was a staggering list. Not only did America accept serious

restrictions on its freedom of action in negotiating for a settlement of the Palestinian issue, but, if it paid so much for a limited acreage in the Sinai, how much would it have to pay for a settlement of the hard substantive issues?

IV

Thereafter, when President Carter took office at the beginning of 1977, he quite properly perceived the primacy of the issue of the Palestinians and their need for a homeland. Though he saw quite clearly that this issue could be resolved only with the involvement of effective Palestinian spokesmen, he was precluded from dealing with the PLO by the Sinai II commitment, which, after some hesitancy, he felt obliged to reaffirm.

His first year of encounter with the baffling problems of the Middle East was eventful: Menachem Begin became Israel's Prime Minister; efforts were made to get a Geneva Conference under way; President Sadat made his historic trip to Jerusalem; and Prime Minister Begin put forward a plan for limited autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The Sadat visit, made without the knowledge or approval of other Arab leaders, split the Arab world in two, while, in seeking to exploit the possibilities opened up by the Sadat visit, the United States assumed once more the role of mediating between Egypt and Israel in a constricting bilateral framework.

Even so, President Carter repeatedly stated—as did President Sadat—that he would not be content merely with peace between Egypt and Israel, but that the settlement must include progress toward a Palestinian solution. Yet effective progress on that central issue required the involvement of representatives who could speak with authority for the Palestinian people. Though an ingenious arrangement was proposed to create such spokesmen by an electoral process, that proved unrealistic in view of the pressures and tensions in the area.

Nevertheless, the President did not abandon his efforts to expand the scope of the negotiation, and at Camp David, in September 1978, he pressed as far as he felt able—within the constraints of the Israeli-American relationship as by then defined—to exact concessions from Begin that would make progress possible with regard to the occupied areas. Sadat was apparently persuaded to go along with Begin's grudging concessions by the impression that President Carter would take stronger steps to secure the broadening of the settlement than the President subsequently found feasible.

What has happened since the President's spectacular diplomacy at Camp David is well known. In the desire to obtain some agreement as tangible consideration for the prestige and effort he committed, the President finally settled for a document that did not offer nearly enough to attract Palestinian support or the support of Jordan or Syria. Since then, the Begin government, having secured peace with Egypt, has been progressively narrowing the scope of even its Camp David offers. What was originally referred to as an "autonomy plan" has been so reduced by subsequent Israeli statements that it now appears as little more than a proposal to regroup occupation forces, with a small sweetener of local self-government. At the same time, Prime Minister Begin and his colleagues have made clear that they have no intention of giving up the West Bank, to which they claim title based on an Old Testament grant more than 2,000 years old. Beyond an Egyptian-Israeli agreement, therefore, it now seems apparent that the negotiations are going nowhere. They will, according to America's recent chief negotiator, Robert Strauss, not be concluded by the May 1980 target date, though presumably the Administration will try to keep them going in a routine way until after the presidential election.

In the flow of statements emanating from the Begin government, it is impossible to detect any long-range plans for dealing with the occupied areas. Repeatedly in the past the individualism manifest in Israeli democracy and the impossibility of gaining any broad agreement for a new initiative has led to immobilism and that is now the situation. Though more and more Israelis may be privately—and even publicly—taking a more realistic view of their nation's future, the current government is quite clearly incapable of a constructive initiative.

How, then, does the Begin Government foresee the future? It is unrealistic to believe that Israel, which has maintained a military occupation over 1,200,000 Palestinians for the past 12 years, can continue that role indefinitely. With violence increasing and Arab strength expanding, the attempt to maintain the status quo offers only a sad and bloody future. Nor is it reasonable to believe that the American people will be prepared indefinitely to subsidize this Israeli brand of colonialism so far out of tune with present-day opinion.

Yet, if maintaining the status quo is a prescription for disaster, what are the alternatives?

The platform of Mr. Begin's party calls for annexing the occupied areas. But, even if that could be achieved without

precipitating war with other Arab states, demographic realities would defeat it. If the Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were added to the 500,000 already in Israel, more than one-third the total population would be Arab, and, since the Arab population is increasing at twice the rate of the Israeli, the proportion would, within a relatively few years, amount to 50 percent. That would certainly call into question the concept of a Jewish national home, particularly since Israel is now losing population by net emigration.

What some in the Begin government seem wistfully to hope, however, is that, by its current settlements policy, Israel can persuade more and more Arabs to leave the West Bank. There is some basis for this belief; during the past year, something over 22,000 Palestinians did leave, and, to the extent that the settlements policy preempts the best land and water facilities, it could, over time, be expected to hasten that emigration. Already Israel has taken over one-third of the West Bank's irrigation waters.

The Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Ariel Sharon, who is in charge of the settlements policy, told me two years ago that he expected there to be 2,000,000 Israelis in the West Bank by the turn of the century. When I asked him how that was demographically possible, he replied that by the year 2000 the total Israeli population would rise to 4,200,000. When I pursued the question as to what would happen to the Palestinians, who would be increasing at a much faster rate, he broke off the conversation.

Obviously, I am not suggesting that all Israelis advocate the tactics of the American cowbird, which lays its eggs in other birds' nests with the chicks then forcing the other eggs out. There is every variety of opinion in Israel, including a growing element who feel, as does Israel's former Foreign Minister Abba Eban, that

Israel's urgent need is to grasp that the avoidance of Israeli rule over the million Palestine Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza is not only a concession by Israel to her adversaries, but also a service that Israel should render to her own interest and destiny.

But, given such a diversity of opinion, all that emerges from a search for an Israeli policy toward the occupied areas is a profusion of vaguely defined hopes and ambitions compounded by the fear that any solution of the problem would endanger Israeli security. Unhappily, the extraordinary factionalism that characterizes Israeli democracy tends to reduce policy in operative terms to its lowest common denominator, and its lowest common denominator means simply a continuance of the status quo in the vague hope that something good will come out of it.

In short, the current position of the Israeli government offers no hope whatever of progress toward resolution of the problems of the West Bank and Gaza, the core of the Palestinian issue which in turn is the key to a lasting peace. Not only is no progress in sight, but Israel keeps on expanding settlements on the West Bank, it renews permission for Israelis to buy West Bank land (in circumstances where any such purchases are bound to have an element of coercion), and in southern Lebanon—in the name of retaliation for terrorist raids—it conducts a policy of savage and wide-ranging air attacks that inflict casualties out of all proportion to the occasions. Both in the West Bank and in southern Lebanon, Arabs can hardly be blamed for believing that Israel is engaged in a deliberate policy of expansion and consolidation.

For reasons I shall expand on in a moment, such actions by Israel are profoundly antithetic not only to American interests and to American moral principles, but also as to the interests of Israel itself. Yet Israel consistently rebuffs Washington's protests and also our efforts to move the negotiating process forward by the quiet diplomacy of Cyrus Vance, Robert Strauss, and now Sol Linowitz. Why is this?

Is it because Israel, having made peace with Egypt and thus removed the major Arab military force from the balance, no longer needs the assurance of American military aid in enormous quantities, with additional sophisticated items as a "worst-case" argument for them appears? Apparently not, for Israel keeps on urging that the United States supply more F-15 fighter-bombers, more F-16 fighters, and similar items. Plainly, Israel still feels that it needs vast American military help.

Nor is its economic dependence decreasing; on the contrary, Israel's economy is deteriorating at a shocking pace. With inflation running at a rate approaching 100 percent, Israel's economic statistics are unique in the world; no other nation's economy even vaguely resembles it.¹ No other country has a national budget

¹ For a detailed and objective discussion, see Ann Crittenden, "Israel's Economic Plight," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979, pp. 1005–1016.

I am indebted to Dr. Douglas Ball for certain historical information that dramatically illustrates the state of the Israeli economy. At the time of the Israeli declaration of independence in 1948, both the Palestinian pound (which also circulated in parts of what later became Jordan) and the pounds being circulated by the Anglo-Palestinian Bank were at par with the British pound, then quoted at \$4.06. Both the new Jordanian dinar (issued by the new Bank of Jordan) and the Israeli pound then followed sterling down to \$2.80 per pound in the 1950s. Thereafter, there was a steady divergence, with the Israeli pound steadily sinking until by September of 1979, the dinar was quoted at \$3.333, while the Israeli pound was quoted at .03333, or one hundredth of the dinar.

that is almost as high as its GNP, or an external debt that is roughly equal to its GNP. In fact, its external debt per capita is now the highest in the world, while its balance of payments deficit for this year will amount to \$4.5 billion. It would be hard to find another country that commits 40 percent or more of its GNP to defense, which illustrates the point that the expansion of its territory as a result of the 1967 War did not mean that it could rest in peace behind "secure borders"; far from it, it accelerated the defense drain, with the result that between 1967 and 1978 its defense costs have enormously increased.

Obviously, Israel's extravagant rate of national expenditure has been at the cost of its economic development. Ever since the 1973 War, its economy has been nearly stagnant, while the Israeli people are the most highly taxed in the world. Thus, it is hardly surprising that, in spite of the government's vigorous efforts to promote immigration, more people have been leaving the country during the past three or four years than have been entering it.

Today Israel is able to continue on its present course only because of continued vast subsidies from the United States. Distasteful as it must be to Israelis, the nation has become a ward—a kind of welfare dependent—of America. The United States is providing annual subsidies out of the public sector that amount to the equivalent of \$7,500 a year for every Jewish family—or, in other words, every five persons—and those subsidies will be substantially increased before America finishes paying the costs of Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. In addition, of course, there are the huge sums paid every year to Israel out of the admirable generosity of the American Jewish community, on a scale without precedent in history.

So Israel's hard-line policies and total rejection of American advice are not due to some newfound independence from any need for American support. On the contrary, such dependence has now reached the point of totality.

Rather, one must ask, is it the very scale of this dependence—necessarily irksome to a proud and brilliant people—that makes Israelis so resistant to American suggestions? Perhaps a good psychologist could make the case that when, through force of circumstances, any nation (or person) has become heavily dependent on a larger and more powerful entity (or parent), the only way to assert one's continuing identity—to maintain one's self-respect—is to strike back at the nation (or parent) on whom one depends, hard and often.

Yet I doubt if this is a satisfactory explanation. The Israelis are

influenced by many factors other than their American connection. They see themselves as beleaguered, and the judgment of beleaguered nations or peoples is often distorted and lacking in perspective.

Rather, I think one must give great weight to the simple politician's explanation. Why should Israel not pursue its own course, when Israelis have been so long conditioned to expect that America will support their country, no matter how often it disregards American advice and protests and America's own interests, that both sides now accept this extraordinary ritual dancing as quite normal?

That this is the view of Prime Minister Begin is confirmed by his own words. In her autobiography, *My Life*, Golda Meir discusses the cease-fire proposed by Secretary of State Rogers in 1970, which called for discussions of a settlement based on Israel's withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, as required by Resolution 242. Mr. Begin's party, the Gahal, which was then in the government, insisted that the Israeli defense forces must remain on the cease-fire lines until peace was attained; they refused to agree to any negotiation on the subject of withdrawal until there was peace. Mrs. Meir then wrote:

"But we won't have any cease-fire unless we also accept some of the less favorable conditions," I tried to explain repeatedly to Mr. Begin. "And what's more, we won't get any arms from America." "What do you mean, we won't get arms?" he used to say. "We'll *demand* them from the Americans." I couldn't get it through to him that although the American commitment to Israel's survival was certainly great, we needed Mr. Nixon and Mr. Rogers much more than they needed us, and Israel's policies couldn't be based entirely on the assumption that American Jewry either would or could force Mr. Nixon to adopt a position against his will or better judgment. But Gahal, intoxicated by its own rhetoric, had convinced itself that all we had to do was to go on telling the United States that we wouldn't give in to any pressure whatsoever, and if we did this long enough and loud enough, one day that pressure would just vanish.

In the minds of Israeli leaders, the test of American friendship would thus appear to be our unquestioning willingness to continue our heavy subsidy, however aberrant Israeli policies may seem. Israel's former Foreign Minister, General Moshe Dayan, made that clear recently when he praised the Carter Administration as Israel's great friend, pointing out that, even though there had been some harsh exchanges, the Carter Administration had never once made a threat to slow down the outpouring of economic and military aid to Israel.

Obviously, that attitude does not make for a healthy relation-

ship between our countries. So long as we accept that unflattering assessment of ourselves—and confirm it by our actions—the Israelis will have little respect for America or the strength and character of the American people.

VI

From an American standpoint, the simple present facts are that (1) both our national interests and our moral principles now require a speedy settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict; (2) progress toward such a settlement is, and has been since 1973, possible on terms that would protect the survival and long-term status of Israel in the Middle East far better than any futile effort to protect the status quo; (3) it is, at this stage at least, Israel that is blocking the unfolding of a process of settlement that might meet both Israeli and American interests in both the short and long term.

We have already addressed the third of these points. Let us take the other two in order. Since 1973, nothing has changed in the outlines of a reasonable Arab-Israeli settlement: what made sense then still makes sense; what was in accord with both the American commitment to Israel and to American—and world—sentiment about the need to accord the Palestinians self-determination is still the same. What almost any thoughtful American (or group of Americans) would suggest as the terms of peace today does not differ from what such an individual or group might have suggested five or ten years ago.² The Carter outline for peace (or the Connally one, for that matter) is essentially the same as what President Johnson or President Nixon would have regarded as reasonable. America has not sold its soul for oil—although there was unfortunate language in Governor Connally's October statement that seemed to make a connection between oil and the substance (as opposed to the timing) of a peaceful settlement.

Yet there *has* clearly been an important change since 1973. If the neutralization of Egypt has changed the balance of military power in the area, the world oil crisis has changed the political balance. Prior to 1973, it was possible for the United States to pursue a policy of complaisance toward Israel with only marginal

² See, for example, the outline of a settlement set forth by John C. Campbell, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An American Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1970, pp. 60–61; the similar outline in Stanley Hoffmann, "A New Policy for Israel," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1975, pp. 422–27; and, of course, the outline presented by a Study Group under the auspices of the Brookings Institution in the summer of 1976. The latter is sometimes said to have played a large part in the Carter Administration's approach. In fact, its central points, including Palestinian self-determination, had been widely accepted by most objective American observers in and out of government for several years previously.

concern for its own interests. Since the rise of OPEC as a major factor in world affairs, America's interests have become vitally and directly involved in a speedy settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Already, the splitting of the Arab world by Camp David has created tensions and complications in our relations not merely with Saudi Arabia but with the other oil-producing states as well. That has been given increased importance by the disappearance of Iran as a reliable oil supplier.

Unless we make prompt and serious progress toward solving the Palestinian problem, we can expect to see our energy needs increasingly hostage to our Middle East policies. Once it is clear that the Camp David talks have ground to a halt with no progress on a Palestinian solution and we have launched no new negotiating initiative, the more activist Arab states will bring enormous pressure on Saudi Arabia to use its oil production for political purposes. Anyone who believes that the Saudis can easily resist that pressure does not understand the significance of what occurred at the Baghdad meeting of October 1978, when the Saudis were reluctantly forced to go along with a decision to cut off subsidy funds for Egypt. Not that the Saudi government would explain a curtailment in explicit political terms—that is not its style. Instead, we could expect a progressive reduction of Saudi production—attributed, perhaps, to technical reasons. That is a realistic prediction, and it is time we pondered its implications not only for America but for all non-communist oil-consuming nations.

If our country is to advance and protect its interests in the Middle East, we must carefully define those interests. We must be quite clear at the outset that our interests are not always congruent with the Begin government's perception of Israel's national interests. Thus we must unravel the tangled skein that intertwines our interests with Israel's, or we shall lose control of policy even more than is now the case.

America's overriding interest in the Middle East is to promote peace in the area, and particularly an early peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors. There are many reasons for this.

The first is that America needs to establish lasting friendly relations with the Arab states that are becoming increasingly significant elements in the economic life of the world. Yet today, as the acknowledged friend of Israel, we are politically hobbled so long as Israel is at odds with its Arab neighbors. If the enemy of my enemy is my friend, it is also true in Arab thinking that the friend of my enemy is my enemy. Thus, so long as there is hostility

between Israel and Arab, we shall suffer severe disabilities in developing relationships that are becoming increasingly important.

Second, we need to keep the Middle East out of the communist orbit. That requires not only that there be peace between Israel and the Arab world but that we avoid those divisive issues that set Arab states against one another and thus invite them to play one superpower against the other. Recently, in our efforts to promote peace between Israel and Egypt, we have contributed to the polarization of the Arab world. The result is to force such activist nations as Iraq and Syria to rely on the Soviet Union as their principal arms supplier. It creates extreme pressures on Saudi Arabia to choose up sides between two sets of Arab nations at the cost of internal dangers. Particularly now that the Soviets have beachheads in the Horn of Africa and South Yemen, America must do everything possible to sustain and strengthen the nations on the littoral of the Gulf, which is at the moment the strategic heart of the world.

It is here one must note a point that I think is often misconstrued or misunderstood. In the past, there was at least one occasion—the *fedayeen* and Syrian attack on Jordan in September 1970—when Israeli military forces played a crucial role in preserving Middle East stability. And, so long as Iran was governed by the Shah who was friendly to Israel, it was at least arguable that the military power of Israel, in tandem with Iran's, was a general force for stability.

Today, however, with Iran in a militantly anti-Israel posture that is unlikely soon to change, there is no possibility whatever of Israel playing any useful part in the direct military or strategic sense. Last February, when Secretary of Defense Harold Brown visited Saudi Arabia and other countries to see what could be done to assist in the face of Soviet incursions (including the then raging South Yemen attack on North Yemen), his mission was told in the most categorical terms that any project that involved Israeli territory or forces would be highly disruptive.

The blunt fact, then, is that so long as Israel holds on to the occupied territories, and especially so long as it seems to be seeking to consolidate its hold on the West Bank for the long term, its impact on the stability of the Middle East will be wholly negative. Only if those conditions change can Israel hope for genuine acceptance in the area, or for any possibility of useful economic or security relations with its neighbors.

None of this, of course, means any change in the basic American

position toward the survival of Israel. Our commitment to Israel's security is an integral part of American policy and we should do nothing to qualify that commitment. That does not mean, however, that we should leave any ambiguity as to its application. We are pledged to secure the territorial integrity of Israel within approximately its pre-1967 boundaries, not an expanded Israel that includes the occupied territories.

At the same time, we should emphasize to the Israeli government that Israel can never achieve lasting security through superior military force or the pledge of a friendly power; it can be safe only by establishing peaceful relations with its neighbors.

VII

What are the concrete immediate policies to which this analysis points? They must start with the United States insisting that Israel cease its settlements policy. That policy, in the view of American authorities, is a flagrant violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which provides that "the occupying power shall not deport or transfer part of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies." When we continually condone conduct that not merely offends our sense of legality but undercuts progress toward an objective that vitally concerns our national interest, we are acting in a manner unbecoming a great nation.

The settlements policy discredits any Israeli claim to an ultimate peace, confirming the deep—and probably well-founded—suspicions of Israel's Arab neighbors that at least substantial elements in the Israeli government have expansionist ambitions. It is a major impediment to the attainment of peace, and we must categorically insist that it be stopped. So long as we continue our subsidy while Israel flouts our futile protests, we not only support illegality but look both impotent and absurd.

Second, the current negotiations in the West Bank and Gaza must be completed by their May 1980 deadline in such a way as to assure elections that will lead on to genuine Palestinian participation in the major governing functions of the area. Under the Camp David agreements, this would mean an agreed transition period of genuine but limited autonomy.

The Camp David agreements implied (and President Carter clearly intended) that the process, once it got under way, must inevitably lead to self-determination by the Palestinians at the end of the transition period. But this was not categorically specified in the agreements—doubtless because it seemed too much for

Menachem Begin (and perhaps the Israeli public) to swallow in one gulp.

It is a familiar negotiating technique to avoid crossing bridges in this manner, and to trust that unfolding events will provide the answer needed. And if it had not been for the upheaval in Iran, which tended to stiffen both Arab and Israeli positions, it might have worked here. *If* the Israeli-Egyptian treaty had been concluded by December 1978, *if* Israel had then taken forthcoming positions in the West Bank negotiations, *if* incidents relating to Lebanese territory had not continued—then the prospect of self-determination at the end of the road might today be clear enough.

Unfortunately, the reverse happened, and today self-determination remains an American position but not an agreed one with Israel. And President Carter (doubtless under Israeli pressure) has qualified his support for the principle by saying that he opposes an independent Palestinian state.

I do not know what the chances are that a genuine exercise of self-determination by the Palestinians would produce a choice for an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza. Some form of federation with Jordan would seem more practical. But I do know that the more Israeli spokesmen rail against an independent state as intolerable—while continuing to block even the most limited steps toward autonomy—the more they feed sentiment for just such a state, not only among Palestinians but among ruling elites in Arab countries. Whatever their private reservations may be, such elites cannot help supporting the Palestinians so long as the Israeli position denies any prospect of self-determination, while the American position remains one of “self-determination, but no fair choosing a separate state.”

Thus, the only answer—and it is needed soon—is an unqualified acceptance of ultimate self-determination. Though the Palestinian leaders—including the PLO—would probably be prepared to accept even five years of limited autonomy, they would do so only on the agreed condition that it was a prelude to self-determination.

Here, again, we encounter a refusal to face reality, since Camp David has already demonstrated the futility of trying to find a West Bank solution under procedures that exclude the PLO.

That the PLO is guilty of obscene acts of terrorism, no one can deny. Nor can anyone committed to the humane principles of the West help but find terrorism totally repulsive. But if it would be both stupid and evil to condone terrorism, one should try to identify its roots—and terrorism has historically been a psychotic response to military occupation. The way to remove terrorism is

to remove the cause, since the longer the conditions that produce such a response are permitted to continue, the more difficult will be its eradication. It is dangerous to let a whole generation grow up conditioned to terrorism as a way of life.³

If we are to get on seriously with the attainment of a peaceful settlement, we must face the realization that the great bulk of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip recognize no legitimate spokesman but the PLO. That is an inevitable result of Israeli policies; for the Israeli army, by suppressing all political discussion and organization in the occupied areas, has precluded the development of a more moderate alternative.

Perhaps, so, some will say, but we still cannot deal with the PLO's leaders until they have accepted Resolution 242. Thus we create our own impasse. The agreement to revise those provisions of the PLO protocols that call for the destruction of Israel is for the PLO leaders their only available bargaining chip. They will give it up only in exchange for a promise of self-determination to the Palestinian peoples at the end of an appropriate process. It is the old question of what must come first, and experience has shown a thousand times that the answer can be found only through simultaneous offers.

If there is to be peace, we must, therefore, return to the principle of self-determination we have long espoused yet have extended only in a qualified way to Palestine. Only when we advance that principle without qualification, recognizing that any qualification contradicts the principle, can we ever hope to gain the support of other Arab states which have themselves accepted Resolution 242; only then can we expect the peoples now living in the West Bank and Gaza strip to respond in a manner that will enable the more moderate leaders of the PLO to agree to participate in a serious diplomatic effort.

Insisting on self-determination, of course, places the burden on us to find means to assure the security of Israel. But by combining a number of measures the solution to that problem should not be

³ That those who go through a passing phase of terrorism can become responsible leaders once their cause is achieved is shown by the experience of Prime Minister Begin himself. The Irgun Zvai Leumi, which he headed, committed several atrocities in its fight for freedom from British military occupation. It blew up the King David Hotel, which cost 91 lives, and wiped out the village of Deir Yassin, which may have cost as many as 254 Arab lives. In fact, Mr. Begin's activities as head of the Irgun were so widely known that when he visited the United States soon after the establishment of Israel, a distinguished list of Jewish leaders, including Hannah Arendt, Albert Einstein, Sidney Hook and Seymour Melman, wrote to *The New York Times* on December 4, 1948, denouncing him as "the head of a Fascist party for whom terrorism (against Jews, Arabs, and British alike) and misrepresentation are means, and a 'Leader State' is the goal." Today, Mr. Begin is a respected leader of Israel and a winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace.

beyond human ingenuity. Among other measures are the demilitarization of a new Palestinian state for at least an agreed term of years while peaceful relationships develop, elaborate technical arrangements for surveillance that will assure Israel against the possibility of surprise attack and even the possible establishment of an American military presence in the area.

In the current state of the military art, there is no such thing as a totally secure border between hostile states; nor has there ever been, though it is a myth with a long history. In 1940 France had its Maginot Line, while more than a century earlier a slogan of the Revolution that France must achieve "natural frontiers" was used by Napoleon to legitimize his subsequent overrunning of all of Europe. But Napoleon's conquests, far from assuring France "natural frontiers," only paved the way for ultimate defeats. Natural frontiers, or, in other words, secure borders, cannot be achieved by natural obstructions or geographical depth, but only by the development of peaceful relations on both sides.

A reformulation of our relations with Israel does not mean in any sense an abandonment of our commitments or of our close cooperation. But no relations between nations can be mutually healthy and satisfactory unless they are based on a mutual fulfillment of national interests. Over the years we have become so sympathetic to Israel's aspirations, so admiring of its achievements, and so aware of its sensitivities, that we have smudged and lost sight of our own interests—and, paradoxically have in the process done Israel a disservice.

What Israel needs more than anything else is peace, for it will suffer a severe erosion of national élan and self-esteem if it is forced to continue armed to the teeth, squandering its human and material resources on maintaining a garrison state and dependent for its economic livelihood on American generosity. Not that we should cease being generous, but we should so shape our generosity as to promote the best interests of the recipient, and in Israel's case we have not always done this.

Were there to be peace—real peace, which is possible only with the solution of the hard substantive issues that still haunt the area—the Israeli people could then devote their extraordinary gifts and energies to making the whole Middle East flower, as they have done for Israel itself. Not only would Israel greatly profit by this but America and the whole non-communist world would richly benefit.

VIII

But, it will be said, these positions—however sensible they may be in terms of American national interest—are simply not accept-

able to Israel. And it is Israel that must carry out the principal actions that would lead to genuine autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza and hold out the clear prospect of Palestinian self-determination there, and it is Israel that must waive its objections to dealing with the PLO. So what can we do, since, over the years, we have been constantly admonished that the United States must not "bring pressure on Israel" because that might suggest an "imposed peace."

What, however, do those terms mean? Do they mean, as now interpreted, that the United States should continue to pay out a massive subvention each year to meet Israel's military and economic needs, even though Israel insists on pursuing a course of action that frustrates the peace and is contrary to our own national interests? Stated in those terms, the absurdity of the proposition is evident. The Congress is mandated by the American people to spend their tax money only for purposes consistent with the advancement, and not impairment, of our interests. Particularly at a time of threatened economic recession, the decision as to how such funds are spent is a sovereign action whose benefits must be carefully weighed.

In short, as I said at the outset, Israeli-American relations must either become much closer—with Israel accepting the essential changes in its present position—or they must become much looser, with the United States resuming its freedom of action on all forms of aid to Israel, so long as Israel sticks to its present course.

Such freedom of action for the United States is not, of course, solely a matter for the President and the executive branch. It will require the understanding and cooperation of the Congress. And the sanction of withdrawing or limiting American aid is so drastic in its implications that even serious discussion of it is bound to set off a confrontation in which members of Congress will be under enormous pressure to vote the required billions regardless of Israeli behavior.

Ordinarily, such a confrontation would be out of the question in an election year. In 1968, and again in 1972 and 1976, negotiations for peace were allowed to lapse, with serious loss of time and momentum at least in the latter two years. I do not think we can permit a similar lapse in 1980, even though Israel's government and many of its vocal supporters here seem to be counting on it. The time is short—too short—both for Israel and the United States, on the one hand, and for the potentially moderate Arab nations on the other, now themselves threatened, who insist on progress toward peace and who hold, in some cases, an important degree of control on the price and supply of the oil from the

Middle East on which we continue to let our nation depend to an outrageous degree. One way or another, events will force the situation to a boil some time during 1980.

So it is not hyperbole to speak of a "coming crisis" in Israeli-American relations. That crisis is already upon us. Deep down, the Administration knows it and a large section of the American public senses it. Only by the effective pressure of American public opinion, leading in turn to constructive actions by Israel, can we avert an outcome that would be desperately damaging to both countries, but most of all to Israel itself.

Claudia Wright

IRAQ-NEW POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

On the evening of August 8, 1979, immediately after 21 executions that he and his Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) had ordered and witnessed, Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti, President of Iraq, stood on the balcony of the presidential palace in Baghdad, his arms raised in salute. Over 50,000 demonstrators roared their approval and chanted, "Death to the traitors!" As he looked down, Hussein might have contemplated the example of King Sargon II, the Assyrian king and clever military tactician whose battle success is celebrated in 2,500-year-old reliefs from the throne room at Dur-Saharukin, today displayed in the splendid Iraqi Museum. In one, Sargon stands in his chariot reviewing his victorious army, while soldiers build a pile of his enemies' heads in tribute. Not entirely self-assured, the king stands behind a burly bodyguard.

Although he assumed the presidency only last July, Saddam Hussein, a lawyer now 42 years old, had been for years the strongman of the Baathist group that took power in Iraq in 1968. In November 1978, he played a leading role in organizing the Baghdad summit meeting at which Arab heads of state joined forces to condemn the Camp David accords between Egypt, Israel and the United States. A year later, at the second Arab summit in Tunis, he celebrated what he regards as Iraq's succession to Egypt as the preeminent organizing force in the Arab world. Hussein is the first modern Iraqi leader to dream of restoring the power of the ancient Mesopotamian city-states.

A thousand years before Sargon (whose rule collapsed after 16 years in the face of border assaults and internal division), the lessons of ancient political authority had been enunciated by the conqueror Hammurabi. Having "stormed the four quarters of the world," as he put it, Hammurabi dictated his conclusions in the famous code of law and administration, cut into black stone stelae

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and erected throughout his domain. The lessons reflected in the code were simple: never err in distinguishing between the people of the homeland, with whom you must be predictable and just and whose property you must assure, and your enemies beyond your borders. With them, be unpredictable, ruthless and terrible; but use threats instead of war, and avoid protracted military campaigns far from home.

Mindful of Hammurabi's advice, Hussein is little troubled that many Western observers regard him and his colleagues on the RCC as "wild men" of the Arab world.¹ Beyond their borders, they prefer to be feared rather than liked or understood. They are confident that among Arab states, the Baghdad regime is the least knowable, the most unpredictable, the most difficult for Western (or Soviet) intelligence services to penetrate. The incomprehension with which the Iraqis' policy moves are interpreted by diplomatic networks and the press is consequently a source of satisfaction (and much amusement) in Baghdad.

Hussein is, moreover, in no hurry to make his foreign relationships more conventional. Diplomatic links with the United States, he has said in response to several overtures from the State Department, "will remain severed until we are convinced that their resumption will be beneficial to Iraq and the Arab nation." With as much venom as is customarily reserved for the United States and Israel, senior Iraqi spokesmen also warn that the Soviet Union, with which Baghdad has a formal friendship treaty, should stay out of the Gulf of Arabia (the Persian Gulf to some), Saudi Arabian territory and the Red Sea. With Britain, whose influence lasted in Mesopotamia until the first Baath coup in 1958, Hussein maintains a posture of calculated disdain.

Last summer, as the European states sought to ensure stable supplies of oil for the winter of 1979-80, Iraq was able, by arranging official visits to Baghdad within days of each other, to play a tough and enticing diplomatic game. To the French Premier, Raymond Barre, increased oil supplies were offered at stable prices in return for major new arms purchases, plus confirmation that the experimental Osirak nuclear reactor, now being constructed by the French in Iraq, will be supplied with at least an initial charge of highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium, which President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing had tried to withdraw. (Hussein also reminded the French government that he wants the

¹ See John C. Campbell, "The Middle East: The Burdens of Empire," *Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1978*, p. 619.

return of the original black stele of Hammurabi, which sits in the Louvre.)

To the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, Iraq offered its willingness to lift a trade embargo that had been in effect since mid-1978, when Iraqi intelligence agents assassinated a political opponent in London and a round of diplomatic expulsions was ordered in both capitals. Iraq also offered to reconsider the fate of two British businessmen, in jail in Baghdad for espionage and bribery, as hostages for its man in an English prison. With Canada, Hussein was adamant that Prime Minister Joe Clark's campaign promise to move his embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem would result in an embargo on oil supplies; early in July, Baghdad ordered a tanker waiting to discharge Iraqi crude for Toronto to return without unloading, relenting only after last-minute negotiations with Ottawa. The West German, Belgian and Irish foreign ministers, together with the Japanese minister for international trade, were also drawn into the game in return for a wide range of economic and political commitments, partly hinging on their attitude toward the Palestinian issue.

But Hussein's initiatives went further. In the summer and fall of 1979, he sent military commanders to draw up detailed mutual security arrangements with Saudi Arabia; promoted plans for a formal dialogue between the Arab Gulf states and the European Economic Community; was assiduously courted for support by Libya in its border conflict with Egypt, by Algeria and the Polisario Front for similar support in the desert war with Morocco, and by several delegations from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Appearances of a rift notwithstanding, he continued to maintain aid payments to Syria, fixed at the Baghdad summit at around \$200 million for 1979. An economic development mission was sent to the Yemen Arab Republic (Sanaa) while agents were dispatched to assassinate an Iraqi Communist Party lecturer teaching in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Aden). On the other hand, in September an emissary of the Sultan of Oman, come to request Iraqi support for security guarantees for the Strait of Hormuz, was sent away empty-handed.

Hussein also oversaw Arab preparations for the Havana Non-aligned Conference and carefully managed the drafting of the political declaration by a Conference committee which Iraq chaired. At Havana, Hussein, who will succeed Cuban President Fidel Castro as the head of the Nonaligned Conference in 1982, paid considerable personal attention to African delegates, and

tentative arrangements were drawn up for state visits in 1980.

And, in October, Hussein became the first major Arab head of state to break with Iran's Islamic regime, deriding it as "a non-Islamic revolution," with a special slap at the authority of the ayatollahs: "The Koran was written in Arabic," he remarked, "and God destined the Arabs [not the Iranians] to play a vanguard role in Islam." The threat of injury was added to the insult by the announcement that Iraq would intervene militarily in Bahrain if the Iranians made any move to implement their new territorial claims there. Normally reticent about military visitors, the Iraqi news agency pointedly announced, only days after Hussein's broadside, that the general commanding Romanian border forces had arrived in Baghdad to "exchange expertise between the two countries' border troops."

In Washington, this burst of activity has passed virtually unremarked. It is possible, of course, that the flurry is mostly rhetorical, and has produced little of substance. At the State Department, where the Iraq desk is even more isolated from the senior policymakers of the Near Eastern Bureau than the unrecognized U.S. Interests Section is isolated from political affairs in Baghdad, it is now almost a reflex action to label Hussein as a bluff artist, paranoid about internal dissent and so beholden to the Soviet Union as to be incapable of autonomous foreign policy, let alone the delicate task of coordinating inter-Arab economic and diplomatic objectives.

In fact, Washington has seriously misjudged the man and underestimates the capabilities of his government. For better or worse, Iraq does indeed have weight in the Middle East and means to use it.

II

The present Baathist regime came to power in 1968 after a military group, led by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, and a civilian group, dependent on the military and led by Saddam Hussein, edged non-Baathist elements out of the cabinet and into exile. But between 1968 and about 1977, Iraq's potential power was undercut by its evident lack of economic, military and political capability. Despite initial efforts to nationalize foreign oil interests—largely British, Dutch and French—the Baghdad government was unable to control the rate of oil production or its oil revenues, which until 1972 grew very slowly as the foreign oil companies filled demand with output from Iran and Saudi Arabia. In 1972,

foreign concessions of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), operating in the north, were nationalized, although it was not until December 1975 that the Basrah Petroleum Company, an IPC subsidiary operating in the south, was also taken over.

Iraq was unable to benefit as much as its neighbors from the initial OPEC price increases because of the loss of international contracts stemming from nationalization, and because disputes with Syria stopped the transit of oil from the northern Kirkuk fields to Syrian port terminals in early 1976. Exploration for new oil was minimal until 1975–76, although in hindsight this had a positive twist—no one but the Iraqis has an accurate idea today of the size of the country's oil reserves.

Counting both proven and probable reserves, the published 1978 CIA estimate for Iraq was 36 billion barrels, a fraction of Saudi Arabia's 150 billion, and behind Kuwait's 71 billion, Iran's 60 billion, the Soviet Union's 40 billion, and the United States' 39 billion.² Subsequent analysis of the Saudi fields has caused some revisions. In both Saudi Arabia and Iran old oil has been pumped faster than new oil has been found to replace it. In both countries, production limits have been imposed, as much for technical recovery problems as for economic objectives. In Iraq, on the other hand, exploration activity since 1977 has steadily expanded proven reserves and increased sustainable capacity (although not production) levels. The government's past inability to rely on oil output and revenue estimates naturally debilitated its economic planning and hampered investment programs, but since 1977 these constraints have largely disappeared. Senior officials at the Iraqi Oil Ministry will confirm no figures, but they are content not to dispute recent British estimates of potential reserves of 95 billion barrels.³ Daily production in the third quarter of 1979 was 2.9 million barrels per day.

Regarding military capability, Iraq's inclination to involve itself in fighting on the eastern front with Israel was limited for years by the protracted campaign to suppress the Kurdish rebellion in the northern border areas as well as by border and territorial disputes with Iran, Kuwait and Syria. In neither the 1967 nor the 1973 War were Iraqi forces heavily committed—in 1973 even less than on the earlier occasion. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the Kurds—aided by the Shah of Iran and covert American policy—were able to tie down the bulk of the seasoned Iraqi army

² *The International Energy Statistical Review*, Washington: National Foreign Assessment Center, 1978.

³ Patrick Cockburn, London: *Middle East Economic Digest*, June 3, 1977.

and air force. Defense purchases during that period also drained a substantial share of the national budget away from agricultural and industrial development.

Since the first Baathist coup of 1958, led by Brigadier Abdul Karim Kassem, Iraq has been militarily dependent on the Soviet Union. At that time, U.S. moves to land marines in Lebanon were deliberately intended to have a demonstration effect on Baghdad, even more than they were designed for an impact on Lebanon itself. Although the demonstration was only minimally successful in destabilizing Kassem's regime, which survived until 1963, the possibility of another U.S. intervention in the area has been the preoccupying military concern of Baghdad defense officials ever since. The turn to the U.S.S.R. for military aid culminated in the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed in 1972.

Thus, Iraq now has a powerful military force, well equipped with enough MiG-23 fighter bombers, SAM and Scud SSM missiles, artillery and tanks (mostly Russian T-54s, some T-62s, but no T-72s reported yet) to deter an American landing or an Iranian or Syrian attack. In offensive terms, this complement might pose some threat to Saudi Arabia (mitigated by the terrain and long distances involved in a potential incursion), but it posed little real threat to Israel.

This was the situation until very recently. Since Iraq settled its border differences with Iran (1975), Kuwait (1976), and Syria (1977), and by ending the Kurdish war, its military planners have been able to concentrate far more on the larger Arab conflict with Israel. In addition, the disintegration of Iranian military forces during the Islamic revolution, and their preoccupation with Kurdish and ethnic Arab insurrections ever since, have lifted a major defense burden.

Although the Soviets in the last few years have been almost as reluctant to help build Iraqi capability against Israel as they were to accede to demands for additional counterinsurgency weaponry during the late stages of the Kurdish conflict, the French have been more than willing to step in. Most recently they have agreed to provide Iraq with up to 100 Mirage F-1 and Delta-2000 fighters and fighter-bombers, as well as new tanks, antitank weaponry, and naval vessels for the Gulf.

Since the Baghdad summit of November 1978, the Iraqi and Syrian military commands have met jointly to coordinate their procurement and deployment of weaponry and troops, and to unify their tactical plans. Both groups have made approaches to

Jordan to participate (with partial success). Nonetheless, Israel is still more than equal to their joint threat. Despite considerable successes achieved by Arab missile crews against Israeli tanks and aircraft during the 1973 war, the three countries' radar, artillery and missile systems are poorly coordinated and much of the equipment is incompatible. Thus, a potential Israeli strike force would be left with plenty of room to slip through Arab defenses.

The Israelis do not, however, have attack aircraft with adequate range to hit targets inside Iraq, as Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman repeatedly told the Pentagon and press during 1979. (At least publicly, this is one of Israel's rationales for requesting accelerated delivery of American F-15s and F-16s.) It is common for Israel to inflate Arab offensive capabilities to boost the credibility of its arms requests in Washington, and it is arguable that the buildup of air defenses on both the Arab and Israeli sides along the eastern front has now checked each side's inclination to attempt a first strike against the other, at least by conventional forces.

In one key respect, however, Iraq may be developing a military capability unmatched by its allies, with a potential for threatening Israel which has not existed before. This is Iraq's potential nuclear capability. It has been clear for some time that Israel has been stockpiling nuclear warheads, and has its own missiles to deliver them to Cairo or Baghdad. Iraq, which is a signatory of the international Nonproliferation Treaty, has conventionally armed Soviet missiles with the range for striking Israeli cities. With the development of the French-built Osirak reactor near Baghdad,⁴ it may be intent on acquiring the material and technology for arming these missiles with nuclear warheads. For this reason Israel applied intense pressure on the French government, and on the United States also, to break the 1976 agreement to provide Baghdad with highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium to fuel the reactor. But French efforts (hastened by U.S. pressures) failed to persuade the Iraqis to accept "caramel," a lower grade uranium unusable for nuclear munitions.

In April 1979, only days before the reactor core and other components were to be shipped from the French plant at Seyne-sur-Mer, a sophisticated squad of sappers evaded light security and blew up the shipment. The agents were almost certainly Israeli, and it is widely believed that they must have had the assistance of elements of the French Directorate for the Surveil-

⁴ Robert J. Pranger and Dale R. Tahtinen, *Nuclear Threat in the Middle East*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1975.

lance of the Territory.

Although the sabotage has caused as much as two years' delay in the installation of Osirak, Hussein's subsequent negotiations with Premier Barre in July 1979 kept the original fuel supply contract in force; if anything, Hussein extracted further commitments from the French to strengthen Iraq's potential for air and naval as well as ground-launched missile attacks.

It is significant that Iraq's new oil power has coincided with its freedom from debilitating local conflicts. Both factors have allowed it to decrease its dependence on the Soviet Union, although the Soviets will continue to serve as a future counterweight to deter any U.S. moves in the Gulf—a strategic tie which the Iraqis will not lightly let slip.

III

Domestic prospects are less predictable. While settlement of the Kurdish war has contributed to domestic tranquillity, it has not necessarily assured the Baath regime of political stability or popular legitimacy. By conventional standards, the political history of Iraq since 1958 has been marked by chronic instability and violence. One observer counts, in the past 20 years, "at least ten coups and attempted coups, two armed rebellions, and a full-scale civil war."⁵ Although Washington's traditional assessment of Iraqi (like other Arab) politics overemphasizes internal sectarianism and factionalism, significant cleavages are present. Western intelligence sources believe that the large Shi'ite population is resentful of its meager share of the senior political or administrative positions; and that sharp conflicts also divide the military and political elites, most of them Sunni Muslims, who have precariously juggled power among themselves since the 1968 Baathist takeover. The success of the Iranian Shi'ites in deposing the Shah might also be viewed as a potential stimulus to their traditionally repressed co-religionists in Iraq.

With time, however, the indicators of instability have shown marked moderation. Ousters of top officials by force have become less frequent; purges of the bureaucracy and military forces uncommon and limited in scope; political murder very rare. Factionalism and open quarreling have been progressively confined to civilian circles; military officers have stayed out of politics, and

⁵ Phebe A. Marr, "The Political Elite in Iraq," in *Political Elites in the Middle East*, ed. George Lenczowski, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1975. p. 125.

regular troops have not been called on to take sides in political conflicts.

The most serious challenge in recent years was the abortive coup attempt by Nazim Kazzar, the chief of the security police, in June 1973. During that attempt, the defense minister was killed, and the minister of the interior wounded. Kazzar and at least 34 others were executed, and the internal security forces substantially purged and reorganized.

Since 1973, the regime has reacted forcefully at least twice to suppress public demonstrations by Shi'ites. Street riots in Najaf and Karbala in February 1977 may have been largely instigated by Syrian Alawites, a Shi'a sect to which Syrian President Hafez al-Assad belongs, and whose members have dominated the Syrian government and military forces for almost as long as the Sunni-dominated Baathists have been in power in Baghdad. These demonstrations, for which army detachments were called out, reportedly also resulted in a large number of arrests, and at least eight executions after hearings by Baath Party tribunals.⁶

Less widespread and less violent were the June 1979 demonstrations in Najaf (reportedly in Baghdad also, but that cannot be confirmed), which were contained by regular police forces. A Shi'ite clergyman, Sayed Sadr, who was arrested before the disturbances, apparently played a central role in them. According to the Iraqi news agency, Sadr was put under house arrest for preaching political opposition in the mosques of Najaf; according to other reports, he had been stimulating covert military preparations against the regime.

The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) is the oldest surviving political organization in the country, and despite periods of clandestine existence, it has been legal in the eyes of the regime and was at one stage formally co-opted into the cabinet. However, in 1977 and 1978 Hussein decided to put an end to alleged attempts the ICP had made to organize party cells in the army, to suspend the ICP newspaper for criticism of the regime's foreign policies and to remove the communists from the cabinet and the National Progressive People's Front (a largely ceremonial coalition of Baathist, Kurdish and minor parties). Official reports said that 22 Party organizers were tried and executed for subversive activities. A larger number of Party members fled abroad, and have since been instrumental in a variety of anti-government activities, provoking

⁶ Majid Khadduri, *Socialist Iraq, A Study in Iraqi Politics since 1968*, Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1978, pp. 68–69.

retaliation by government agents and a spiral of bombings and assassinations in several Middle Eastern cities.⁷

Against such a background, the events of July and August 1979 in Baghdad might appear more the rule than the exception in the disorder of Iraqi politics. The shakeup this time was major—involving the installation of a new president, the ouster of many top government officials, and the arrest, trial and in some cases execution of a good number of those deposed.⁸ In the shuffle, Saddam Hussein replaced the ailing Ahmed al-Bakr as President, and the former Minister of Planning and newly appointed Deputy Premier, Adnan Hussein al-Hamdani, was among government leaders purged. In early August, a special tribunal, composed of senior RCC members, sentenced 21 of those arrested (including Adnan Hussein) to death, and 33 to prison sentences, releasing another 13. The executions were carried out on August 8—by a firing squad reportedly composed of 400 Baath Party members drawn from all over the country, with the surviving membership of the RCC as witnesses.

But what lay behind these dramatic and violent changes? Commentary by outside observers has emphasized international actors. Reports from Cairo and Beirut, as well as most of the Western press, claimed that the conspirators named Syria and President Assad as the origin of the plot. According to this theory, the conspiracy reflected the ambitions of a group of Shi'ites who had hoped to see Assad emerge as the leader of the unified Iraqi-Syrian Baath Party and state, negotiations for which had been going on for more than a year. Other theories point to Soviet agents as the source of the plot (in retaliation for the anti-communist purge).

⁷ One round of violence in Beirut last summer resulted in the death of an exiled Iraqi journalist and associate editor of the PLO journal, *Revolutionary Palestine*, who took the *nom de guerre* Adel Iraqi. He had helped form the Organization for a Democratic Iraq, which includes ICP members and others critical of the Baath Party's treatment of Iraqi communists, the loosening of ties with the Soviet bloc, and the rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. His associates retaliated a month later in a near-fatal machine gun attack on the Iraqi ambassador to Lebanon.

⁸ To summarize briefly, the summer's events started on July 12 with the arrest of Muhyi Abdul-Hussein Mashhadi, the Secretary-General of the RCC. Four days later, the RCC announced that the President, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, would step down for health reasons, and that Saddam Hussein had been elected in his place. A reshuffle of the cabinet ministries promoted Adnan Hussein al-Hamdani, former Minister of Planning and head of the presidential office, to Deputy Premier; General Adnan Khayralla, Saddam Hussein's cousin and the Defense Minister, was also elevated to Deputy Premier and Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces; Hussein's brother, Barzan al-Tikriti, moved from Deputy Chief to Chief of Intelligence. A week later, an extraordinary congress of the Baath Party was called in Baghdad. At one meeting, Mashhadi emerged to confess the existence of a conspiracy against the Party and the leadership, apparently naming as co-conspirators the recently promoted Deputy Premier al-Hamdani and other RCC leaders.

As guides to Iraqi political behavior, however, such theories err in being both too general and too personal. The Shi'ites executed were too few to pull together the large group of conspirators involved. No alleged conspiracy had links to the ICP or the Soviet Union.

Nonetheless, analysis of the list of conspirators does reveal discernible signs of the factionalism that was more likely to have been involved. One particularly notable group centered around the Ministry of Planning and the young and widely admired Adnan Hussein. It included ministers and the first two echelons of civil servants from the Ministries of Planning, Education, Industry, and Tourism. Because the planning ministry controls all budgeting and supervises the spending and investment plans of the entire government, it exerted considerable control over policy. Adnan Hussein and his associates may have challenged the President's decision to put defense spending ahead of educational and industrial investment (and in that sense may have been a faction of "capitulationists" as was charged). After their removal, ministry officials remaining will be hesitant about taking initiatives that are not first cleared by the President himself, insuring that the new President is the sole source of policy review.⁹

A second group of victims occupied positions in the Foreign and Information Ministries. There may have been some opposition in this group to Saddam's softer line with Saudi Arabia, but this is impossible to verify.¹⁰ A third group can be identified as having had important administrative or security roles in the main northern city (Mosul) and in the surrounding districts and Kurdish areas. But it is impossible to say how or why they may have acted together against Hussein.

Whatever the explanation, the harshness of the sentences apparently aroused sufficient criticism that the President was moved to announce a series of placatory measures. Cost of living and general salary increases were announced for civil servants and the military forces; and foreign exchange and duty-free purchase allowances for Iraqis traveling abroad were raised. In mid-August, the RCC announced an amnesty for 725 political prisoners, most of them Kurds and Shi'ite demonstrators, and a small number of

⁹ After he took over the presidency in July, Saddam reportedly ordered regular cabinet meetings for the first time in eleven years. Previously, ministers used to report independently to the President.

¹⁰ *Ash-Sharq Al-Aswat*, an Arabic paper published in London, commented on July 31 that "the downfall . . . is probably due to their opposition to the policy of rapprochement with the Gulf states. It goes without saying that a difference over Gulf policy, if it exists, or any other difference alone is not enough to topple some of the most prominent and senior figures of the regime."

communists. Finally, on August 19, Tariq Aziz, a Deputy Premier and RCC member, declared the regime's intention to implement the articles of the Constitution dealing with a national assembly and to hold general elections soon. This announcement, so soon after the exposure of the August conspiracy, indicates more than that "the Iraqi revolution is strong and is confident of its future," as Tariq Aziz declared. Saddam Hussein knows that he cannot repress internal political opposition forever, and he is mindful of the need to mix a show of mercy and generosity with a stroke of ruthlessness, as if perhaps to compensate for his lack of Nasserist charisma.

On the whole, Hussein emerged personally in control. The entire affair lasted less than five weeks, and was limited to the senior political and administrative elite. Only two serving military officers were implicated (and shot); there was no mobilization of forces, and throughout the climactic week of the trial there were no unusual security precautions or display of arms in Baghdad, no opposition demonstrations, and considerable evidence instead of real (if also orchestrated) popular support.

The one useful generalization about the conspiracy is that it was one of loosely related factions, or a set of cliques, without central direction, outside resources or common ideological line. At one time each probably discussed criticisms of Saddam with others, and that was their downfall. What appears central is Hussein's refusal to tolerate the formation of independent factions within the RCC or ministries, whatever views they might have held. Also he struck, as his Assyrian models might have recommended, before his opponents had any chance to threaten him, in a manner which clearly signalled what others might expect if they were tempted in the future.

IV

In viewing Iraq's internal development, then, the importance of sectarian conflict or of Syrian-Iraqi tension should not be exaggerated. Saddam's stated commitment to proceed with Iraqi-Syrian unity negotiations remains in force. For reasons which reflect the length and methods of colonial rule in Syria (French) and Iraq, the two countries have developed very different patterns of ethno-religious relationships. Also, the development of the Baath Party has proceeded quite differently in the two countries. In Syria, Party blocs have developed a sectarian character dividing different areas; this has not been the case in Iraq. Sectarianism has also been far more significant in the Syrian armed forces than in the Iraqi.

It is therefore quite misleading to speak of the Iraqi Shi'ites as oppressed by the Sunnis. Over the last decade two factors have largely erased the significance of both ethno-religious and regional loyalties: rapid urbanization, particularly the near-doubling of Baghdad's population, has undermined the strength of traditional communal ties, while universal and compulsory education has diminished religiosity and opened up job and income opportunities that reduce intercommunal inequities and rivalries.

Nor, in general, would the Iranian pattern seem applicable to Iraq. The Iraqi cities, unlike Tehran, are relatively free of slums and poverty. Nowadays, Baghdad is a vast suburban city whose center is occupied mostly by office buildings and large hotels. Gone is the traditional infrastructure of mosques, markets and Arab tenements which have remained in Tehran and represent there the geographical base for the clergy's organization and power. In fact, Iraqis are considerably more secular in their culture than the Iranians or than other Arabs. Neither Shi'a nor Sunni religion has much drawing power, and in a population in which two out of every three Iraqis is under 25 years old, this can only grow less with time. The Iranian revolution next door poses a foreign, not an internal, problem for Iraq.

The most important underlying cleavage that remains in Iraq is between rural and urban areas, and systematic efforts to stimulate agricultural investment and improve rural living standards, together with accelerated programs in the Kurdish areas, have made strides in alleviating that source of grievance. Policymakers realize that with a population of just over 12 million, two-thirds of whom live in cities, and an annual population growth of about 3.3 percent, the improvement of both agricultural and industrial development are essential. Iraq alone among the Arab oil states has the potential for self-sufficient food production; traditionally, it has been a sizable exporter of dates. But the historical evolution of the agricultural sector indicates deep-seated problems. Land reform efforts since 1958 have been unable to stem the flight of rural capital, along with labor, into the cities. Providing irrigation and assuring water supplies will involve not only substantial domestic investment but also difficult agreements with Turkey and Syria over sharing the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. In 1978, Iraqi crop production increased and imports declined, by comparison with the previous year, but in most cases output has failed to match the peak levels achieved in the early 1970s, while crop acreage and yields have also fallen.

In its direction of agricultural and industrial policy, Iraq, like

most developing (and developed) countries, is hampered by shortages of skilled manpower. Bureaucratic reorganization is common in both areas, and implementation of ministerial directives involves long and unreliable chains of command through state corporations, down to the provincial and district levels.

Despite its bureaucratic problems, there seems no doubt that Iraq will remain a centrally planned economy geared to equalizing the distribution of income and resources. It is unlikely, however, that the government will want to enlarge its control over what remains of the private marketplace. The regime is notably willing to bend to consumer demand. In public housing, for example, Shaker Mahmoud, the Under Secretary of the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction, told me that it would obviously be far more efficient and cheaper for the government to build apartments for people. But, he had to admit, Iraqis, especially peasants just arriving from rural areas and used to traditional village compounds, would not accept this type of housing. They insist instead on detached houses with lots large enough for gardens. The result is a very expensive anomaly in the arid Middle East: a horizontal version of the ancient Hanging Gardens of Babylon with suburbs of squat houses, each in a green plot, which sprawl from the center of Baghdad in all directions for more than 20 miles. The sprawl devours water and electricity, and demands bus transportation and commuter highways far faster than they can be built.

On the other hand, its central role in the economy has enabled the government to control inflation because it directly employs (and sets wages for) somewhere between a quarter and a third of the economically active population, and directly subsidizes or purchases outright for its people their food, housing, medical needs and education. Information about wages is not as readily available as most other statistics, but one does not hear the same complaints about loss of purchasing power in Iraq as can be heard in no less socialist Arab economies, such as the Libyan. If the most recent year created an abnormal strain on prices—and some officials indicated to me that it had—then Hussein's August announcement of a public-sector wage hike would have been particularly mollifying.

Within this relatively positive internal situation, the most serious long-run problem to the regime lies in the youthfulness of the population. For the Iraqis are an exceptionally young people; one in five is presently under ten years old, and two in three are under 25. How is this group, which has grown to adulthood since the 1968 revolution, to be motivated with the values of the regime?

Although the majority of Iraqis were illiterate 20 years ago, the youthful group has experienced the expansion of educational opportunity without limit. Before the 1958 revolution, the life expectancy of the average Iraqi was less than 40, and his short lifetime a hopeless struggle with rural poverty. For the post-revolutionary youth, expectations are richer, more diverse, and more sophisticated. For al-Bakr, Hussein and their associates, there were only two paths to career advancement—through the army or through the law. And for men like Hussein, who chose law, it was Cairo, Beirut or Damascus, rather than Baghdad, which promised the involvement in Arab politics they sought. This too has changed dramatically.

At the same time, the present leadership is relatively young itself, indicating a long potential hold on power. If Saddam Hussein, at 42, is to survive another 30 years in political life, does he anticipate having to purge or kill off young turks like Adnan Hussein every ten or 15 years? Will the President seek to impose a benign despotism in the fashion of Hammurabi for at least another political generation? Or is Hussein himself unsure about the political means to be allowed in the Baath, while he remains intent on securing the political objectives of the Party as he understands them?

The youthfulness of the Iraqi regime differs notably from the typical Arab pattern (and from the Iranian and the Israeli, for that matter). Having largely avoided the 1973 engagement with Israel, the RCC has a memory that is singularly free of humiliation or of personal defeat. As a result, the Iraqi leadership believes that it is in no hurry. Time, I have been told many times in Baghdad, is on Iraq's side so long—and the conditions are crucial—as the policy objectives of the Baath are constantly and tenaciously adhered to. "If you want to know the course of the revolution," an intimate of the President told me last August, "then you should watch the way the ship heads and not the rudder which swings as the wind changes."

As far as the internal development of Iraq is concerned, the socialist egalitarian commitment is central. With time, the regime looks forward to the disappearance of the traditional divisions of the ancient land, particularly tribal and religious sectarianism, and it anticipates the evening out of regional inequalities to remove the vestiges of the Kurdish grievance. Only if these things occur first can a Baathist experiment in parliamentarism succeed in diversifying the means of political expression without succumbing to the conflicting demands inherent in a modernizing economy

as well as to the renewal of factionalism.

v

If the United States wants to understand Iraqi policy, it would do well to examine Hammurabi's ancient prescriptions. The present-day link between assuring the internal welfare of the country and enhancing its power abroad is oil.

To administer the sixth largest (possibly the second largest) oil stock in the world, the Iraqi Oil Ministry shares pricing and production decisions with an interministerial planning board. Under this coordinated direction, Iraq's oil policies can be expected to remain as consistent and clear as they have been for the past two years. They will emphasize government-to-government supply agreements, which index the volume and price of oil exports to the reciprocal commitment of large-scale industrial investments and capital goods imports (steel and nuclear plants and arms from France; fertilizer, conventional electrical generating, liquefied natural gas and oil refining plants from Japan; and agricultural investments from Italy, for example). The major purchasers of Iraqi oil are France (23 percent), Italy (21 percent), Spain (6 percent), England and Japan (8 percent). With 1978 imports of only 75,000 barrels a day, the United States is a minor importer.

By keeping production well below capacity and by holding surplus revenues in mixed, largely European currencies, Iraq is able to provide special supply bonuses to its friends without loosening the overall international market. For instance, during the unexpectedly cold months of February and March 1979, the Iraqis delivered to France about 25 percent more than its normal monthly allocation. At the same time, Iraq avoids the damage which tight markets and the declining dollar have inflicted on such producers as Saudi Arabia, whose exchange reserves are dependent on the United States. For these reasons, Iraq has been one of the leading advocates among the Arab oil producers (OAPEC) and in OPEC itself for price increases, production limitations, and for repricing oil exchanges in a basket of currencies in place of the American dollar.

Dr. Awni al-Ani, the Oil Ministry's Director General of Foreign Relations and Investments, says that present policy is to pump less and leave the oil in the ground for the next generation. "Rather than burn oil as fuel, we think it has a much more noble use—petrochemicals, medicines and phosphate. And so we are thinking of nuclear and solar energy sources [for home consump-

tion].” At the same time he points out that his country is more than prepared to meet, and during 1978–79 has in fact met, the demands for increased output from its European consumers. Al-Ani also emphasizes that the oil industry is run completely by Iraqis now, and that their policy is not to invest the surplus outside the Arab area: “We don’t want to support countries who stole from us for 50 years.” Recent investments of \$212 million, directed by the Ministry, have been made in Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya and Saudi Arabia. Iraq has also said that it proposes special economic aid to the Third World, along the lines of the proposal made at the October session of the U.N. General Assembly by Fidel Castro.

What Iraq will not accept is pressure from the United States, either directly or through Saudi Arabia. Confrontation with America on oil policy is largely rhetorical, since the oil trade between the two is so small. With Saudi Arabia, Iraq has preferred to avoid public or private conflict, but sought instead to do two things: first, to mobilize as many of the other OPEC members behind its positions as possible, to outvote the Saudis; and second, to provide the Saudis with a wide range of economic, political and military assurances of Iraq’s goodwill and flexibility on common interests.

During 1979, first at the OPEC meeting in June, and then at ministerial meetings in late summer, the Iraqis were able to bring about significant shifts in Saudi positions. A delicate accord may be developing—although firmly opposed by the Saudi Oil Minister, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani—according to which Saudi Arabia will stop playing the spoiler in OPEC by boosting its oil output to stem price increases, while Iraq will moderate its price and foreign-exchange demands. In concrete terms, this may mean a slowly declining level of production from Saudi Arabia and reciprocal Iraqi cooperation in stemming the sharp price increases proposed by other OPEC members. Thus, Iraq hopes slowly to wean Saudi Arabia away from its American ties.

VI

Apart from oil, the outlines of Iraqi foreign policy are also clear. First and foremost, Iraq is Arab, and no ideological or practical line of policy will be tolerated if it were to put non-Arab interests ahead of Iraqi Arabism or nationalism. This is the reason that communism in Iraq has coexisted with the regime so precariously. When the ICP, albeit firm in opposition to the Camp David accords, sent anniversary wishes in 1979 to the Israeli Communist

Party, it transgressed a fundamental principle of the Baath. ICP members can only be tolerated as long as their communism is not internationalist in orientation.

The same underlying nationalism ensures that, in Iraq's case, the relationship with the Soviet Union must always be a contingent one. The Soviet friendship with the Iraqis they regard as the corollary of their enmity toward the United States. Hussein, whose public speeches are not always easy to interpret, has put this matter succinctly: "Our relationship with the Soviet Union . . . is not linked to any special time, but to our understanding of the extent and nature of the Arab struggle, as well as to what the Soviet Union can do to help the Arab nation, through agreement on strategies, mutual interest or both."

When Iraq judges that the Soviet Union is pursuing a line that may suit its own but not Arab interests, it has been far from reticent in advising the Soviets to desist, and in organizing to block them if need be. Last August, for example, Saddam Hussein's brother, Barzan al-Tikriti, the Chief of Intelligence, warned in an article for *Ath-Thawrah*, the Baghdad party newspaper, that the Soviet Union should end its attempts to gain strategic control over the Red Sea. He singled out Soviet moves "to arrange the international situation in Aden in accordance with their future plans," and Soviet strategy "opposing independence for Eritrea . . . completely ignoring our Arab people's just struggle [there]."

The Iraqi attitude toward the United States, and toward Israel, which is regarded as entirely an American creature, is less complicated. For, as I have already indicated, the Americans are perceived as directly threatening military intervention and occupation, if necessary, through the Gulf, while Israel is seen as potentially ready to annihilate the country by nuclear attack from the east. In more immediate terms, the Iraqis feel that American pressure on Arab oil policy and the potential for Israeli economic expansion in the Middle East (with or without Egypt) constitute fundamental challenges to the goals and methods of Iraqi economic development. The political mobilization of the country's youth, Hussein's diplomatic campaigns in Europe, Africa and the Arab world, the use of the "oil weapon"—these are all elements of a single anti-American, anti-Zionist strategy that will not be softened.

On the other hand, the regime will treat Arab moderates, who in Iraqi eyes are prepared to compromise with the United States and Israel, far more gently than might be expected. The Iraqis

have studiously avoided direct attacks on Morocco, for instance, which has stayed close to the United States, and is now accepting Egyptian arms and military advisers, and requesting new American arms for its war against the Polisario. Asked to comment directly on the Western Sahara, Tariq Aziz said that Iraq "does not desire the establishment of small entities, but supports the Arab people's will." Hussein has refused to be drawn into an attack on Morocco. He said last October: "We hope that Moroccan-Algerian relations will not deteriorate to the point of clashes that weaken these two countries. . . . The enemies of the Baghdad summit are indeed trying to turn the Arabs against each other."

The Iraqi approach, therefore, can accommodate considerable flexibility and compromise, but within Arab limits. Like the Saudis, they have entered the process of mediation and negotiation with Algeria and the Polisario, but they would scorn the approaches Saudi officials were reported to have made in Washington, urging the United States to approve new arms supplies to the embattled King Hassan (and offering to pay at least part of the purchase price).

The Iraqis calculate that it is only a matter of time before the Saudis will draw away from their special relationship with the United States. They count on time (age, popular education) to replace the older members of the royal household, and expect a much closer entente with the younger members who will take over (those whom Minister Yamani has derisively called "a young turk Mafia").

In this respect, the crucial testing period for American policy lies just ahead, for if the Carter Administration, under intense pressure from the presidential candidates or the cold weather, tries to increase the pressure on the Saudis to stave off a drop in oil output, the result may be an acceleration of Saudi moves to a more independent position. The political calendar for the first half of 1980 provides plentiful opportunities for the discreet signals the Saudis usually favor. Therefore, a revival of the anti-Saudi militancy which appeared in the Senate in 1979 would be disastrous for the United States.

Once again to put the situation into Iraqi perspective, Hussein considers it absurd for the United States to emphasize Saudi Arabia as a "cornerstone for attaining U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Arabian peninsula," as the Pentagon publicly states the position. Riyadh's internal security is relatively untested, and despite recent improvements in the electronic monitoring and guard systems which watch over the Saudi oil fields, the Abqaiq

fire of 1977 remains a reminder that the kingdom's principal asset can never be secured against sabotage.

Last year Iraq was able to demonstrate that its influence in ending the fighting between the two Yemens was probably more decisive than anything the Saudis were able to pull out of Washington's hat. Riyadh may also have concluded that for the security of Gulf waters and the Strait of Hormuz, the new Iraqi naval force, together with its own, would be at least as dependable and no less effective than the U.S. Navy. Washington has still to prove that any military force it could drop into the area would do less damage to Saudi interests than it would be intended to forestall.

Entente with Saudi Arabia does, however, strain the Baath's relationship to the Palestinian movement. Iraq's support for the PLO is based on a common anti-Zionist, anti-imperialist ideology, tempered on each side by somewhat different national interests. Iraqi-supported factions within the PLO have been nurtured during past conflicts with Syria and Jordan. They are adamantly opposed to tendencies within Fatah, particularly among PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat's supporters, to seek negotiations with the United States or accommodate Palestinian demands to an American-sponsored compromise. They also distrust the Saudi role in Middle East peace maneuvers, and in the past have regarded the Saudis as likely to collaborate with the United States to impose settlement terms on the Palestinians. Many PLO leaders continue to say that the downfall of the Saudi regime is a precondition of their own success.

By moving closer to Saudi Arabia, and substituting nonalignment for earlier Soviet links, Saddam Hussein has produced a severe ideological disturbance among the left-wing Palestinian leadership, who at the same time cannot afford to sacrifice Iraqi support. This has fostered a willingness in some Palestinian circles, not countenanced by the leadership, to conclude unholy alliances with some of Baghdad's most notable enemies in exile, which in turn has produced the violence that each side is now trying to suppress.

As long as recognition of the PLO remains a key Arab objective, solidarity between senior PLO and RCC officials can be maintained. Since the Baghdad summit, Iraq has faithfully paid its pledges to the PLO, and has been very effective in pressing for recognition of the PLO by its major European oil purchasers—France, Italy and Spain. For Iraq and the PLO, U.N. General Assembly recognition may count for less now than it did several months ago, while the objective of forcing the abandonment of

the erstwhile Palestinian autonomy talks, under the Camp David framework, is more important.

But if the United States were to find a formula for talking to the PLO and accepting PLO representation in a new round of talks, Baghdad would have to decide whether to go along with Saudi approval in the face of opposition and condemnation from George Habash of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and others from the Arab Liberation Front and Palestine Liberation Front. Current American intransigence on the PLO issue, together with Washington's ignorance of exactly how Iraqi policy develops, makes it easy for Hussein to keep his ambivalence to himself and avoid having to choose between old friends and traditional enemies. This is a choice which Hussein cannot make if he is to succeed in his ambition to unify the Arab world and establish Iraqi power as its core.

Stephen J. Solarz


ARMS FOR MOROCCO?

Most Americans have probably never heard of the Western Sahara. If the name of this Colorado-sized territory in northwest Africa evokes any image at all, it is likely to be one of nomads with their tents and camels against a background of blinding sunlight and endless sand engaged in the ancient and timeless confrontation between man and nature. During a visit to the region last summer, I often wondered at the contemporary international significance of this vast and empty-looking land with its parching 120° days, fierce sandstorms, and blue-robed, nomadic inhabitants.

Yet the Western Sahara is the scene of a major four-year-old war for national independence waged by Algerian-backed Polisario Front guerrillas against Morocco and, until recently, Mauritania—a struggle which now threatens to escalate into a large-scale regional and even international conflict. In that struggle, an old friend of the United States, the Kingdom of Morocco, seeks American military support for a cause which the overwhelming majority of countries in the world oppose as a contradiction of the very principle of national self-determination. Most important, perhaps, the Moroccan request poses anew the fundamental question raised by our experiences in Angola, Iran and Nicaragua—whether U.S. policy must always accommodate our friends even when they cling to ill-conceived or untenable positions, or whether our interests are better served by adapting to compelling regional circumstances.

At the moment, the Administration's policy toward the Western Sahara appears to be swinging toward a "globalist" approach which emphasizes the implications of the conflict for our reputation as a reliable ally rather than the intrinsic merits of the dispute itself. It has proposed, in spite of the reported opposition of the State Department and skepticism of the Central Intelligence Agency, to abandon its existing policy of selling Morocco arms only for the defense of its own internationally recognized boundaries. Instead, we would be providing King Hassan II with new

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weapons suitable for counterinsurgency warfare in the disputed area—particularly OV-10 “Bronco” armed reconnaissance aircraft and attack helicopters embellished by TOW antitank missiles. In the coming months, Congress will be reviewing these and any other proposed military sales in the context of both the Arms Export Control Act and the overall foreign assistance program for Morocco. The issues posed by the Saharan war are unlikely to be resolved quickly, and they will undoubtedly provide a major test of our post-Vietnam diplomacy.

Last July, the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee held hearings on U.S. policy toward the conflict in the Western Sahara. In addition to academic experts on the region, we heard from Administration witnesses who presented a series of arms sales options, most of which involved some change in our existing policy of public neutrality on the substance of the dispute in the Western Sahara. As Chairman of the Subcommittee, I felt a need to become more familiar with many of the complex and controversial issues raised at our hearings before coming to a judgment on our overall policy. In an effort to get a better sense of the situation in the Sahara and its implications for American foreign policy in the region, I traveled last August to Morocco, Mauritania, the Western Sahara and Algeria (including the Polisario Front political headquarters and refugee camps at Tindouf) as well as to Spain, France and Liberia. Fortunately, I was able to meet all of the key leaders in the region, including King Hassan, Algerian President Chadli Benjedid, Mauritanian Prime Minister Ould Haidalla, and Polisario Deputy Secretary-General Bachir Mustapha Sayed, as well as a significant cross-section of relevant government and political elites.

One strong impression that I carried away from my trip was that the military and diplomatic drama now being played out in the Western Sahara is a political version of *Rashomon*. Like the characters in this Japanese film of a rape as seen from the very different perspectives of the rapist, the victim and the victim's husband, the major interested parties disagree profoundly over even the most basic facts of the situation, such as the population of the Western Sahara and the identity of the guerrilla forces. Morocco, for example, contends that there are at most 74,000 people who come from the Western Sahara and that the overwhelming majority of them are still there, living happily under Moroccan rule. The Polisario, on the other hand, argues that there are closer to 750,000 inhabitants of the territory and that they have almost all fled to refugee camps in Algeria and to other

neighboring states. Similarly, Morocco claims that the Polisario is a wholly owned and operated subsidiary of the Algerian government, created several years ago for the sole purpose of advancing Algeria's geopolitical interests in the region. Algeria, which hotly denies this analysis, contends that the Polisario is a genuinely indigenous and independent liberation movement with which it has a real sense of ideological identification but over which it does not exercise any direct control. And while Algeria acknowledges its strong support for the Polisario's effort to establish an independent Saharan state, it argues forcefully that it is not engaged, nor does it have any interest in, destabilizing the Moroccan government. Indeed, given the extent to which any successor leadership in Rabat is likely to be at least as militantly nationalistic as the current government, Algerian leaders say they "prefer the devil we know to the devil we don't know."

I found out personally just how difficult it can be to sift fact from fiction amidst the shifting political sands of the Sahara. From 1975 onward, Morocco shared with Mauritania a *de facto* condominium over the Western Sahara, following the departure of the former colonial power, Spain. In early August 1979, however, the Polisario and Mauritania signed a peace treaty in which Mauritania renounced all territorial claims to its portion of the territory. A week later Morocco augmented troops which were already in this area in accordance with a previous Moroccan-Mauritanian agreement. At that time, I was told by Colonel Dlimi, the head of Morocco's security services, that there had just been spontaneous demonstrations of support for Morocco throughout the Mauritanian section and most notably in the major city of Dakhla (population 5,000, according to the 1974 Spanish census). The Colonel even produced two journalists who had just returned from Dakhla and testified to the existence of the demonstrations and their apparent sincerity. He then asked if I would like to go to Dakhla in order to see the situation for myself. Since the existence of such demonstrations seemed to indicate that the inhabitants of the territory identified with Morocco rather than the Polisario (which, if true, would constitute a fact of enormous political significance), I decided to accept the Colonel's invitation.

The next morning I was flown to the city in the King's private airplane. When I arrived, I was greeted by nearly a thousand people, which I was told was the entire population of Dakhla, enthusiastically waving red Moroccan flags and photographs of King Hassan while loudly chanting slogans of allegiance to Mo-

rocco. Although Moroccan troops were everywhere in evidence, it did appear as if the demonstrators were genuinely committed to the Moroccan cause. Having suspected that many of the people in Dakhla might be pro-Mauritanian and pro-Polisario, I was a little surprised to see such a unanimous expression of pro-Moroccan feeling. When I subsequently arrived in Mauritania, however, I was informed by high Mauritanian officials that the demonstrators I had observed were largely Moroccans whom the retreating Mauritanian administration had observed arriving in Dakhla by air the previous day. Finally, when I arrived at the Polisario camp in Tindouf, Algeria, I was told by the former Mayor of Dakhla and other ex-residents that the true population of prewar Dakhla was in excess of 15,000 but that nearly all the residents had voted with their feet for the Polisario by fleeing the city. All of this was a powerful reminder of the difficulty of establishing an objective basis for a rational analysis of the problem and the consequent desirability of a cautious approach toward policy-making.

II

The Western Sahara lies along the Atlantic coast of northwest Africa opposite the Canary Islands, and is bounded by Morocco to the north, Algeria to the east, and Mauritania to the south and east. Spain commenced its colonization of the territory in 1884 but did not complete its conquest of the interior until 1934. Until little more than a decade ago, the majority of the indigenous population led a nomadic existence arising from the desert's unsuitability for farming and the need to move toward areas where there is sufficient rainfall to support an animal-based economy. Their quest for water often took the several Western Saharan tribes into neighboring countries without regard for colonial or postcolonial frontiers.

The situation changed some with the discovery of the world's fourth largest phosphate deposit at Bu Craa in 1963. Subsequently, as a result of the combined impacts of Spanish efforts to develop the local economy and the Sahelian drought of 1968-73, most of the population had become settled in small cities and towns by the end of the 1960s. Inspired by the worldwide anticolonial movement, the new urban elite began to form modern nationalist political movements. After 1966, the U.N. General Assembly passed several resolutions calling for a U.N.-supervised referendum in the Western Sahara to enable the indigenous population "to exercise freely its right to self-determination and independence." At the same time, Morocco and Mauritania as-

serted historical claims to the area and argued that the results of any true consultation with the people of the territory would be favorable to their respective causes and countries.

In May 1975, an eight-day U.N. Visiting Mission led by representatives of Iran, the Ivory Coast and Cuba, which traveled all over the Western Sahara, concluded that "the population, or at least almost all those persons encountered by the Mission, was categorically for independence and against the territorial claims of Morocco and Mauritania." Moreover, they said the Polisario Front (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia El Hamra and Rio De Oro—the two major regions of the Western Sahara) "appeared as a dominant political force in the Territory. The Mission witnessed mass demonstrations in support of the movement in all parts of the Territory."

Morocco and Mauritania had previously requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding the legitimacy of their historical claims to the Western Sahara. Despite the repeated assertions I heard from virtually every Moroccan I met that the decision of the ICJ constituted a legal endorsement of their position, the truth is that the Court's ruling, which was handed down in October 1975, represented a decisive rejection of the case for Moroccan and Mauritanian sovereignty over the Western Sahara. For while the Court acknowledged "indications" at the time of Spanish colonization of "ties of allegiance" between the Sultan of Morocco and "some, but only some of the nomadic tribes of the territory"—along with overlapping "ties" between "almost all the nomadic tribes of Western Sahara" and the "Mauritanian entity"—it declared that these historic ties did not amount to "effective and exclusive state activity" and therefore did "not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity." The people of the territory, therefore, were entitled to determine their own future as provided for in numerous U.N. resolutions.

Despite this adverse ruling, Morocco and Mauritania pursued their claims to the Western Sahara. In November 1975, while General Franco lay on his deathbed in Madrid and the Spanish government was politically incapacitated by the impending succession crisis, Morocco launched its dramatic "Green March," in which 350,000 Moroccans, armed only with the Koran in one hand and the Moroccan flag in the other, walked into the Sahara in a modern ritual of manifest destiny. Confronted in a moment of internal political disarray, Spain signed the tripartite Madrid

Agreement on November 14, under which it agreed to withdraw from the Western Sahara by February 28, 1976.

Although the Madrid Accords established a Moroccan-Mauritanian "interim government" in the territory, they also provided for the "collaboration of the Jema'a," the largely Spanish-picked local territorial council; declared that the views of the Saharan population, as expressed through the Jema'a, "will be respected"; and mandated that the U.N. Secretary-General be informed of the various measures taken. Convoked by the Polisario Front only two weeks after the Madrid Accords, the Jema'a voted to dissolve itself and transfer its authority to the Polisario. Reassembled a few months later, however, by Morocco and Mauritania, it agreed to the partition of the Western Sahara between the two claimants. But the withdrawing Spanish authorities refused to attend this decisive session on the ground that the U.N. Secretary-General had declined to send a representative to legitimate the consultation, and to this day the Spanish have contended that the second Jema'a vote did not constitute a free and genuine expression of the will of the Saharan people. In April 1976, Morocco and Mauritania, claiming that a legitimate act of self-determination had already taken place, officially partitioned the Sahara, with the former annexing the more populous and phosphate-rich northern two-thirds and the latter taking the southern third.

As the Moroccan and Mauritanian military moved in during late 1975, the Polisario helped organize an exodus of much of the territory's population to Tindouf, Algeria, where a refugee camp for Sahelian drought victims had already been established. In the years that followed, the Front conducted an increasingly successful hit-and-run war for independence from its Algerian rear base, backed by military supplies and financial aid from Algeria and Libya. Last August an exhausted Mauritania, unwilling to defend itself further against increasingly effective Polisario attacks, signed a peace treaty with the Polisario, renouncing all territorial claims in the Western Sahara. In a secret annex to the treaty, Mauritania stipulated that it would turn over its section of the Sahara—called the Tiris el Gharbia—to the Polisario in seven months. But Morocco, unwilling to permit the Polisario to establish itself in the southern part of the territory and determined in any case to assert its historic claim to the entire Western Sahara, promptly and forcibly annexed the Tiris as its 37th province.

Since January 1979, the Polisario has also mounted a series of attacks on a stretch of southern Morocco which is largely populated by Saharan exiles and related ethnic groups. Their purpose

is evidently to further sap Morocco's will to continue the war in much the same way they succeeded through similar attacks against Mauritania in eroding Mauritania's commitment to the conflict. In the Western Sahara itself, over 50,000 Moroccan troops are increasingly confined to a handful of urban enclaves (both north and south of the original demarcation line) where they are regularly besieged by a growing Polisario contingent of at least 12-15,000 full-time guerrillas.

The Polisario's military success in the last year has been matched by its growing diplomatic support. At the recent summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Monrovia, Liberia, a resolution calling for a cease-fire and internationally supervised referendum to determine the political future of the Western Sahara was adopted by a vote of 33 to 2 with 8 abstentions. This resolution was based on the report and recommendations of an OAU "wise men's" committee consisting of Presidents Nimeiri of Sudan, Obasanjo of Nigeria, Traoré of Mali, Touré of Guinea, and Nyerere of Tanzania. The subsequent Nonaligned Conference in Havana endorsed the OAU's recommendations and condemned Morocco's forcible seizure of the Tiris el Gharbia following the Polisario-Mauritania peace treaty. The United Nations, which has consistently called for self-determination and specifically invited an OAU role, seems prepared to make a similar expression. The Polisario's government-in-exile, the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic, has now been recognized by 32 mainly African states. Their ranks comprise not only the more "radical" regimes like Ethiopia, Mozambique and Benin, but also "conservative" countries like Togo and Rwanda and "moderate" governments like Mexico, Tanzania and Uganda.

The reasons for Morocco's persistence in the Sahara include: a powerful nationalism which has in recent times generated claims to all of Mauritania and parts of Algeria and Senegal as well; King Hassan's use of the "national cause" as a means of bolstering his internal political standing; control over Saharan phosphates by a country which already provides 40 percent of world phosphates exports and could significantly enhance its market power by adding an additional 20-25 percent from Bu Craa; and a concern about the appearance of a shift in the regional power balance in favor of the Polisario's Algerian and Libyan backers. For Algeria, what began in 1975 as a strategic political counter to Moroccan expansionism and perhaps a quest for a more secure passageway to the Atlantic to facilitate the profitable development of its own iron mines at Gara Djebilet, has since ripened into an

ideological commitment to the same sort of armed struggle for self-determination that Algeria itself engaged in two decades earlier and that constitutes an important asset for Algeria's Third World diplomacy.

III

When I began my visit to the region, I leaned toward the view that there might well be a convincing strategic and political case for changing our arms sales policy toward Morocco. But I came away from my trip persuaded that the proposed sale of offensive arms to Morocco for use in the Western Sahara would have significantly negative consequences for U.S. foreign policy and that the advantages cited in behalf of such a course of action are either minimal or nonexistent.

In the first place, it would be a fundamental contradiction of the principles on which our country was founded, as well as our commitment to human rights, if we were to assist in the suppression of a genuinely indigenous and internationally recognized effort to achieve self-determination, particularly in the absence of any compelling strategic considerations to the contrary.

Although Moroccan spokesmen have charged that the Polisario is mainly an Algerian creation and that its following consists largely of Algerian mercenaries and Sahelian refugees, these allegations are contradicted by the reports of more objective observers. It was the 1975 U.N. Visiting Mission, dominated by representatives of two conservative states (Iran and the Ivory Coast), which first brought the Polisario Front's dominant political position in the Sahara to the world's attention. More recent reports by area specialists, journalists and veteran observers of African liberation movements who have visited the Front's refugee camps in Tindouf and traveled with guerrilla units in the Sahara conclude that the Polisario is overwhelmingly based on the indigenous Western Saharan population, that it has managed to create a national as opposed to a purely tribal sense of political consciousness, and that it has achieved an extraordinary degree of independent organizational competence.¹ As a leading Spanish official with long experience of the Western Sahara problem commented, "The Polisario has created a nation."²

¹ *U.S. Policy and the Conflict in the Western Sahara*, Subcommittees on Africa and on International Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st Session, July 23-24, 1979, Washington: GPO, 1979.

² Those not familiar with the Western Sahara have sometimes tended to connect the Polisario with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Despite their similar names they have little in common. The PLO is formally committed to the establishment of a Palestinian state and the elimination of an existing state, Israel, while the Polisario is committed only to the

Some have questioned the viability of an independent Saharan state in view of the Spanish census of 1974 which revealed only 74,000 inhabitants. However, both the U.N. Visiting Mission and more recent studies suggest that the Spanish count omitted significant numbers of nomads and tens of thousands of exiles in Morocco and Mauritania who had fled the combined French-Spanish repression of 1958. If one also adds those in neighboring countries (especially Mauritania) who have an ethnic or familial connection to the Saharans and would be inclined to cast their lot with an independent Saharan state, it is reasonable to estimate a population of at least 125,000 to 150,000.³ In any case, with its natural resources of phosphates and its rich coastal fisheries, not to mention possibilities for iron and oil, the Western Sahara should not have great difficulty in supporting its modest population.

Because of the character of the conflict and the nature of the weapons it is using, the impression has developed in some Western circles that the Polisario is the cutting edge of Soviet expansion in the Maghreb. Actually, based on my personal conversations with the Polisario leadership as well as other sources, it would appear that the Front is neither pro-Marxist nor pro-Soviet. In response to questions, the Polisario leaders indicated that, in the context of an independent Saharan state, they would be inclined, for economic, cultural and geopolitical reasons, to look toward the West, not the East, for support. In fact, they are the only major liberation movement in Africa that has not received direct Soviet, Cuban or Chinese military assistance. A substantial amount of their equipment is Soviet in origin, but this has been transferred from Algeria and Libya, which purchased the arms with hard currency. There is no evidence that the Soviets, who have a substantial investment in Moroccan phosphates, have approved or encouraged these transfers and indeed no Eastern bloc country has yet recognized the Polisario government-in-exile. The Polisario's main political effort in Europe has been directed toward the West European democratic socialist parties, not the East European communist parties.

Concerning future intraregional relations, the Front's leadership acknowledges its intention to maintain close relations with Algeria

establishment of a Saharan state and does not aim to eliminate Morocco as an independent country. The PLO has also conducted acts of terrorism against civilians, whereas the Polisario campaign is directed against military rather than civilian targets.

³ This is the conclusion of a forthcoming Ford Foundation-sponsored study of the Western Saharan issue by Tony Hodges. See also footnote 1 above.

but also places considerable emphasis on the necessity of cooperation with Morocco "since we share 500 kilometers of border with Morocco but only 50 with Algeria." As an illustration of their desire for a negotiated settlement they cite the clause in the Mauritania-Polisario peace treaty which would have delayed a Polisario administration for seven months, thereby providing the King with an opportunity to save face in the context of his joining a diplomatic negotiation.

Given its diplomatic preferences, the Polisario Front has refrained from asking the Soviets for military support because it does not want to internationalize the conflict. But if the United States changes its policy and begins to provide Morocco with new counterinsurgency equipment for use in the Western Sahara, it could push the Front toward global alignments which would be unfavorable to our own interests in the region. In any case, while we may not have any real interest in facilitating the establishment of a Saharan homeland in the Western Sahara, neither do we have any significant interest in preventing it.

Second, according to U.S. military experts, the Moroccan army is unlikely to achieve anything more than marginal improvements in its unfavorable military position no matter what equipment we provide. The major weaknesses of the Moroccan military in the Western Sahara are in the areas of communications, command and control. The problem lies in the King's refusal to grant his field commanders enough autonomy to communicate directly with each other and to react quickly to local circumstances. Since King Hassan fears a renewal of the coup attempts of 1971 and 1972, he continues to insist on overcentralized communications and command structures. Thus, several hours often pass between a reported attack on a Moroccan garrison and the arrival of nearby air power, since the request has to go through Rabat. Furthermore, field commanders lack the authority to embark on preventive patrolling. These conditions also help sap military morale, as do the unfavorable climate, the increasing number of Polisario guerrillas, and the gap between largely incompetent (but loyal), corrupt senior officers and middle or lower ranking cadres. Sophisticated American arms, however generously supplied, will prove ineffective in the absence of a significant improvement in the ability of the Moroccan army to effectively integrate them into its order of battle.

Third, a change in our arms sales policy toward Morocco would probably halt the improvement that has taken place in our economic and political relationship with Algeria, which is the

become a much more important economic partner of the United States than Morocco. Thus Algeria provides nine percent of our crude oil imports (16 percent of East Coast imports) and two percent of our total natural gas consumption; U.S. firms have won over \$6 billion in construction contracts since the early 1970s; and Export-Import Bank loans and guarantees now total \$1.4 billion.

Politically, Algeria tends to be remembered for its militant sponsorship of a New International Economic Order as well as support for a potpourri of national liberation movements. However, there is strong evidence, particularly since the election of Chadli Benjedid to succeed the late Houari Boumedienne as President in February 1979, that Algeria has begun to take more moderate positions on a number of international issues which are consistent with our own policy objectives. The Algerians worked with Yugoslavia and India at Havana in the effort to prevent Cuba from directing the nonaligned movement toward a distinctly pro-Soviet position; favored a peaceful resolution of the conflict between North and South Yemen at a time when the Soviets were supporting the latter in the use of military forces; opposed Soviet policy in Ethiopia and Uganda by supporting the Eritreans and the Tanzanian-aided overthrow of Idi Amin; and stiffened their previously tolerant attitude toward airplane hijacking.

In the course of my conversations with high Algerian officials, they privately acknowledged that the state of Israel is an "historical reality" whose existence must be taken into account in the context of a comprehensive resolution of the conflict in the Middle East, criticized Cuba's overambitious policy in Africa and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and expressed interest in purchasing U.S. military supplies. Furthermore, unlike Boumedienne, Benjedid appears to be much more of a pragmatist than an ideologue, and there is reason to believe that, if and when the new Algerian President consolidates his power, the stage will be set for further progress in the relations between our two countries. But such an improvement will probably become much more difficult to achieve if, in the interim, we abandon our policy of neutrality and tilt in favor of Morocco by providing it with arms for use in the Sahara.

Fourth, a change in our arms-sales policy would have adverse consequences for our relations with a number of important African and Third World countries. The OAU summit's overwhelming approval last July of the recommendations of its wise men for a cease-fire and internationally supervised referendum constituted

a real watershed in Africa's view of the Western Sahara issue. It represented a clear turn away from the Organization's previous temporizing approach, reflecting both the Polisario's military and diplomatic gains and the wise men's own research into an unresolved problem of self-determination.

Of course OAU resolutions do not, in and of themselves, convey the intensity of African feeling on an issue, or the extent to which an apparently opposed U.S. policy could affect our African relations. Obviously the Western Sahara is not going to replace Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa as the main area of African interest in international affairs. Yet I was impressed by OAU Chairman and Liberian President Tolbert's observation that the OAU vote indicated "a clear consensus in Africa for self-determination in the Western Sahara" and that "Africa would look with much disfavor" upon a change in our arms sales policy. Other important friends of the United States in Africa, particularly Nigeria and Tanzania, who have appreciated the determination of the Carter Administration to view African problems in an African context, would also see such a change in policy as an implicit repudiation of the new direction in which the President has steered our African policy. While few states are likely to permit bilateral relations with the United States to suffer due to this issue alone, a change in our policy could contribute to cumulative downturns where there are also other matters of concern.

In the aftermath of the OAU vote, we are seeing growing support for the Polisario position at the United Nations, in other world forums, and in individual acts of diplomatic recognition. Because the United States must seek diplomatic support in a variety of multilateral institutions, it would be a serious mistake to antagonize African and Third World nations on a major issue unless there were compelling strategic and political interests at stake. For example, at the World Health Assembly last June, and in a variety of international meetings subsequently, it was the voting strength of the Africans which blocked Arab efforts to take punitive action against Egypt and Israel. The African group in the nonaligned movement joined with others to successfully block efforts at Havana to expel Egypt. A decision on the part of the United States to provide Morocco with offensive arms—clearly contradicting the OAU resolution calling for a cease-fire and an exercise in self-determination—could make it more difficult for us to attain such support from African and other Third World countries in the future.

Fifth, a decision to provide Morocco with new arms suitable for use in the Sahara would require us simultaneously to change our interpretation of the 1960 U.S.-Morocco military agreement under which Morocco is not permitted to use American weapons outside of its internationally recognized borders. Such a reinterpretation would constitute a significant retreat from the Administration's own efforts to prevent U.S. arms exports from contributing to dangerous military conflicts abroad.

For almost two years we have maintained a policy of refusing to sell Morocco the equipment in question precisely because Morocco refuses to abide by our existing interpretation of the 1960 agreement which prohibits the use of U.S. weapons in the Sahara. In fact, Morocco today continues to use our F-5 aircraft and 106 mm. recoilless guns in the Western Sahara⁴ despite official U.S. requests to redeploy such equipment to Morocco proper. For us now to revise our interpretation of the agreement in order to sell Morocco new arms for the Sahara would be to condone Morocco's past behavior and invite similar violations of U.S. restrictions elsewhere.

Part of the rationale for both new equipment and a new interpretation of the bilateral accord is that since the Polisario has launched an intensified series of attacks on southern Morocco, Morocco now needs to use U.S. arms in the Sahara in order to defend its own recognized borders. However, it is one thing to countenance Morocco's occasional use of American equipment to respond to specific attacks upon its internationally recognized territory and quite another to revise our interpretation of the bilateral military accord in the context of Morocco's continuing campaign to enforce its claim of sovereignty in the Western Sahara—a claim which has not been recognized by a single country in the world. Such action would clearly go against the grain of our government's past support for the international legal doctrine of "proportionate" reprisal under which we have accepted only limited use by Israel of American military equipment in its effort to strike back at PLO terrorists in southern Lebanon.

Another element of the proposed reinterpretation is the notion that Morocco's "administrative authority" over the Western Sahara justifies its use of U.S. equipment for "internal defense and security" in the administered areas. But this would require us to ignore the clear intention of the international community to deal with the Western Saharan problem by political, not military,

⁴ *U.S. Policy and the Conflict in the Western Sahara*, p. 153.

action, as well as our own statements of support for a regional solution. The OAU has specifically called for the "preparation of an atmosphere suitable for peace in the region through an immediate and general ceasefire." In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Africa, Nicholas Veliotis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs declared, "We hope that the issue can be solved on a regional basis, specifically by the OAU," and Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, said "We have offered to help [the OAU and other mediators] in any way that we can."⁵

Finally, whatever the legal case for permitting Morocco to defend that part of the Sahara over which it has exercised de facto administrative control since 1975, there would appear to be no merit in the argument that Morocco should be allowed to use American military equipment in that part of the Western Sahara which Morocco recently moved into over the opposition of its former Mauritanian partner. It is hard to see how giving Morocco permission to utilize American military equipment throughout the Western Sahara could be in any way squared with the relevant legislation's reference to "legitimate self-defense." It would in fact be seen by the world as a reward for aggression.

IV

In view of the demonstrable disadvantages associated with the Administration's newly announced policy of providing Morocco with arms specifically suitable for use in the Western Sahara, what are the presumed advantages which would result from this course?

Some have argued that we should alter our existing arms sales policy in order to maintain or enhance our mutually beneficial relationship with the pro-Western regime in Morocco, or even to prevent a friendly King from having to give up his throne because he had to give up the Western Sahara.

There is no doubt that Morocco has been helpful in a variety of ways to the West in general, and the United States in particular. The Moroccan government does, for example, permit port visits

⁵ *Economic and Military Assistance Programs in Africa*, Subcommittees on Africa and on International Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, March 1, 1978, Washington: GPO, 1978, p. 156; *U.S. Policy and the Conflict in the Western Sahara*, p. 103.

by our ships and refueling stops by our airplanes. It helped facilitate the initial Sadat-Begin contacts which later culminated in the Camp David Agreements. And it sent troops to Zaïre's Shaba province to protect Western interests at the time of the second invasion of Zaïre by Katangan exiles living in Angola.

On the other hand, if our relationship with Morocco is to be seen in its proper perspective, it should also be noted that Morocco has occasionally acted in ways that are not compatible with our regional concerns: it dispatched three brigades to fight against Israel in the 1973 War; it voted for the 1975 U.N. resolution stating that "Zionism is a form of racism"; it joined the other hard-line Arab states at the Baghdad Summit in October 1978 in denouncing the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt; it has severed diplomatic relations with Cairo; and it excluded an Egyptian delegation from the Islamic Conference at Fez last spring. Consequently, while we clearly have an interest in a close and constructive relationship with Morocco, we have no obligation, morally or politically, to support Morocco in what is essentially an unjust and unwinnable war.

Fortunately, there are other ways in which we can indicate a continuing responsiveness to Morocco's legitimate diplomatic and military requirements. We could, for example, continue to provide Morocco with arms primarily designed for the defense of Morocco rather than the annexation of the Western Sahara, while increasing the level of our economic and humanitarian assistance. Last spring when the Administration was reviewing its arms sales policy toward Morocco, it indicated that our refusal to provide Morocco with offensive arms had caused a significant strain in the overall relationship between our two countries. Yet in spite of that, King Hassan and his principal advisers recently described the state of U.S.-Moroccan relations as "excellent." In part, this reflected U.S. cooperation in the return airlift of Moroccan troops from Shaba, Congress' recent decision to increase the amount of overall military aid by 50 percent, and the Administration's earlier approval of the sale of U.S.-licensed, Italian-made Chinook helicopters contracted for prior to the imposition of our Saharan restrictions, as well as spare parts and ammunition for previously supplied F-5 aircraft.

The Moroccan government also has its own interest in maintaining good relations with the United States even if there continue to be restrictions on the use of our military equipment. After France, we are Morocco's greatest Western source of economic

and military assistance, and our moderating diplomatic influence would be an important trump card for Morocco in an eventual negotiation to end the war in the Sahara. In fact, the Moroccan leaders with whom I spoke put much more emphasis on the need for U.S. diplomatic understanding than they did on the need for new arms. Needless to say, it is inconceivable that the conservative Moroccan leadership would turn in spite toward the Soviets even in the unlikely event that the latter wished to antagonize the Third World by associating itself with a war against self-determination. Therefore, to the extent that we continue to be responsive to the Moroccan government's need for defensive arms, economic assistance and diplomatic ties, our refusal to supply the requested counterinsurgency equipment should not occasion a serious break in our relationship with the King.

Some have speculated that a willingness to be more forthcoming in the sale of offensive American arms would encourage Morocco to reverse its current opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, thereby advancing U.S. interests in the Middle East. But a more credible reading is that the King has decided to sever relations with Egypt and refrain from supporting the Camp David process because he clearly believes that the opposite course would be incompatible with his own political interest in avoiding isolation within the Arab world. In this connection, it is worth noting that the Saudis, who steadfastly oppose the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, are now Morocco's leading source of external assistance and have offered to pay for any new American arms. To the extent that Morocco is relying on Saudi Arabia for financial assistance in acquiring the arms it hopes for from the United States, it is exceedingly unlikely that the King would take a course of action that would be unwelcome to his Saudi supporters.

Some are also persuaded that, in view of the impressive mobilization of the Moroccan people during the Green March and their continued overt support of the war for the Sahara, the King could not survive politically if he agreed to substantial concessions to the Polisario. Thus they urge a change in our arms sales policy to enable a relatively pro-Western regime to continue in power. Yet both governmental analysts and journalists have detected a growing war-weariness in Morocco during the last year, evidenced by private anti-war expressions among the heavily taxed upper-middle class, widespread strikes by workers unwilling to sacrifice for the "national cause," and reports of anti-war sentiment in important sections of the army. Notwithstanding the diverse

discontents caused by the conflict and its consequences, the Moroccan political parties—from the Communists on the Left to the Istiqlal nationalists on the Right—do tend to be more monarchical than the monarch on this issue. And the King has legitimate reason to fear that a *precipitate* withdrawal from the Sahara could lead to his own downfall. A number of well-informed U.S. experts believe, however, that the King might well be able to prepare his country for a realistic but face-saving settlement. Indeed it is quite possible that the King faces greater risks to his throne—from both the Right and the Left—by continuing an unwinnable and expensive war than by moving carefully to end it. In this sense, the sale of offensive American arms to Morocco for use in the Sahara may do more ultimately to undermine the monarchy than to shore it up.

The real threat to the King is not from without but from within. If there is no way he can militarily drive the Polisario from the field, there is also no way the Polisario can militarily force Morocco out of the Western Sahara. But by encouraging the King to maintain the illusion that a military victory is possible, we are much more likely to prolong the war than to shorten it. And with Morocco spending a million dollars a day on a war it cannot win the King will be less able to deal with the festering problems within Morocco itself.

Recognizing the overriding U.S. interest in preventing the internationalization of what has thus far been a localized crisis, the Administration has argued that a change in policy would increase our influence with Morocco, putting us in a better position to urge a negotiated solution of the conflict. In reality, the proposed arms sales would be more likely to have the opposite effect. During the course of my conversations with the King and his chief military advisers, they made it clear that they looked toward U.S. arms for the Sahara as a means of producing a quick Moroccan victory. To the extent that Moroccan decision-makers believe that a military victory is possible—in spite of the opinion of knowledgeable military analysts that such a victory is impossible—our selling Morocco arms suitable for use in the Sahara would not encourage it to make the concessions necessary for a diplomatic solution of the conflict. Morocco's failure to explore new negotiating possibilities at the time of the Mauritanian-Polisario treaty, its forcible annexation of the ex-Mauritanian sector, and its continued refusal to admit that it is fighting an indigenous foe in the Western Sahara, all suggest that new American arms will be used with the aim of securing a military victory

rather than to facilitate a negotiated settlement. On the other hand, an ineffectual but provocative U.S. policy change is likely to result in a hardening of the Algerian and Polisario positions, and to the extent that their cooperation is necessary for a peaceful resolution of the problem it will probably reduce the chances for a negotiated settlement.

Most important, the longer the conflict goes on the greater are the risks of escalation and internationalization. With the Polisario now engaged in periodic raids against Morocco proper, the King is under considerable pressure from frustrated military commanders and an angry population to strike back at the main Polisario bases in Algeria. So far Morocco has acted with great restraint in responding to these Polisario incursions. But the possibility of regular Moroccan forces engaging in "hot pursuit" of Polisario guerrillas, and coming into conflict with the Algerian army, cannot be dismissed. Lately Egypt has become somewhat involved in the conflict by shipping Morocco light arms and ammunition. Until now, the Polisario Front has refrained from large-scale recruitment of ethnic Saharans living in Mauritania or from using Mauritanian territory to mount attacks on Moroccan positions in the Sahara. Nor has it acted to obtain advanced military equipment or advisers from the Soviet Union and Cuba. If we change our policy, the Eastern bloc countries could see an opportunity to gain an advantage, particularly in view of the Polisario's favorable military prospects and widespread diplomatic support, and move to become involved in a conflict from which they have thus far abstained.

Finally, some have suggested that a change in our arms sales policy would be seen by other countries as a manifestation of our willingness to help a friend in need and would therefore bolster our overall global credibility in the aftermath of perceived defeats in Angola, Iran and Nicaragua. While there are some countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt which would be clearly pleased by such a development, even they do not view our arms sales policy toward Morocco as a litmus test of our determination to come to the aid of friendly countries. For example, the Saudis assigned an infinitely higher priority to U.S. military support of neighboring North Yemen when it was attacked by South Yemen last year than they do to U.S. military assistance to Morocco in the Sahara. Other friends of the United States with interests in the region would be very displeased, particularly Spain (whose Prime Minister has declared that self-determination has not yet taken place and whose governing party recognizes the Polisario

Front as the legitimate representative of the Saharan people). The French position is characteristically ambiguous. While abandoning previous official rhetoric against "microstates" and placing some restrictions on arms deliveries and new arms contracts for Morocco, the French would apparently like the United States to assume a military role that they themselves have partially relinquished due to their own interests in Algeria, Africa and the Third World.

Actually, a change in our arms sales policy would virtually guarantee the very crisis of credibility that it purports to avoid. Since the equipment in question would not significantly alter the Moroccan military and diplomatic position, it would simply link us more closely with a deteriorating situation. As in Angola, increased U.S. military involvement without corresponding prospects for military success could lead to a widening international credibility gap and domestic recriminations as well. On the other hand, to the extent that we provide Morocco with arms for its own self-defense but not for use in the Sahara, we can maintain that we are willing to help our friends, but not by providing assistance in a war of dubious legitimacy which has attracted virtually no international support. At the same time, we could explain to the Saudis and Egyptians that U.S. arms cannot reverse Morocco's military and diplomatic decline but might provoke a dangerous escalation, and we could encourage them to work for a political solution.

v

Beyond providing Morocco with additional assistance for its legitimate military and economic concerns while maintaining a policy of neutrality in the dispute in the Western Sahara, there are other things that the United States could do to advance its interests in the region.

Our primary objective should be to facilitate a resolution of the conflict. Unfortunately, a negotiated settlement will not be easy to achieve. On both the substance of a solution as well as the modalities of a negotiation the parties to the conflict are far apart. Morocco, contending that the Polisario is not a free agent, insists on solving the problem through bilateral discussions with Algeria, which it firmly believes holds the key to a solution. Algeria, on the other hand, takes the position that the conflict in the Sahara is between the Polisario and Morocco, and that any negotiation to bring the war to an end should be between them. Similarly,

while Morocco is prepared to accept a settlement based on the principle of autonomy within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty, but is not willing to consider a withdrawal from the Western Sahara, the Polisario is insisting on complete independence (or at least the right of self-determination which, in their view, would produce the same result) and categorically rejects the possibility of accepting autonomy in lieu of sovereignty.

It probably would not be appropriate for the United States to take the initiative in seeking a negotiated settlement of the conflict. We could, however, quietly encourage other interested parties, such as Spain, Saudi Arabia, France and the OAU, to take the initiative in moving the dispute from the battlefield to the conference table.

Whether or not the final determination of Western Saharan sovereignty comes through an internationally supervised referendum (as recommended by the OAU and other international organizations),⁶ other possible arrangements which might be conducive to compromise include: the establishment of a loose political and economic confederation in the region as one means of providing the Polisario with a political entity in the Western Sahara while simultaneously saving King Hassan's diplomatic face; joint Moroccan-Western Saharan ownership and management of the phosphate mine at Bu Craa (currently Morocco owns 65 percent and Spain 35 percent, although there has been no production for several years due to wartime insecurity); and provision for continued Moroccan access to sub-Saharan Africa through minor adjustments in the borders of an independent Western Sahara.

We should also quietly ease the existing prohibitions on contacts between our diplomats and Polisario officials and on visits by our diplomatic personnel to the Moroccan-held areas of the Western Sahara. These self-imposed restrictions were originally based on a well-intentioned desire to appear neutral on the substance of the dispute. But for us to continue these restrictions in the current circumstances is to deprive ourselves of the information needed for rational decision-making on a major world problem. We paid a significant political price for depriving ourselves of such potentially informative contacts in Iran, and there is no reason to make the same mistake again.

⁶ While the modalities of such a referendum would be complex, they would not be insuperable given a modicum of goodwill on all sides. In this connection, the very detailed Spanish census of 1974 could serve as a helpful, if incomplete, means of establishing a list of eligible voters.

The case of the Western Sahara illustrates the need to avoid an approach to foreign policy problems that poses a stark contrast between a “globalist” position of supporting our friends regardless of the indigenous realities and a “regionalist” position of adapting to local circumstances regardless of international implications. It is true that Morocco is a friend in difficulty but there is more than one way that we can respond to its need for external assistance. Under existing circumstances the sale of counterinsurgency military equipment to Morocco for use in its war of annexation in the Western Sahara is compatible neither with our ideals nor our interests.

John Hume

THE IRISH QUESTION: A BRITISH PROBLEM

The current cycle of conflict in Northern Ireland began over 11 years ago. As a practicing politician in Northern Ireland throughout that period, I have taken a particular interest while traveling abroad in following the world media coverage of the problem. For the most part, this has been a chronicle of atrocities reported spasmodically from London or by “firemen” visiting from London. It has struck me that, for the outside observer, it must have been difficult during these years to avoid the impression that Northern Ireland was hopelessly sunk in incoherence and its people the victims of a particularly opaque political pathology. There have, it is true, been a few brief interludes when some measure of clarity seemed to take hold, only to be swept away in the inevitable swirling clouds of violence, intransigence and misery—in other words, the normal political climate.

The people of Northern Ireland, however divided, share a keen awareness of the bewilderment of outsiders, which occasionally finds expression in the mock-heroic couplets of the street: “To Hell with the future and long live the past/May God in His mercy look down on Belfast.”

The cynicism and dismissiveness of the Irish style (Churchill’s Dunkirk exhortation, “The situation is serious but not desperate,” is said to have evoked the somewhat bleary comment from an Irish listener, “Over here the situation is always desperate but never serious”) often conceal, as the readers of Swift and Joyce know well, a quite serious desperation. Nevertheless, in its superficial manifestation the hopeless wit of the people proved congenial to those who are currently responsible for the affairs of Northern Ireland, and who, of all “outside” observers, often seem the most puzzled and wearied by its problem, i.e., the British political establishment. This is nothing new. It was, in fact, Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons in 1922, who most eloquently caught this feeling of his colleagues, then and since:

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Then came the Great War. . . . Every institution, almost, in the world was strained. Great empires have been overturned. The whole map of Europe has been changed. . . . The mode of thought of men, the whole outlook on affairs, the grouping of parties, all have encountered violent and tremendous changes in the deluge of the world, but as the deluge subsides and the waters fall, we see the dreary steeples of Fermanagh and Tyrone emerging once again. The integrity of their quarrel is one of the few institutions that have been unaltered in the cataclysm which has swept the world.

Other cataclysms have since supervened, and are themselves now forgotten, but "their quarrel" endures, now in a more grisly form than ever. Politically motivated violence is on the increase. Northern Ireland (population 1.5 million) has two new prisons and a third under construction. The skilled and the professionally trained emigrate while the economy stagnates, and the semiskilled and unskilled swell the unemployment lines as well as the ranks of the paramilitary organizations.

Some weeks ago, to coordinate its security efforts in Northern Ireland, the British government recalled from his retirement the man who reputedly furnished the model for George Smiley in John Le Carré's entertaining spy novels. This may be symptomatic of a long-standing British inability to take the Irish seriously (it should be admitted that the reverse tradition also exists). However, events recently unleashed a chilling shower, drenching Irish and British alike, from which the flippant, patronizing and slightly amused attitudes of the past afforded no refuge whatever. It is beyond high time the British and the Irish took each other—and our common crisis—seriously. There is, I believe, urgent need for the friends of Britain and Ireland to do likewise, and there is heartening evidence in fact that some of them have begun to do so.

It is my strong conviction, as well as that of my party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party of Northern Ireland, that the politics of Northern Ireland are not hopelessly irrational. They do have a meaning and a structure. The protagonists do act in the light of their interests as they perceive them, though their perceptions are sometimes mistaken. Events are, in fact, predictable—often, it must be admitted, depressingly so.

My conviction that there exist structure and meaning, and therefore hope, is not based simply on Henry Kissinger's moral injunction to statesmen that they must at all costs believe in the possibility of solutions to the most intractable impasses. I believe, as the title of this paper suggests, that the perennial British view of the problem as "their quarrel" and not "ours" is fundamentally

wrong: Britain is, in fact, included in the quarrel as a central protagonist, and must be centrally involved in the solution. It is for the acceptance of this principle that I and my party worked for years. There have, as I have implied, been moments when we seemed to have achieved a breakthrough. This does not seem to be such a moment, alas. All the more reason for putting the case again.

II

The problem, as I know from years of talking to foreign visitors, is at first sight a mass of contradictions. Some of the contradictions are real. London, for its part, exercises a reluctant sovereignty in Northern Ireland, while Dublin maintains a somewhat reluctant claim to that sovereignty. The "loyalists" are those proponents of the union with Britain who, while they are avowedly the most patriotic of all Her Majesty's subjects, put up the most stubborn resistance to her government's designs. The Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army believes Irish unity will be secured by waging war against a British establishment which clearly has no fundamental opposition to unity, while they ignore (and, in their campaign against Britain, further incite) those who must adamantly resist the imposition of unity, the one million Protestant majority. Does this mean things are hopeless? No, but it further underlines the necessity, reinforced by horrific events, that all major parties to this crisis should rigorously reexamine their own roles, responsibilities and room for maneuver.

The basis of British policy is concealed under layers of good intentions, ingenious initiatives, commissions of enquiry, attempted reforms, financial aid and a good deal of genial bewilderment. I do not use the word "concealed" maliciously. Many sincere and concerned British politicians and observers have the impression that they have tried everything possible to get the Irish to agree together: that is a measure of the extent to which the basic assumption of their policy has become imperceptible to the British themselves.

The ground of their policy is the reiterated guarantee that Northern Ireland shall remain a part of the United Kingdom so long as a majority of the electorate of Northern Ireland so desire. That would seem, at first reading, to be an eminently democratic and responsible undertaking. The fact is, however, that it has not worked. It has not produced peace or stable government in Northern Ireland. Moreover, it has provided the basis for a half

century of injustice, discrimination and repressive law, a situation in which the minority community (the one-third Catholics) have been the persistent losers and victims.

Northern Ireland is a divided community, divided not by theological differences but by conflicting nationalist aspirations. The Unionist majority historically favor maintenance of the union with Britain, while the one-third Catholic nationalist minority by and large favor a united Ireland. In 1921, when the overwhelmingly Catholic nationalist Free State was established in the south, the area of Northern Ireland was excluded from the arrangement because of British hesitancy (which proved to be an enduring feature of British policy) in the face of militant Protestant Unionist resistance.

"The British guarantee," as it is called, proved to be a guarantee of permanent exclusive power to one side, the Unionists, and a guarantee of permanent exclusion from power to the other, the Catholic minority. Its existence undermined any hope of political negotiation between the two sides in Northern Ireland. It guaranteed the integrity of "their" quarrel. While this guarantee exists, there is no incentive for Unionists to enter into genuine dialogue with those with whom they share the island of Ireland. The suffering and frustration of the people of Northern Ireland overwhelmingly attest to the fact that the guarantee was, to put it very bluntly, a tragic mistake. The price has been paid too long, and in too many lives.

The many attempts at reform, in which so much British as well as Irish energy was invested, all failed. The one initiative that almost succeeded was the Sunningdale Arrangement of 1973 between the British and Irish governments and the principal parties in Northern Ireland. This established a power-sharing government containing representatives of both sections of the community in Northern Ireland and accepted the principle of a Council of Ireland, which would provide a forum for north-south cooperation as well as a means of expression for the Irish nationalist aspiration, while Northern Ireland would continue to be a part of the United Kingdom. The establishment of power-sharing was a tribute to the political courage and imagination of the last Conservative government in Britain. Unfortunately, the Labour administration, which succeeded it early in 1974, showed no similar courage, and in May of that year, in what was one of the most squalid examples of government irresponsibility in our times, surrendered its policy in the face of a political strike organized by a paramilitary minority on the Unionist side. As a result, the

guarantee was not alone seen to be restored, it was seen to be reinforced: extreme Unionism or loyalism was encouraged in its belief that it could henceforth resist and jettison any British policy for Northern Ireland which involved conceding power to the minority.

The politics of Northern Ireland have not yet recovered from that setback, and, because of it, the problem for the British is even greater today than it was in 1973. Will the new Conservative government find the considerable courage it needs to face this compounded challenge? My hope is that Prime Minister Thatcher, in coming to grips with the problem, will commit all her vaunted capacity to reversing the blind momentum of British public policy, all her vaunted steadiness of nerve in the face of contrary pressure to secure and maintain a success. Failure, however, be it the failure to attempt a serious initiative or the failure to sustain an initiative under pressure, will only reinforce the difficulty, and the measure of failure will again be in the spreading field of white crosses in front of city hall in Belfast commemorating those who have died at the hand of political violence.

III

The Unionists of Northern Ireland are justly proud of their heritage and their contribution to the world. As many as eleven American presidents came of their stock. They number field marshals, captains of industry and colonial governors among their great men. They see themselves as a pragmatic, hardheaded, skeptical, robust people, and there is much in their history to justify their view. They have shown a corresponding tendency to regard their nationalist Catholic neighbors throughout the island as a more fanciful and less realistic race, and indeed there may be much in the history of the dispossession and enforced illiteracy of the Catholic community to give color to that view.

History has changed the face and condition of Ireland, and these opinions have been overtaken by events. The south started from a platform of no industry and relatively primitive agriculture in 1921, while the north was the only part of Ireland seriously affected at that time by the Industrial Revolution. Now the south has caught up with and will shortly overtake the north economically. Northern industry is in decline and is for the most part owned by outsiders. The North has no sovereign voice in the world, nor, significantly, in the European Community. Unionists watch with envy tinged with resentment as Dublin, for the second

time, exercises the presidency of the Council of the European Community during these months. Unionists are, furthermore, dismayed at the decline of Britain's greatness to a point where, most galling of all, London must now treat Dublin as an equal in the councils of Europe. A hardheaded people should logically draw the conclusion that an arrangement with the south is in its best interest. I have no doubt that they would do so now were the problem of Northern Ireland purely economic. Of course, it is not.

The Unionists are a majority in Northern Ireland, but their political behavior there can only be understood if they are seen, as they feel themselves to be, as a threatened minority on the island of Ireland. Theirs are the politics of the besieged. Hence their stubborn refusal to share power with the minority in Northern Ireland, whom they fear as the Trojan horse of the "real" majority in Ireland, the Catholics. Hence, the similarity between their attitudes and those of the whites of southern Africa.

Can this attitude be unfrozen? There are some grounds for believing that it can. I have mentioned the Sunningdale experiment, the most promising attempt so far to solve the problem. The main Unionist political group at that time, and particularly its leader, the late Mr. Brian Faulkner, showed courage and political agility, and the response of most Unionists to the experiment was by and large benign. The pusillanimity of the Labour government in London, in failing to resist the predictable destructiveness of the demagogues and paramilitaries on the extremes of Unionism, set back the situation almost irremediably; Unionist opinion, it must be admitted, shifted further to the Right as a result, as evidenced by the growing electoral strength of Ian Paisley. Nevertheless, the reality of power-sharing did exist, however tenuously. Unionists, given the right leadership, were seen to be capable of magnanimity. The problem now is to create the conditions where magnanimity can again take hold, this time more securely.

I am also encouraged by what I take to be a resurfacing of traditional Unionist realism. There is a growing suspicion among Unionists that their dependence on the British guarantee as the sole foundation of their political survival may in the long run be a risky and unprofitable enterprise. No leader of present mainline Unionist opinion has yet found the courage to put this squarely to his people, but several have expressed concern about the trustworthiness of the British.

Now is, as I have suggested, the moment when political leaders in Northern Ireland, in the Republic, and in Britain must radically

reexamine their own fundamental assumptions. As I see it, the two greatest problems in Northern Ireland are the British guarantee, which inhibits such reexamination, and the Unionist dependence on it. Given economic developments in the Republic and the growing suspicion about Britain's long-term intentions on the part of many Unionists, this would seem a propitious juncture at which to take a serious initiative. Only Britain can create the conditions in which Unionists can perceive and pursue their true interests.

I believe that the true interest of Unionists depends precisely on the exercise of their traditional gifts of self-confidence and self-reliance. The time has come for them to believe in themselves as their own best guarantors in a future shared with the other people of the island of Ireland.

IV

As it is now, Unionists see themselves as a threatened minority on the island of Ireland. If you ask a Unionist how real the threat is, he or she will tell you of friends or relatives who have been murdered or injured by the Provisional IRA. What threat could be more real? That, however, is only a vivid and chilling expression of an even deeper sense of intimidation. Unionists fear that they would be culturally and racially overwhelmed by the Catholic nationalist majority if they were to join with the rest of the island. Would they? This is the challenge to Irish nationalism, to Dublin, to the nationalist minority in Northern Ireland, and to the friends of Irish nationalism around the world.

The campaign of violence of the Provisional IRA has, more than any recent development, set back and distorted the cause of Irish nationalism in the eyes of Unionists, and of British and world opinion. It is clear that a majority of the people in Ireland as a whole, including a majority of Catholics in Northern Ireland, both favor Irish unity as a solution and reject violence as a means of promoting that solution.

The Provisionals have been relatively impervious to the universal rejection of their methods for a number of reasons. First, they are sustained by an extremely simple view of the Irish problem, and in this simplicity they find strength and purpose. For the Provisionals, the Irish problem consists of the British presence in Ireland—nothing more; remove that presence, they claim, and the problem will quickly be solved by the establishment of a

unified, independent Irish state. This analysis of things not only affords a simple view of a highly complex situation, but it also provides the inspiration for violent action aimed at inducing British withdrawal. The Provisional reading of the problem also gains from its clear affinities with the vision of the partially successful, and widely revered, insurgents of the 1916–22 period, who, in their determination to secure freedom for the greater part of the Irish people, were understandably distracted from the peculiar circumstances which obtained in the six northeastern counties.

A second factor in Provisional endurance has been the encouragement which they—like the loyalist extremists—have been able to draw from British weakness and prevarication. That weakness has so shown itself not alone in the fact of loyalist intransigence but also in the intermittent British dalliance with Provisional “political spokesmen,” whose credentials have been forged by bombs and bullets.

Third, I believe that the case for Irish nationalism has not been clearly enough expounded by Irish nationalist leaders. The Provisionals have not hesitated to exploit the ambiguities of policy and the innuendoes of the public debate to seek to claim support of, or justification for, their actions.

Fourth, unjustifiable excesses by British security forces, condemned by the European Court of Human Rights as inhuman and degrading treatment, created an implacable hostility to Britain in the minds of many who were subjected to them. These excesses, together with the introduction of internment without trial in 1971 (it has since been abandoned), did more to gain recruits for the Provisionals than any exhortations to “blood sacrifice” from the patriarchs of the movement.

Fifth, the absence of political activity from the life of Northern Ireland has provided both an opportunity and an argument to the men of violence: they can with some credibility play upon the frustrations of the minority in the absence of political hope, and they can well ask, in the face of British immobilism: Who but we are doing anything about Northern Ireland?

Finally, it can be seen that the Provisionals have hardened into a ruthless terrorist force which can compensate in terms of experience and technique for what it has lost in political support. It is a long time now since commentators invoked Mao and predicted that, as the water of popular approval dried up, the guerrilla fish would have to abandon the struggle to survive. We can now see that the fish need less water than we had thought. The Provisionals

have for several years received only insignificant support from the population of either Northern Ireland or the Republic; yet they retain the ability to disrupt and terrorize.

Indeed, their activities have descended to a level of savagery which has all but numbed the capacity of the public to respond with horror to even their inhuman atrocities. Life has become cheap—and the entire community to some extent dehumanized. “Is there a life before death?” asks a piece of anonymous graffiti on a Belfast wall, with some reason. The writer might also have asked whether there is any childhood left for the battle-scarred children of the ghettos of that city, and of the rest of Northern Ireland.

Aside from the immorality of its actions, the Provisional IRA campaign has no hope of success. It is, I suppose, conceivable that it might eventually frighten a feeble British government out of Northern Ireland before any process could begin. What would undoubtedly follow would be a serious risk of a bloodbath. This would quickly spread to the south, and, after thousands of deaths, would finally resolve itself by the division of the island into two bristling, homogeneous sectarian states, neither stable, both sunk in the obscurantism of their most extreme supporters. No military victory followed by a political settlement is possible in Northern Ireland. That is true not for the Provisionals alone but for the loyalists and the British government as well.

The Irish government and most nationalists in Ireland have repeatedly given convincing evidence of their repudiation of the violence of the Provisionals—the public by its consistent rejection at the polls of those who support violence, and the Irish government by its active pursuit of the men of violence, its commitment of additional police and army units to the border areas, and the introduction of draconian legal measures to secure convictions in the courts. Dublin and Irish opinion generally clearly intend no threat to Unionists; on the contrary, the leaders of Irish-American opinion, which was generally seen by Unionists to be hostile to their interests and indeed supportive of violence, have in recent years repeatedly condemned support for violence from the United States. This has had the double effect of reducing material assistance for the Provisional IRA from the United States and of going some way toward assuaging one source of Unionist anxiety.

Despite these positive elements, there is an important sense in which the principal source of Irish nationalist sentiment, i.e., Dublin, has not yet fully clarified its intentions. Unionists will not be able to bring themselves to entertain seriously the notion of

Irish unity unless Dublin unambiguously spells out what it understands by unity and gives clear evidence of its commitments.

The southern state is seen by many Unionists (in varying degrees by the majority) as a lay expression of sectarian Catholic values. As such, it is unacceptable to them. The reality, as I encounter it, is that the Republic is a modern state struggling to develop its economy and society within a European framework. The partition of Ireland, 50 years ago, created a state in the south with an overwhelmingly Catholic population. Inevitably, Catholic values were enshrined in some areas of law, particularly family law, although the state is in other respects one of the least confessional in Europe, with no official church. Unionists have a right to be convinced that the south is serious when it declares its intention to embody pluralist values in the law of the United Ireland to which it aspires. So far, the evidence for these intentions is inadequate.

Even more seriously, those who avow a nationalist solution must clarify how they would implement this. Statements which contain hints of irredentism, of conquest, of compulsion, do not promote a policy of unity; moreover, they give comfort to the men of violence. The Irish government repudiates violence and by its action is seen to do so. It should, nevertheless, in claiming the ground of nationalism, clarify, if necessary *ad nauseam*, its commitment to unity by agreement, only by agreement, and through reconciliation.

v

One of the difficulties about Northern Ireland which existed until recently was that the problem seemed to matter little, if at all. It mattered very little to the British. It seemed incapable of sustaining the attention of any but the most committed fanatics. Governments and serious observers, if they looked at it, had a feeling of impatience with its complexities, its anthill of competing eccentricities. There was a feeling that it ought to be like the pieces of a jigsaw, needing only to be placed in a certain arrangement for tranquillity to ensue. Unfortunately, the pieces did not seem to fit, and the puzzle quickly lost its interest.

The time has come for a positive and decisive initiative. It must be taken by both Dublin and London acting together. They should first make it clear that there are no longer any unconditional guarantees for any section of the northern community. There is only a commitment to achieving a situation in which

there are guarantees for all.

Second, they should make it clear that there is in fact no pat solution as such, but only a process that will lead to a solution. They should declare themselves committed to such a process, a process designed to lead to an agreed Ireland with positive roles for all. They should invite all parties to participate in this process, the process of building a new Ireland. Some groups will undoubtedly react with an initial refusal, but the process should continue without them, leaving the door always open for their participation at any stage.

Indeed, on embarking on this process we ought to be encouraged by the example of both the United States and the European Community. In the United States, in spite of deep differences of origin and background, they have formed a constitution which is able to harness great differences for the common good. Yet the Italians remain Italian, the blacks are still black, and the Irish still parade on St. Patrick's Day. They have created a unity in diversity.

Europe itself has suffered centuries of bloody conflict. In this century alone, the peoples of Europe have been locked in the savagery of two world wars with a bitterness and slaughter that goes far beyond anything that we have experienced on this island. Yet 34 years after the Second World War, as a result of an agreed process, they have been able to create one parliament to represent them, one community—and the Germans are still Germans, the French are still French. They, too, have a unity in diversity.

Is it too much to ask that we on this small island do precisely the same thing? Is it too much to ask that these two responsible governments begin to declare themselves now in favor of such a process? Can we too build a unity in diversity?

VI

One of the few developments which has cheered those who believe that moderation and reason must prevail in Northern Ireland has been a growing interest in the problem on the part of responsible political leaders outside of Ireland and Britain. This is particularly true of the United States, and, to a significant extent, of the European Community.

I believe that the friends of Britain have been dismayed at evidence in recent years of a British retreat from a world view. Many have felt that this contraction of vision has been accom-

panied by, if it is not symptomatic of, a weakening of Britain's political psyche. That in itself, if true, should concern those who hope for a solution to Northern Ireland's problems which, as I have argued, will require considerable political courage on Britain's part.

Mrs. Thatcher, in recent speeches and indeed in her post-election approach to the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia problem, has shown some willingness to reverse the decline. All the more reason why she should be serious about the problem of Northern Ireland, a strategically placed area in the Atlantic approaches to northwest Europe, potentially ripe for subversion if political neglect continues. The growing serious unrest of American and European leaders reflects, I believe, an awareness of this threat. Several responsible American leaders have implicitly questioned Britain's capacity to meet the political challenge and, on Britain's record so far in Northern Ireland, they are right to have this concern.

VII

The interest of the West in the problem is not only strategic. History has made of Ireland one of the most "internationalized" communities in the world. The foundation of her relations with the two wings of the Western world lies in the emigration of the past centuries: in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to France and Spain; in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries to America; and again, more recently, to Britain. The basis is people, the Irish diaspora.

The situation today is intriguing: the earlier links with the continent have been renewed but now rest on the solid foundation of the treaties of the European Community. The links with America are founded on the old connections of blood, friendship and heritage between the four and a half million people on the island today and upwards of 16 million people in the United States. The relationship has deepened and matured as the Republic has developed politically and economically, and as the Irish in America have prospered and built on their extraordinary political achievements of the past hundred years.

These two global relationships have played major roles in the fortunes of Ireland in recent years. From America came much of the industrial investment which created the impressive economic development of the Republic in recent years. From Europe have come the economic benefits of membership in the Community which have transformed life, particularly in the Republic, and

also created a sense of political dignity and statehood, again in the Republic, which, prior to membership, had been stifled by a claustrophobic bilateral relationship with the neighboring island.

Since the great tides of Irish emigration began to flow to America in the nineteenth century, the Irish in America tried without success to interest Washington administrations in the "Irish question." Great names such as John Devoy, editor of *The Gaelic-American*, and Eamon De Valera were energetically involved in this endeavor, but in vain. This is not to fault these men: it was a function of the nature of Irish political power in America during these generations, which was confined to the leadership of some of the great cities and states. It remained largely excluded from Washington. That situation changed dramatically in 1960 with the Kennedy presidency.

VIII

In recent years the influence of powerful American leaders of Irish extraction in Washington, notably Senator Edward Kennedy and House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, has brought the issue to a point where the Carter Administration has taken a position on Northern Ireland. As a result, the support for violence from the United States has been contained and has in fact dropped. That this should have been maintained during the past years of political vacuum in Northern Ireland is an extraordinary achievement. There are many men, women and children in Northern Ireland who are alive today, I am convinced, because of the political courage and concern of these men.

President Carter has committed himself to providing economic aid in the event that a solution acceptable to both sides in Northern Ireland, and to the British and Irish governments, can be found. That was a generous, humane and unprovocative commitment. It was welcomed by the Irish and British governments as a major incentive to reconciliation, and they were both consulted about it. The Irish question has become a legitimate and serious issue in the Atlantic relationship between London and Washington.

The responsible interest of American leaders is welcome. Less welcome is the exploitation of the issue by a few less distinguished politicians. Violent men in Ireland invoke their names as certifying their own respectability and as an indication of support for their cause. The votes of Americans should not be purchased at the expense of Irish lives.

The European Community, because of its name, because of its primary historic commitment to reconciling the enmities of generations of Europeans and averting the recurrence of armed conflict, could not stand aside from the conflict between two of its own peoples. Several European leaders have expressed concern and interest. It is my hope that the European parliament will soon hold a full-scale debate on the issue, and that the Community will match America's generous incentive to peace.

The interest of the United States and of the European Community in Northern Ireland is historically inevitable and perfectly legitimate. This need not involve direct intervention or support for particular partisan policies. It should be taken as an encouragement by London, by Dublin and by parties in Northern Ireland to have the courage to resolve this old quarrel that involves them all.

Jean Herskovits

DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA

On October 1 Nigeria added to its list of vital statistics a new status as the world's fourth largest democracy. The list was already impressive. One African in four is a Nigerian; with a population of 80 million or more, Nigeria is larger than any country in Europe. It is also the world's eighth largest producer of crude oil and has been the United States' second largest supplier for six years, neither joining in the Arab boycott of 1973-74, nor cutting exports for policy reasons subsequently.

Any voluntary handover of government from military to civilian rulers is unusual. Nigeria's was, arguably, unique. Meticulously planned, and including civilians at all stages of the four-year process, it culminated in a change of government as smooth as in a Western democracy. Further, Nigerians set a precedent in breaking from their colonial constitutional heritage. Rejecting Britain's parliamentary form of democracy, which they had continued after their independence in 1960, they chose, in their first wholly Nigerian-made constitution, to follow the American model instead.

They made that choice with characteristic pragmatism: Nigeria, like the United States, is large, complex, heterogeneous; as one of Nigeria's constitution-makers said simply, "What works for you may work for us." Americans, unaccustomed these days to being seen as exemplary, even historically, need to consider the statement Nigerians have made, however indirectly.

Nigeria's new government looks remarkably familiar to an American. The newly elected President has ahead of him a four-year term, with the possibility of a second term thereafter. The national assembly is bicameral, with a Senate of 95—five from each of the 19 states—and a House of Representatives of 449 members, distributed among the states by population. The independent judiciary has at the apex of its federal structure a Supreme Court of up to 15 justices. Each state has a governor (and, parallel

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to the vice-president, a deputy-governor), a unicameral House of Assembly and an independent judiciary.

Certain procedures are also familiar. For example, appointments to the cabinet, the Supreme Court, and ambassadorial posts require Senate confirmation. Americans should feel comfortable looking at Nigeria's new form of government—more comfortable than Britons, certainly, and even than many Nigerians, who are having to unlearn the Westminster model.

But the Nigerian constitution also has important special provisions that differ from the American (or any other) model—particularly those intended to ensure regional balance. The President must, for instance, have in his cabinet at least one minister from each of the 19 states in the federation.

For Nigeria's constitution-makers were preeminently determined to make repetition of their nation's past mistakes impossible. Theirs is a country of extraordinary complexity, whose people speak several hundred mutually unintelligible languages. Half of them belong to the three largest ethnic groups—Yoruba, Ibo, Hausa-Fulani; the rest, called "minorities," come from the more than 300 other groups.¹ This diversity has brought agonies of growth to Nigeria. After receiving its independence in 1960, the civilian government broke down in the middle of the decade in conflicts among the three major groups over the distribution of power and resources—in which the Hausa-dominated Northern Region and Ibo-dominated Eastern Region first formed a coalition against the largely Yoruba Western Region. Two military coups, both bloody, followed in 1966, and ethnic tension escalated in the north into violence directed against easterners resident there. After the secession by the Eastern Region (self-proclaimed as Biafra), the country was plunged into civil war from 1967 to 1970. Again, the abortive coup attempt in February 1976, in which the head of state was assassinated, had an ethnic component. In light of this history, building a genuinely united nation, with institutions which would clamp down on virulent ethnic feeling, was the priority.

To take the primary example, the Supreme Military Council (SMC)² and the civilians who drew up the Constitution were

¹ Even though the term "tribalism" persists, especially in outsiders' analyses of African politics, many of Nigeria's ethnic groups are more accurately "nations," both in size—several are over ten million—and history.

² The SMC was made up of the senior officers constituting the country's executive, including the Commander in Chief, and head of state; the chief of staff, Supreme Headquarters; the chiefs of army, navy, and air staff; the general officers commanding the four divisions of the Nigerian Army; the Inspector-General of Police; and some other senior military and police

agreed on one vital matter: no one could become President of Nigeria with only sectional—or, more bluntly, tribal—support. Thus, apart from the largest number of votes, an incoming president must have geographical spread as well: according to the new Constitution, he must receive “one-quarter of the votes cast in each of at least two-thirds of the states in the Federation.”

As it turned out, the newly elected President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, did receive significantly broader support than any other candidate. In every state but Lagos, he came in first or second. Nor could anyone claim that “his own people,”—the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group—put him in office; they neither all supported him, nor did they outnumber his other supporters. Indeed, it can be argued that he was elected not by any of the three large groups who had dominated First Republic politics but by the “minorities” all over the country. That is a change of stunning significance for Nigeria.

But the significance of the transition reaches far beyond Nigeria, and even beyond Africa. As President Nyerere of Tanzania commented to Nigeria’s head of state, General Olusegun Obasanjo, in 1977, “No military government has worked so hard to get itself out of power.” A year later, at the 1978 summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Khartoum, the Nigerian leaders found that they had, to their delight, disconcerted other African military leaders who were planning prolonged—even unending—regimes of their own.³ In October 1979, Nigeria’s military rulers took the army back to the barracks.

Not only did Nigerians have to devise structural changes to cope with questions of unity and stability, they had to overcome obstacles inherent in introducing a complex version of democracy into a massively illiterate population. Although they had elected local government councils in 1976 as part of a reform often called “revolutionary” in its implications for traditional power, there had been no national elections since 1964. Those who remembered the First Republic thought in terms of choosing a single member of parliament, of casting one vote in one election. Instead, on five successive polling dates in the summer of 1979, Nigerian voters had to choose members of two federal legislatures and one state, state governors and finally a national president. If democracy

officers. Importantly, it did not, in contrast to its counterpart of the Gowon era, include the military governors of the states, who therefore did not participate in formulating the national political program.

³The OAU applauded Nigeria’s achievement, however, in a unanimous resolution commending General Obasanjo’s government at its 1979 summit at Monrovia.

presupposes an informed populace, a task as great as bringing institutional change itself was how to inform them.

Thus, what has happened in Nigeria is significantly different. But it is only in following the processes that brought the transition, not simply in stating the outcome, that one can see why the differences matter. For those processes also show the complexity of the problems Nigerians have already had to solve, as well as their care in dealing with them. In both these respects, their solutions have meaning beyond their borders.

II

When on October 1, 1975 the late General Murtala Muhammed set forth the precise timetable that would hand over power to civilians exactly four years later, Nigerians were not hearing such a promise for the first time. From the coup in January 1966 that ended the political chaos of the First Republic, Nigeria's military rulers had continued to state explicitly that their rule was an aberration in Nigeria's governance. The end of the civil war, a conflict viewed in Nigeria now with near unanimity as tragically unnecessary, saw not only a program of reconciliation and reconstruction unprecedented in intrastate conflict of this sort, but also a pledge from the then head of state General Yakubu Gowon that civilians would rule Nigeria by 1976.

When Gowon reneged on that promise in October 1974, he opened the way for his own ouster, in the bloodless coup of July 29, 1975 that brought General Murtala Muhammed to power. The Muhammed government was popular particularly because it offered to Nigerians not merely a vague promise but a program to reach civilian rule, with specific steps coming at clear intervals.

Throughout this four-year period, the military government kept strictly to its proclaimed schedule. The abortive coup of February 13, 1976, took the life of General Muhammed and caused national trauma, but affected the political program of the government not at all. Most Nigerians say that the very survival of the new government, led by then Lieutenant-General Obasanjo, depended on its adhering to the timetable for the handover, and because of evident commitment as well, adhere it did. To arbitrate vexed electoral issues it created the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO). This body, whose 23 commissioners included one from each state, had procedural and logistical responsibility for everything from voter registration to announcing the final results. It was, by law, completely independent of everyone, including the Supreme Military Council itself.

By the time of Muhammed's speech the first steps of the process had been implemented. The SMC had already appointed 49 civilians—with a range of professional qualifications and coming from the 12 states into which Nigeria was then divided—to a constitutional drafting committee, which convened on October 18. The rest would follow: creation of new states, making 19 (February 1976); submission of the draft constitution (August 1976); reorganization of local government (also in August); followed by local government elections that December.

In October 1977, after a year's public debate on the draft constitution, the Constituent Assembly convened, its members having been chosen through local government councils in August. In August 1978, the SMC received the proposed constitution, which, with 17 amendments, the head of state promulgated on September 20. The following day, a week ahead of schedule, Obasanjo launched the next stage by lifting the ban on political parties. Then, in April 1979, came the announcement of the five elections.

III

When the SMC lifted the ban on politics on September 21, 1978, Nigerians were watching to see who would emerge as civilian political leaders. Many were bound to come from among members of the Constituent Assembly. In the days when politics was still technically banned, Satellite Town, a complex of bungalows along the expressway leading west from Lagos, where the members lived, was the ideal place for the gestation of political parties: the police were not welcome there, and stayed outside. By late October 1978, no fewer than 30 political associations had announced themselves. By the time for registering political parties in December, there were 52 applicants!

The desirable number of political parties had long been a subject for debate. The Constituent Assembly had considered a limit of three at most, but the view that any limit would be undemocratic prevailed. At its December meeting, FEDECO ruled that five parties met the stringent requirements for registration, the most important of which was an established party presence in two-thirds of the states of the Federation. Other requirements ensured that parties would not appeal for support on ethnic or religious or regional grounds.

The presidential candidates of the five parties were then chosen or ratified by nominating conventions staged in the federal capital,

Lagos. These conventions varied in form, in the degree of actual democratic choice open to delegates, and in their accessibility to public scrutiny. One at least had a banner-waving atmosphere so like that of the Democratic Party in the 1950s that American-educated Nigerians present shivered in recognition. All conventions had party delegates from as many states as could muster sufficient support.

Each of the five presidential candidates was known to his countrymen from the politics of the First Republic. The first to announce his candidacy, to no one's surprise, was Chief Obafemi Awolowo, about to turn 70 and a central figure in Nigeria's politics since the late 1940s. The one-time Premier of the largely Yoruba former Western Region, Awolowo has continued to personify Yoruba politics. Despite his reputation for hard and serious work, coupled with brilliant organization and analysis, controversy has dogged his career—through a treason trial and conviction; release from jail after Nigeria's second military coup in July 1966; a term as Commissioner (minister) for Finance in the government of General Yakubu Gowon, who had released him; and his resignation from that position in 1971 in order, everyone believed, to prepare for the politics of civilian rule, which was theoretically imminent then. His countrymen took it in stride that when the ban on politics was lifted, Awolowo emerged with a fully organized political party, the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), with himself as its presidential candidate. Although the draft constitution would have barred from elected office anyone who had been "found guilty of corruption, unjust enrichment, or abuse of office between October 1, 1960 and the date when this section comes into force," one of the SMC's amendments changed the date to January 15, 1966—seemingly to permit Awolowo to run.

Another presidential candidate who has been a constant in Nigeria's political scene, and perhaps its greatest historical-political luminary, was Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. American-trained and a journalist from the Ibo-dominated former Eastern Region, Azikiwe (known popularly as Zik) founded Nigeria's first clearly nationalist political party, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, in 1944. At independence in 1960 he became the first Nigerian Governor-General, and then its largely honorary President. During the civil war, he at first supported Biafran secession, but later shifted his allegiance to the federal government. Zik was chosen to lead the Nigerian People's Party (NPP).

Two other candidates led parties largely based in the Muslim north—Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim and Alhaji Aminu Kano. A mem-

ber of one of Nigeria's "minorities," rather than the largest of the main northern ethnic group, the Hausa-Fulani, Waziri was not himself a member of the Constituent Assembly; combining forces with other groups to create the NPP, his group split off to form the Great Nigeria People's Party (GNPP). Aminu Kano, 59 and active in Nigerian politics for some 20 years, led the People's Redemption Party (PRP), which continued its leader's long-time populist stand in opposition to traditional Hausa-Fulani aristocratic dominance.

Finally, many "heavyweights" of the old politics came together in Satellite Town to form the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). The party's claim to regional diversity was reflected in its many contenders for leadership from different areas of the country. (One member of the NPN commented that the party was—of necessity—formed in the dark, and when the lights went on, people were surprised to find who was with them.) Since the NPN did not form around a single and obvious presidential aspirant, it had to narrow the field and did so by what Nigerians called "zoning": allocating an office to each geographical section of the country. The presidential candidate would come from the old North (now the ten northern states); the vice-president from Iboland; the party chairman would be Yoruba; and the president of the newly elected Senate, if the party should control that post, would come from the "minorities."⁴

The man who emerged from a six-way final contest at the NPN convention, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, had always been described as a quiet unassuming man, and had been a reluctant candidate. He had, however, had continuous experience in government—as a junior minister in the First Republic, in several ministerial positions in the Gowon government, among them as Commissioner for Finance in succession to Awolowo—and had also been a member of the Constituent Assembly. He was, nonetheless, viewed by many at the time of his nomination as a pliable agent of his party's heavyweights. His ethnic background was also emotionally charged for many Nigerians: he was a Fulani from Sokoto, like the titan of First Republic politics, the Sardauna of Sokoto, the leader of the Northern People's Congress that dominated Nigeria's

⁴ All Nigeria's parties concerned themselves with ticket-balancing, but the other parties were, in a sense, pre-zoned by the origins of their presidential candidate, and could balance their tickets without seeming to say what part of the country must produce the President; the critical and highly controversial difference was that NPN declared before the fact that the presidency was reserved for the northern zone.

pre-civil war civilian government and for many non-northerners personified what they called "Fulani hegemony." (The Sardauna was assassinated in the January 1966 coup.)

After January 1979, the parties took to the road, covering the entire country in a fashion unimaginable in bygone days of wholly regional politics. The scrambling to find candidates was intense—the states would have to produce 95 senators; 449 members of the House of Representatives; 19 governors and their deputies; 1,347 members of state Houses of Assembly. Multiplied by five parties, the number became an impossible quota even for a large country. In the end, only the NPN could field candidates for most positions.

Only on April 1 did the SMC announce the dates of the elections that would come weekly, starting with the senatorial election on July 7, and continuing on July 14 with the election of the federal House of Representatives, on July 21 with the election of state legislators, on July 28 with state gubernatorial elections, and finally, on August 11, with the presidential election. Until then, their number, their order, and the intervals between them had been only speculation. Then, later in April, FEDECO cast doubt on the candidacies of Azikiwe and Aminu Kano, who they alleged had not met the requirement that candidates produce receipts for income tax payments (made when due) for the preceding three years. This requirement, in the end, disqualified some candidates for all elections, but the possible ouster of two presidential candidates stimulated a spate of conspiracy theories. First Azikiwe and then Aminu Kano asked the courts to clarify their tax status. Azikiwe's status was resolved less than three weeks before the August 11 presidential election, when an appeal by FEDECO against the Enugu high court's ruling in his favor in May was dismissed. As for Aminu Kano, the court decision in his favor came only on August 1.

All along, the electorate was in fact the greatest imponderable. How would Nigerians vote after more than 13 years? The hold of the old political ties and alignments, the youth of so many voters (all citizens over 18 were eligible to vote), the far larger number of women voters than ever before, would each affect the outcome. And the form of the elections created another conundrum: Would bandwagons roll from each election to the next? Most important, had the structural changes made by the military specifically to counteract the malign effects of ethnic and regional politics in fact brought fundamental change?

On July 7, the day of the first election, people throughout the southern states peered into an all-day downpour which even for


the rainy season was a notable display. The optimists said, "It is washing away whatever bad anyone may be trying to do." In local symbolism rain is a good sign.

But the rains were the least of FEDECO's problems. They had dealt with extraordinary logistical difficulties already, registering 48 million voters, some in bush stations not accessible by road, placing 97,000 polling stations throughout the country and equipping them with ballots for each election and voters' registers. (The expenses of the election finally approached \$100 million.) The inevitable flaws in execution provoked complaints and vividly retold stories about people wandering great distances, from polling place to polling place, looking for their names on the voters' registers. As the results trickled in, not over hours but days, the air was heavy with charges and countercharges of rigging and skull-duggery.

And yet, during that and subsequent elections, a tour of polling places revealed scenes of impressive order: queues, scarcely an argument, and, most of all, no violence. For many Nigerians this was their first national election. The 18-year-olds were small children in 1964. Women in the northern states had not had the franchise 15 years ago, and now, in the Muslim areas, they worked out systems to deal with the challenges purdah presented, waiting with their own line stretched out at right angles to that of the men. Most striking was the contrast with the 1960s, when thugs frequently broke up political meetings, arson and murder were common, and intimidation was the context for voting itself.

The results of the senatorial election brought some answers about how voters would behave. Awolowo's party, UPN, won overwhelmingly in five states—all part of the old Western Region and four solidly Yoruba—and came in second in one other, also with a large Yoruba population. Zik's party, the NPP, won almost as massively in the two Ibo states, but also had more than 50 percent of the vote in Plateau, a northern state located in an area at the mid-section of the country known as the Middle Belt. The northern-based parties led by Aminu Kano and Waziri Ibrahim (PRP and GNPP) each led in one or two northern states, and GNPP came in second in a number of others. The NPN, however, had clearly the greatest and widest support, having received the most votes in eight states, and the second-largest number in ten others; only in Lagos was it as low as third.

The results provoked general distress over the tenacity of old political ties—which translates as "tribalism." The solid Ibo support for Zik showed the persistence of ethnically based interest



groups. This was even clearer in the case of the Yoruba, whose support for UPN scarcely fell below 80 percent, and in some states was over 90. The Yoruba have since the war gained an ascendancy that they want to preserve in many arenas: in the private sector of the economy, the civil service, the foreign service, even the army. Perhaps more importantly, the Yoruba remember vividly the politics of the First Republic, when they were excluded from power and their part of the country was made the literal battleground during the elections of 1964 and 1965. In Nigeria people do not forget their own past traumas—but as one of them said, “We will truly have a nation when we also remember each other’s.”

In other parts of the country, voting was far less consistent, perhaps because the northern counterpart of Zik and Awolowo, the Sardauna, was not there to become a historic focal point, perhaps because there were three presidential candidates from the far north. (Those states with no favorite son went heavily with NPN.)

Significant changes had, however, taken place. The NPN could now claim a national base. Perhaps most important for outside observers, the political reintegration of the Ibo seemed resoundingly accomplished. They had played a central role, with every presidential ticket carrying an Ibo. All vice-presidential candidates save Zik's were Ibo; his own presidential candidacy was the clearest statement of how far reconciliation had been achieved.

As Saturday followed Saturday, voters went to the polls in larger numbers each week, but the voting patterns remained roughly the same. Nationally, there was no bandwagon, though winning parties tended to increase their margins in each state as the elections progressed. Possibly because the registration figures were inflated, the voter turnout was smaller than expected: the highest turnout, for the presidency, was just under 35 percent.⁵ But when voters come to the polls five times in six weeks—in steadily growing numbers—they can hardly be called apathetic.

IV

As August 11 and the presidential election approached, the results seemed nearly predictable, but whether the NPN would get the required quarter of the votes in two-thirds of the states was highly questionable. In each of the previous elections, NPN had done so in 12 states; only in the State Assembly election had they done so in 13. If no candidate received one-quarter of the vote in two-thirds of the states, the election would, according to the Constitution, be thrown to the electoral college, comprising

⁵ The number of registered voters (48,633,782) exceeded expectations by about ten million. Nigerians have found counting themselves accurately impossible. No issue has, throughout the country's political history, colonial and postcolonial alike, given more problems. Nigerians well know the political and economic implications of numbers in a setting where the winner took, if not all, as much as he could get. It is scarcely too much to say that the census crisis of 1962–63 precipitated the tragedy of coups and war, nor that the attempt to conduct a census in 1973 led directly to the downfall of Gowon's government. The result of the voter registration drive came as a shock to officials, not least because it suggested by demographic extrapolation that Nigeria's population could well be 100 million, rather than 80 million, as planners had been calculating. One FEDECO official says, candidly, that he simply cannot estimate what percentage would be a reasonable correction. Until the national identity card system—the military government's latest effort to count Nigerians above 18—is in place, accurate voter registration will be well-nigh impossible.

all just-elected federal and state legislators, who would choose between the two top candidates (presumably Shagari and Awolowo). Indeed, for weeks Awolowo and Waziri had been working to forge an alliance explicitly to “stop NPN”—in the elections if possible, but in the electoral college if necessary. Moreover, since electoral votes were not constitutionally tied to popular votes, no one knew what would determine the choices individuals might make. If the alliance had held and the election had been thrown into the electoral college, the President could have been Awolowo (who had received 4,916,651 votes concentrated in Yoruba areas to Shagari’s significantly spread 5,688,857).

After the results showed that Shagari had the required 25 percent in 12 states but only 20 percent in a 13th (Kano), FEDECO announced that Shagari was elected President. FEDECO had bypassed the electoral college by unexpectedly interpreting the two-thirds requirement as twelve and two-thirds, rather than 13—and arguing that Shagari had achieved this by taking 25 percent of two-thirds of the votes cast in Kano State. Awolowo took the issue to the courts, as vociferous, emotional and partisan reaction poured in. “We are always waiting for the other shoe to drop,” commented a tired Nigerian, “and Nigeria is a centipede.”

The electoral decree had provided for tribunals all over the country (which eventually reviewed hundreds of petitions, though only 25 elections were finally declared void), and, in the case of the presidential election only, for appeal to the Supreme Court. In the event, Chief Awolowo took his case all the way to the highest court, which handed down its decision affirming the FEDECO ruling on September 26, five days before the scheduled inauguration. Most of the nation breathed a sigh of relief.

Despite the fact that FEDECO had been placed explicitly above—or at least beyond—the law, it had faced the courts three times, abiding by all decisions. Thus, the role of the courts became critical in resolving electoral dilemmas, which gave a boost to the operation of an independent judiciary under the new government. And finally, in what may be construed as a farewell gift to the nation, the SMC at its last meeting on September 28 abolished the electoral college in favor of a runoff vote when another round may prove necessary in the future.

v

Ironically, as October 1 approached, demands by the disgruntled that the army enter the process increased. The military, however, displayed a commitment to the successful implementa-

tion of the transition process that provides the best assurance of their genuine support for civilian rule. Through it all, the SMC played an unobtrusive but important role. At the outset, General Muhammed clearly told the Constitutional Drafting Committee that the former parliamentary system must be changed to ensure the unity of the country; thereafter, the military entered the process only to set it straight when dissension seemed about to derail it—as when the head of state met with members of the Constituent Assembly to end a walkout over the issue of Islamic courts.

Although Nigerians claimed that the military was “teleguiding” events, the SMC held to its decision that conduct of the election would rest with FEDECO and the courts. While running Nigeria, the military was also preparing itself for the civilian era. The specific withdrawal and reorientation of the most senior officers had begun in July 1978 with General Obasanjo’s announcement that all who continued to hold political positions would, at the handover, retire from the army. He and Brigadier (later Major General) Shehu Yar’adua, the Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters and in effect a kind of prime minister, committed themselves to leave the scene entirely—retiring from the military and politics alike. Brigadier (now Major General) Nanven Garba, the internationally respected Foreign Minister, on the other hand, left that “political” post in November 1978 to become Commandant of the Nigerian Defence Academy, which enabled him to continue his military career at the handover.

In addition, plans for general military reorganization and demobilization went into high gear from 1975 onward. Both have produced a much smaller army—down to 150,000 from 250,000 at the end of the civil war. Barracks have gone up all over the country to house soldiers previously living among civilians and in cities. And as October 1979 drew nearer, discussion seminars, tours and speeches by senior officers aimed at preparing all levels of the armed forces for the changes ahead. The goal of the army reorganization, as one of the now retired senior officers remarked, has been to bring the military “back to what we knew in the days before and just after independence, when the army was a truly national but nonpolitical institution.” In striking contrast to departures of military governments elsewhere, Nigeria’s former rulers, though young men—General Obasanjo, the oldest, is 42—have left the barracks completely for civilian life, thereby much reducing any implicit possibility of their return. Moreover, Nigerians widely believe that coups succeed only when the people

support them (they point to the 1975 success and the 1976 failure), and thus the civilian leaders acknowledge that their firmest guarantee against any future coup is governing well.

The Obasanjo government was determined to leave the best possible economic legacy to the civilians. Development progress during military rule emphasized large expenditures on infrastructure—with enormous road-building and construction projects; a high priority for education and communications; major new ports; dams and irrigation projects. New universities brought the total to 13, and universal primary education got underway. The important political decision to move the capital from Lagos to Abuja in the center of the country entailed substantial expenditures even in the initial stages.

But despite oil, Nigeria is not a rich country, when one considers the size of its growing population. Further, material problems abound. Serious inflation—growing at a rate of at least 15 percent annually—administrative bottlenecks, slow growth in the industrial sector, and, critically, declining agricultural productivity continue to plague the economy.

Dependence on oil results in considerable uncertainty about revenues. In 1978, a decline in world demand, compounded by Nigeria's pricing itself out of the market, brought a drop in oil revenues. In addition, oil companies, complaining of insufficient incentives, had stopped exploration. By March 1978, production was down from 2.3 million barrels a day to 1.5 million. Subsequently, revisions in pricing and incentives renewed exploration: by October 1978, output had risen to 2.1 million barrels a day, though in each month it was lower than it had been in its counterpart the previous year.

Then, with events in Iran, the vagaries of the oil market changed in Nigeria's favor. Production rose to 2.4 million barrels a day at its height in the first part of 1979, and was then reined in by government policy to 2.2 million. Further, the price of Nigerian crude had risen 65 percent by October 1979, so that government revenue from oil has increased from \$9.5 billion to at least \$15 billion. Consequently, foreign exchange reserves, down to \$2.4 billion at the end of 1978 (from \$7.5 billion in 1976), were up to \$4.42 billion by the end of September 1979.

But another source of strength came from the unpopular austerity budgets of 1978 and 1979, which banned many imports and licensed others. In addition, an anti-inflationary wage freeze had been in effect since 1976. Through these measures the military government took on itself the onus for austerity.

On the eve of the turnover, at the end of September, came a sudden discovery of "improved revenue" in both the oil and non-oil sectors, of some \$5.1 billion, which was announced along with the \$3.6 billion supplementary budget that revenue made possible. Thus, if the Shagari government faces enormous economic challenges, the SMC has left it in a far stronger position than might have been predicted. And, importantly, the Nigerian public has become attuned to some of the harsher economic realities. Indeed, the outgoing military government may be credited with taking austerity a step further than absolutely necessary—precisely to give the new civilian regime a chance to meet some popular expectations for improvement.

VI

President Shagari, at 55 the second youngest of the aspirants, has, since his election, shown a forcefulness and confidence that belie the standard description of him during the campaign as "quiet, unassuming and modest." His long experience in government and familiarity with Nigeria's problems is one source of strength. Another is that, in contrast to so many of his countrymen, he has studied the new political system carefully and mastered especially the President's role in it.

In a period of adjustment, dramatic actions are unlikely from Shagari's administration. After the Supreme Court's verdict, he stressed his commitment to building the nation: "It is so urgent and so important that we cannot afford any more rancor, division or strife. In order to make . . . progress possible, we must work for peace, unity and stability." Nation-building beyond the structural changes already in place is a painstaking process.

The continuing problems of development are constants. While the GDP for 1978–79 is \$50.2 billion (up from \$33.8 billion in 1975–76), and the rate of economic growth is again rising after dropping to 2.9 percent during 1977–78, population is growing at around 2.6 percent. The military governments aimed to move quickly in building infrastructure, but a good many mistakes—and waste—resulted. In the projected 1980–85 development plan, whose guidelines are already drafted, the keynote is consolidation; for the Shagari government this approach is congenial and correct.

The similarity of the political parties' programs testified to the clarity of Nigeria's problems. Ideology continues to play a very minor role in the country's politics, reflecting a popular consensus

about solving problems within the framework of what Nigerians have long been calling a "mixed economy."⁶

The manifestos of all the parties stressed agriculture, industry, rural development, education, housing, medical facilities and care, and full employment. The differences were in emphasis, most strikingly with UPN's promise of free education immediately at all levels, and NPN's highest priorities placed on agriculture and housing.

Shagari, when asked, quipped that his "Green Revolution would begin at 10 a.m. on October 1," but added with intense seriousness that agricultural problems are not susceptible to dramatic and instant solutions. "I don't believe in rash actions," he said a week before his inauguration. "I take my time whatever I'm doing, and I must be sure of myself. In 1975 the regime did everything in a flash, made a great impression—and then found they had made some mistakes. I am not going to do that. I am not a military man. I will endeavor to do what I've promised within my term of office. I don't want you to expect miracles from October."

If improvement in the agricultural sector is vital (the slight increase of 1.8 percent in cash and food crop production in the last year was the first encouraging sign in about a decade of stagnation), what buys time for Nigeria is oil. Because the oil and natural gas will not last forever—Nigerians estimate reserves conservatively at 15 to 20 years—oil policy is critical to Nigeria's long-term future.

Shagari will have a special adviser on petroleum, which will be handled from the President's office. Decisions about production are likely to place upper limits in the interest of conservation, but will keep production as high as possible—simply because the oil revenue is essential to all development plans, including the diversification needed to decrease dependence on it. Nigeria's November price increase of \$2.77 a barrel officially reflects "the present market situation"; that is, with Libya and Algeria raising their prices on comparable grades of crude, Nigeria, by holding down its own, stood to lose some \$5.5 million a day in revenue. Concurrently, Nigeria is moving to exploit its sizable gas reserves; finding

⁶ Despite socialist rhetoric in some parties' programs, few Nigerians appear to have either taken them seriously or found them persuasive. Comments about the affluent outnumbering the ideologically committed among the leadership of UPN were frequent, and PRP, whose message was most strongly worded in terms of class conflict, gained support only in Aminu Kano's traditional base, and virtually none in the rest of the country, indicating that specific historic resentments, and not ideology, were the basis of appeal.

customers for a planned liquefied natural gas project will command special attention.

In other economic sectors, Shagari's government has set a high priority on improving the climate for foreign investment to assure not only necessary capital for agricultural and industrial development, but also technical know-how. For some time, foreign enterprises have apparently viewed this climate as decidedly chill, probably reflecting less a judgment about Nigeria's economic potential than uncertainty about politics and policies during the time of flux. Foreign companies have complained that sudden actions taken by the military—especially changes in indigenization policy (requiring foreign enterprises to hire Nigerians and sell part interests to Nigerian partners)—created the kind of unpredictable environment which, when compounded by bureaucratic delays and restrictions, made entry into Nigeria less attractive than it would otherwise be. The new administration plans to remove such uncertainties, for overseas, as well as domestic, capital is essential for implementing its programs in agriculture and industry, and also for obtaining equally essential technical know-how.

An endemic problem, bringing complaints from inside Nigeria and overseas alike, is corruption. The new constitution provides codes of conduct for government officials, elected and appointed, with tribunals to penalize proven violators. Officeholders must also declare their assets before they assume office, and when they leave. But, as Shagari says when asked how he will assure probity in his government, "We also have to educate people to detest anything that is immoral or corrupt. When society condones corruption there is little a government can do. In Nigeria we do not yet detest it enough."

Speculations about the directions an NPN government would take often rested on oversimplifications about its "conservatism," as a "wealthy man's party." But the electorate had knocked out most of the "heavyweights" on whom that reputation had rested, and Shagari followed the voters' lead in his cabinet appointments. All appointees are younger than he, and few are yet well known. From all 19 states, as they must be, they also show the President's proclivity to stress technical and administrative qualifications rather than political achievements. But importantly, such appointments show that opportunities will continue for people not yet established. That chance for upward mobility is vital to Nigerians' belief in the system, which offers change within a context of stability. Deflating further the image of a rich, estab-

lishment party, Shagari announced early in October that he would continue both the military's ban on imports, especially luxuries, and their "low profile"—that is, lack of ostentation by government officials.

It is, of course, in the political arena that many of the new administration's greatest challenges lie. Nigeria's military governments brought both revenue and power to the center, taking the oil revenues from the states that produced them. The question of derivation in allocating revenue has been a sensitive one since independence, and is now, especially in oil-producing states. The new Constitution will produce a more truly federal system: it provides an outline for the division of functions between the states and the center which should allow for diffusion of power and of resources in response to pressures from the localities. The President has stated the need for "more even development" throughout the country, agreeing with many that elected representation will go further to guarantee its likelihood than military administration could have done. Further, the recently introduced democratic local government system is already bringing government closer to the villages.

VI

In the weeks after October 1, Nigerians in and out of government watched as their unfamiliar political system began slowly to work. How exactly the presidential system and the separation of powers will function in Nigeria will only become clear in time. For one reason, with five parties instead of two, achieving the majority essential just to get the machinery of government moving—to confirm the cabinet, for example—will take maneuvering. Further, in the new political circumstances, no one knows how the legislators will behave: after the Supreme Court's decision, UPN and GNPP stalwarts threatened to immobilize the government by blocking presidential appointments and legislation.

In setting a slow pace initially—delaying the National Assembly's first sitting a week and submitting cabinet nominees ten days later—the administration had a purpose: to familiarize legislators with the new system and let them see concretely their stake in its functioning.

To some extent, talk of coalitions is left over from parliamentary days and based on Westminster assumptions about party discipline. But, confident of its staying power, Shagari has acted to encourage discussion of the system. Asked in August about just such problems in the National Assembly, he said that the critical new point was that the legislators could not bring down the

government—"and something that you cannot bring down, you'd better help to build."

Some sort of cooperative arrangement between NPN and NPP was logical. The gains for NPN were obvious: majority support for their appointments and programs. The NPP aimed for cabinet posts and cooperation on specific policies—such as special assistance to the areas damaged in the civil war, and to newly created states needing to catch up in infrastructure and economic activity with the older ones—both of which were important to the Ibo and the minorities supporters of NPP. Further, NPP asked for, and got, assurances that Nigeria is, and will be, a secular state. That is provided for in the Constitution and Shagari is committed to it, but religious fears still underlie the passions of electoral politics: the spectre of an Islamic republic à la Khomeini frightened some non-Muslims faced with a Muslim President-elect from Sokoto—the home of Nigeria's nineteenth-century *jihad*.

The first test of the "cooperation"—resolutely not called coalition—came over electing the officers of the Senate and House of Representatives, and in the event half of those positions went to NPP members. NPP's senators voting with the NPN formed a comfortable majority, 52 out of 95. Similarly, the House total came to 245 out of 449.

How the party system will shake down may be clearer after the upcoming elections to local governments, whose present life-span ends in December. Already fluidity indicates possible realignments, combinations, or even something new ahead. Particularly PRP, now putting general statements into concrete action with programs in Kano and Kaduna states, may come to have a broader appeal throughout the country as a result of offering a genuinely different approach to solving social and economic problems. Perhaps, in one form or another, the two-party system which many Nigerians hope for may have emerged by the next national elections four years hence.

VII

On foreign policy, Shagari has no inclination to play down the increasingly visible role carved out by the military government from 1975 onward and widely supported by his countrymen. Far more active in mediation, peacekeeping, and in international organizations than ever before, the SMC had proclaimed African issues and Africa as the "centerpiece" of their policy. Starting with Angola in 1975 and later over Zimbabwe and Namibia especially, Nigeria dealt with the United States and other non-

African powers as it perceived its own and Africa's self interest. It opposed the de facto U.S. alliance with South Africa in Angola in 1975, but worked later to advance Western attempts to find peaceful solutions bringing genuine majority rule in southern Africa.

Shagari has committed himself to his predecessors' lines of policy, out of conviction and to maintain continuity. As his U.N. Ambassador, B.A. Clark, said before the General Assembly on October 11, "Those who speculate that our new civilian government will be less dynamic in the pursuit of our foreign policy objectives will be disillusioned. If anything, and because we shall be operating from a firm foundation, we intend to pursue them with greater drive and vigor."

During the past year, the particular thrust of Nigeria's African efforts north of the Zambezi has been toward resolving intra-African conflicts. Their efforts to mediate the intricate crisis in Chad (complicated especially by the continuing French presence which they deplore) included three major constitutional negotiations and the deployment of a peacekeeping force of 800 (later withdrawn). They also tried, without success, to mediate the dispute between Uganda and Tanzania, and in the end took a strong stand against physical intervention by African states in each others' affairs. (Nigeria's leaders see this stance as essential, given their own sizable capacity for such intervention.) Further, General Obasanjo took part as one of the "wise men" in the OAU's 1979 effort to try to solve the problems of Western Sahara.

Among international issues, southern Africa is, and will undoubtedly remain, primary for Nigerians at large. When it seemed in June that the U.S. Congress might lift sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, the negative reaction of the Nigerian press reflected the depth of feeling all over the country. Although Nigeria did not, as reported in the United States, specifically threaten to use the oil weapon, it warned it would consider "an appropriate response" if sanctions were lifted.⁷ In the event, approval of President Carter's extension of sanctions was spontaneous and enthusiastic.

⁷ Shagari applauds his predecessors' nationalization of British Petroleum, agreeing that that was a necessary political message for the British government on Zimbabwe. But the BP takeover was not, for his or Obasanjo's government, a precedent. It was a specific action aimed at a defined target in circumstances whose repetition Nigerians do not expect. And critically, it was unique in having virtually no potential cost to Nigeria and to its economy. Because only two people in Lagos were on the staff of the parent company, their departure left management intact. It should be noted, too, that challenges about Nigeria's political will ("bark or bite"), such as that which appeared in *The Economist* (26 May-1 June, 1979) contributed in no small measure to the nationalization of BP.

Apart from southern Africa, relations with the United States are likely to turn, as they have since 1975, on issues of economics. The development and marketing of Nigeria's natural gas in the United States may become a necessary basis for continuing good relations. In addition, the similarity between the U.S. and Nigerian constitutions should increase, however serendipitously, contact between people in government at all levels, consequently bringing a time of closer relations—or at least better communication. In one vital sphere the results of such contact are already evident. For years the Nigerian military has sent in increasing numbers its officers and other ranks to the United States for training (Nigeria spent some \$10 million on it in 1978). In consequence more and more of the young Nigerian military have learned that the constitution must be inviolable in the system their country has just adopted. Lieutenant-General T.Y. Danjuma, just retired as Chief of Army Staff and indispensable in insuring the smooth handover, stated the likely continuity of that relationship: "America has the largest English-speaking army in the world. We value the training we get there highly, and will continue to subscribe to it for a very long time to come"—and the non-military impact will also continue thereby.

VIII

For Nigeria, the next few years will be a time of national on-the-job training. But despite some acrimony, the outcome of the elections has given something to everyone. Because each of the five parties controls the government in at least one state, each has a stake in the new system and its success. Most important of all, the overwhelming wish, throughout the country, is for peace and stability.

Debate over how to solve ongoing problems will be vociferous, and so will criticism of whatever solutions this or any government tries. For Nigerians are vocal, self-critical, energetic, imaginative, impossible to regiment; their virtues also make them difficult to govern. They are, above all, intensely political, engaging in continuous debate of the issues not just in cities and on university campuses but also in remote villages, in markets, in lorry parks. It is only the decibels that vary from one group to the next. Thirteen daily newspapers both add to and reflect intense political interest.

Although expectations are high and disappointments therefore likely, some salutary realism on the part of the electorate is already evident in two respects: for one, Nigeria has had several military governments as well as an earlier civilian one. Nigerians are, for

the first time, admitting to a certain admiration for a government that has left power; it may be a sign that people know no panaceas exist, and that the public may temper its usual impatience. Additionally, NPN was not a party of extravagant promises, and Shagari's statements have been aimed at conditioning his countrymen not to expect quick solutions.

While Nigeria's political fate will depend on how the civilians in power meet the country's challenges, Nigerians in and out of politics and the army have made clear their overwhelming will to have their experiment work. Their example will reach far beyond their borders and even Africa, profoundly affecting assumptions about the future of democracy.

Pierre Lellouche

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR POLITICS

A major landmark in the history of international nuclear politics will be the conclusion of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation in February 1980. Though little publicized in the press (perhaps because of its hermetic and quite unpronounceable acronym), INFCE has been an unprecedented international undertaking both in its scope and objectives. For over two years—since the Evaluation was formally launched in October 1977 by the Carter Administration—more than 500 experts from 46 nations, both developed and developing, have jointly studied the international implications of the growth of nuclear energy. In carrying out a detailed analysis of the technical, economic and institutional aspects of nuclear energy development throughout the world, the Evaluation has sought to reconcile the need for nuclear power in many nations with the prevention of a further spread of atomic weapons from civilian fuel cycles.¹

While the problem of achieving a stable balance between nuclear power development and nonproliferation has been a constant dilemma since the 1950s, an international consensus on this issue has never seemed so unattainable as today. This is due in part to the growing military and energy insecurity shared by most nations of the world, which has resulted in making nonproliferation a very costly proposition, both economically and militarily. Another reason lies in the fact that international nuclear politics have been in a state of turmoil since the early 1970s, and that many of the accepted international norms which were gradually established during the 1950s and 1960s have been called into question.

In order to measure the complexity of the problem it must be remembered that when the Evaluation was launched the international nonproliferation controversy had reached a peak. Essentially, two distinct, though interconnected, areas of conflict had emerged.

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¹ For an analysis of the internal structure of INFCE, see Steven J. Warnecke, "Non-Proliferation and INFCE: An Interim Assessment," *Survival*, May/June 1979.

First was the issue of nuclear exports and safeguards, triggered by the Indian explosion of 1974 and by the controversial nuclear deals signed in 1975–76 by France and Germany with South Korea, Pakistan and Brazil, involving “sensitive facilities” (i.e., enrichment and/or reprocessing plants). Here, the attempt on the part of the United States to go beyond the rules of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) by trying to prevent the sale of these facilities and to impose full-scope safeguards on all recipients—whether or not they were parties to the NPT—resulted in divisions among the supplier nations themselves (as evidenced by German-American and French-American quarrels during the London Suppliers Group negotiations).² This U.S. policy also led to a North-South confrontation on nuclear technology transfers, with the developing nations denouncing the “cartel-like” and discriminatory policies of the supplier countries.

A second source of conflict was the decision taken by the Ford Administration in October 1976, later developed by the Carter Administration in April 1977, to oppose “the plutonium economy” (through cancellation of reprocessing plants and indefinite deferral of the commercialization of breeder reactors). That decision met with strong opposition in Europe, Japan, the U.S.S.R. and most of the developing world. Arguing that they could not afford the “luxury” of the American position, these nations insisted that plutonium-fueled breeder reactors constituted an essential contribution to their energy requirements and, potentially, a means of achieving energy independence in the long run. Underlying this quarrel about the so-called economics of plutonium, there was a much deeper disagreement on the extent to which nuclear energy as a whole constitutes either a short-term parenthesis in the history of mankind or a major long-term energy source for the planet.

In this context, then, the Carter Administration launched INFCE with at least two *political* objectives in mind. The first was to create a forum where tensions could be diffused as quickly as possible, in order to prevent the very real risks, at that time, of a sudden breakdown of the existing nonproliferation regime. For this purpose, it was necessary to replace the earlier secretive and cartel-like London Suppliers Group with a more open forum where key industrialized and developing nations could present their own views about nuclear energy development.

² The London Suppliers Group is made up 15 countries which agreed to abide by a set of guidelines providing for the application of IAEA safeguards whenever nuclear facilities, equipment or individuals are transferred, as well as for the exercise of “restraint” with regard to the export of sensitive facilities (enrichment and reprocessing plants). However, as a result of French and German opposition, the guidelines failed to include full-scope safeguards; nor did they put an actual embargo on the sale of sensitive facilities.

The second objective was to convince the international community that U.S. opposition to the plutonium economy was technically and economically sound. If such a technical consensus could be reached, then it could be expected that political agreement would most likely follow, thereby opening the way to a safer world nuclear order.

In practice, however, only the first objective has been achieved. INFCE has indeed been successful in avoiding an escalation of tensions since 1977. This is no small achievement given the deep suspicions and deterioration of the situation at the time, as well as the resentment generated abroad by the fact that the U.S. Congress went ahead and passed its Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) in March 1978 without waiting for the results of the Evaluation. In the absence of an ongoing multilateral discussion, the Act might have triggered a showdown and possibly a major crisis between the United States and some of its nuclear clients abroad. But, beyond avoiding a crisis in 1977–79, the Evaluation has also been useful in developing a certain convergence between the United States and some of its allies in the industrialized world. The United States did gradually begin to recognize the legitimate energy needs of Europe and Japan, while the latter reached a better understanding of the legitimate security preoccupations of the United States.

On the substance, however, the Evaluation did not—and indeed could not—succeed in reconciling the various national points of view about nuclear energy development into a single nonproliferation strategy for the future. The main reason for this is that the Evaluation was from the start inherently ambiguous. Confronted with a series of political deadlocks and the risk of an open confrontation, the United States was proposing to depoliticize what is basically a political issue by approaching it from a purely technical angle.³ Where diplomats and politicians had failed to agree, engineers were expected to reach agreement on a “safe” fuel cycle, which would then constitute the basis for a better world nuclear order. The trouble is that there is no such thing as a proliferation-proof nuclear fuel cycle; nor is there a “technical fix” to the problem. The irony, of course, is that despite their illusory character, technical fixes have been a recurrent theme in American

³ It is interesting to note that the United States used a similar approach during the preliminary phases of the negotiations with the U.S.S.R. on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. The superpowers, however, failed to reach a *political* agreement on the verification of underground explosions, and, as a result, the latter remained outside the reach of the 1963 Test Ban Treaty. See Bernhard G. Bechhofer, *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961, Ch. XIX.

Polisario's major external supporter. In recent years Algeria has thinking about nuclear weapons spread since 1945.⁴ A further basic inconsistency in this approach is that technical aspects are in this field inseparable from political and economic considerations: a technical justification of the "once-through" fuel cycle (in which the spent reactor fuel is not reprocessed into plutonium) advocated by the Carter Administration does carry fundamental political and economic implications; and the same would be true, of course, for a technical justification of the breeder fuel cycle.

As a result, INFCE's conclusions were bound to be as ambiguous as the Evaluation itself. The Evaluation could not and does not "choose" a fuel cycle among those available today or proposed by some of the participants. Nor does the Evaluation resolve the conflicts described earlier, simply because technical solutions are just not available. Thus, the dozens of technical meetings conducted over the last two years, and the 20,000 pages of documents produced by INFCE have merely resulted in reflecting the basic disagreements mentioned earlier, the only difference being that these disagreements will be expressed in the Evaluation's final report in carefully weighted diplomatic language and highly sophisticated numbers and charts.

The ambiguity and limitations of these results are not without risks for the future. Indeed, the crisis which was avoided in 1977 may well take place in the aftermath of INFCE. However, there are also in today's situation some promising opportunities which, if correctly exploited, may eventually lead to a better management of proliferation issues in the 1980s.

II

A key condition for managing proliferation in the future is that all the major nations involved must now be fully aware of the very real risks confronting the international community in the period following the conclusion of INFCE.

Some of these potential dangers stem from the Evaluation itself, or rather from its ambiguity. Although it was emphasized from the beginning that INFCE was not intended to be a political negotiation, but only a technical exercise, the results of which are

⁴ The technical concept, which seemed promising at the time, was the so-called denaturation of uranium fuel. First mentioned in the Frank Report of June 1945, this concept became an important feature of the ill-fated Baruch Plan, launched by the United States in 1946. Under the plan, denaturation, a process to modify uranium fuel in order to prevent its usage in weapons material, was to serve as a criterion for judging between "dangerous activities" to be entrusted to a supranational world organization, and "non-dangerous activities" to be left within the competence of national governments. Interestingly enough, a modern version of denaturation, now called "denaturing," was evaluated in INFCE!

not to bind the participating states, the Evaluation does carry crucial political and economic consequences. Many governments joined the Evaluation not because they were convinced by the technical approach proposed by the United States but in the hope that INFCE would somehow put an end to the bitter nonproliferation quarrels of the previous years. In particular, given the urgency of many other issues to be faced by the West, the United States and its European allies could hardly afford the continuation of nuclear tensions then. In short, the Evaluation was seen not only as a nonproliferation exercise, but also as a vehicle for reconciliation within the West and, to a lesser degree, between North and South.

Added to these political expectations, the Evaluation also took on critical economic importance. Because the international nonproliferation controversy has paralleled a period of virtual "zero growth" of nuclear energy development throughout the world since the mid-1970s, INFCE has come to be seen by the nuclear community as an essential prerequisite for ending this period of "nuclear depression" and for restarting the various nuclear programs currently paralyzed by environmental, economic and technical problems. The fact is that the Evaluation does cut across many domestic issues, such as waste management; moreover, the acceptance of plutonium has ramifications that reach far beyond the proliferation of atomic weapons per se. In this context, the Evaluation was not only expected to deal with proliferation, but also to help generate a new commitment to nuclear power as a whole. The latter would, in turn, ease the world energy situation while salvaging some of the various national industries from a slow and painful death.

It should be emphasized that while some of these expectations were inevitable given the broader environment of the Evaluation (and, in particular, in light of the crisis of nuclear energy experienced since the mid-1970s), a number of misplaced expectations also resulted from the deliberate policies of some of the major governments involved. In essence, INFCE was used as a "freezing mechanism" whereby many of the delicate issues that were open in 1977 were postponed until the end of the Evaluation. In particular, the question of whether suppliers of natural or enriched uranium, such as the United States, Canada and Australia, would impose a right of prior approval for any reprocessing abroad was explicitly tied to the final conclusions of INFCE. One example of this is the "renegotiation" required by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 of the 1958 U.S.-EURATOM nuclear cooperation

agreement, which did not include any right of prior approval for reprocessing. After much public dispute, the two sides essentially agreed in the summer of 1978 to postpone negotiations on reprocessing and breeder issues until the end of the Evaluation. Another example is the 1977 interim U.S.-Japanese agreement to open the Tokai Mura pilot reprocessing plant, which President Carter had opposed, on a two-year trial basis. Once again, a final settlement of the plutonium issue was postponed until INFCE's conclusion.

To be sure, these interim arrangements did help sustain the nuclear "truce" of the past two years. But the price to be paid for this temporary relief may be prohibitive in the future. Indeed, the fact that these high expectations do exist is already part of the problem of the post-INFCE era. For, as noted earlier, the very ambiguity of the Evaluation and the unavailability of "perfect" technical or institutional solutions are bound to leave the problems raised in 1977 largely intact in 1980. In fact, there is a very real risk not only that these expectations will be disappointed next February, but that the issues which were conveniently frozen for the past two years will all resurface at about the same time, and that the U.S. executive branch, constrained as it is by the extensive limitations of the NNPA, will be able to reach a compromise with neither its foreign counterparts nor the Congress.

III

At the core of this dilemma is the ambiguity—not to say contradictions—of U.S. foreign nuclear policy since 1977: on the one hand, the United States did engage in a multilateral exercise in which Washington was bound to soften some of its earlier positions in order to reach a compromise. But on the other hand, the Congress went ahead with legislation which actually imposes a unilateral set of norms on the rest of the world, and which essentially prevents the executive branch from making any significant concessions to the outside world. As a result, in the event that INFCE conclusions do not fully satisfy the provisions of the U.S. legislation—as seems obviously the case—then one must be prepared to face once again the risk of a confrontation similar to the situation in 1977.

Therefore, in a very concrete sense there is a danger that a global storm may well follow the relative lull of the past two years, thereby precipitating the demise of the regime that exists under the Nonproliferation Treaty and under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This danger is heightened not only by the expectations but by the unfortunate timing of INFCE's

conclusion. February 1980 comes in an election year in the United States and this opens the possibility of a new American crusade against proliferation. Certain presidential candidates, unhappy with what is called in some American circles the "retreat" of the Carter Administration in implementing the NNPA over the last 18 months, may well be tempted to use proliferation issues in the campaign. Obviously, such an initiative would further reduce the small room for action of the present Administration and would threaten the delicate compromises which may eventually grow out of INFCE. In any case, the coincidence of the conclusion of the Evaluation and the U.S. presidential campaign will result in effectively postponing any serious negotiations on the post-INFCE nuclear order until early 1981. This, in turn, may lead several key nations to resort to unilateral policies in connection with pending contracts for fuel supplies.

A further danger, also linked to timing, stems from the unfortunate fact that the Evaluation is scheduled to end only a few months before the convening of the second NPT Review Conference in August 1980. This creates an additional risk that, in the event of renewed tensions following INFCE, these differences would spread to the entire NPT system.

In addition to the risks analyzed above, stemming from or connected with INFCE itself, there are further potential dangers which result from the underlying instabilities of the international regime, but which may also have a negative impact on the period following the conclusion of the Evaluation. Recent developments show that INFCE, which concerns itself with the proliferation potential of the commercial fuel cycle, has not prevented Pakistan from going ahead with its clandestine enrichment and reprocessing programs. Nor was INFCE able to prevent the mysterious, possibly nuclear, detonation conducted in September near South Africa. These events reveal the inherent limitations of an exercise dealing only with one route to proliferation while the other is left largely untouched.

Moreover, the emergence of a nuclear "gray market" among nations which have so far rejected or escaped the controls of the existing nonproliferation regime also illustrates the gaps in INFCE.⁵ By concentrating so much on commercial reprocessing and breeder reactors, the exercise actually focuses on a quarrel among the few industrialized countries able to develop such installations, whereas future proliferators, following Pakistan's example, will

⁵ Lewis A. Dunn, "Half Past India's Bang," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1979.

most likely follow the route of building small-scale clandestine facilities.

If nothing is done to deal with the clandestine route, and if new proliferators are to continue building or detonating bombs more or less openly, it will be very difficult indeed for the supplier nations to justify costly limitations on the commercial fuel cycle in the name of nonproliferation. In addition, if such a tendency toward clandestine proliferation continues, regional instabilities will undoubtedly follow and the entire nonproliferation regime will be threatened.

IV

While the potential risks and instabilities described above should indeed be taken seriously, the overall picture in the post-INFCE era need not be altogether somber. The evaluation has brought to light two major opportunities, which if adroitly exploited, might lay the groundwork for effective nonproliferation management in the coming decade.

The first opportunity lies in the considerably improved climate between the United States and the major Western industrialized nations. While this improvement falls short of a true consensus on a future nuclear fuel cycle, the Evaluation, as well as the extensive consultations conducted in parallel with INFCE over the past two years, have brought a better understanding between the United States, on the one hand, and Europe and Japan, on the other. Many of the suspicions evident in the mid-1970s involving commercial interests are behind us: each side now recognizes the need to combine the legitimate need for energy security, which in Europe and Japan may include plutonium breeders and reprocessing facilities, with the need for international security, which implies that plutonium fuel cycles must be developed under special technical and institutional controls.

This growing convergence has been indirectly reinforced by a second phenomenon, outside the INFCE process, namely the prolonged nuclear depression experienced since the mid-1970s. The relationship between this worldwide crisis and nonproliferation policy is a very complex and ambiguous one.⁶ To be sure, the political uncertainty resulting from the nonproliferation controversy of the past six years has certainly contributed to the slowdown of most nuclear programs around the world. It is also true that the proliferation argument has come to be used increasingly by antinuclear movements, particularly in Western countries.

⁶ Pierre Lellouche and Richard Lester, "The Crisis of Nuclear Energy," *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1979.

However, the main causes of the nuclear recession lie elsewhere: societal problems, particularly after the Three Mile Island accident, have increased dramatically in recent years, reaching even developing countries strongly committed to nuclear energy, such as Brazil. Environmental issues, combined with the eroding competitiveness of atomic power, and the overall reduction in energy demand arising from the continuing worldwide economic recession, have drastically reduced the pace of atomic energy growth throughout the world. Many countries are now experiencing a total paralysis of their nuclear programs, while most other nations have had to cut down on earlier plans. The only exceptions to this general trend are France and the Soviet Union in the industrialized world, and South Korea, Taiwan and Argentina in the developing world. Reflecting this trend, current INFCE projections for installed nuclear power capacity in the noncommunist world in the year 2000 range between 850 and 1,200 gigawatts, less than half of what was forecast a few years ago (and even these numbers are considered overly optimistic).

To be sure, this nuclear depression does have some potentially destabilizing effects in the nonproliferation area. In particular, certain nuclear supplier states may be tempted to "save" their nuclear industries by securing export contracts at any cost, including the transfer of technological sweeteners in the form of fuel-cycle facilities. In this connection, the recent sale of a heavy water plant to Argentina as part of a reactor deal signed with Germany, though technically not a violation of the London Suppliers Group Guidelines of 1977, offers a disturbing sign of what could become a new phase of savage competition among suppliers, at a time when industries are becoming increasingly vulnerable.

On the other hand, the current nuclear recession does offer several opportunities for nonproliferation management after INFCE. The first positive element is time. In 1974-75, the great proliferation scare triggered by the Indian explosion and the controversial export contracts signed by Germany and France coincided with a period of great nuclear expansion, due in part to the oil crisis of 1973. Projections of nuclear growth made at that time pictured a world becoming rapidly nuclear, with many newly developing countries entering the atomic field, and thousands of tons of fissile materials being shipped around the globe for reprocessing and use in an ever expanding number of breeder reactors. As a result, nonproliferation took on, particularly in the United States, a sense of absolute urgency, with calls for drastic and

immediate revision of the entire international nuclear system. To a large extent, it was this feeling of imminent catastrophe which surrounded the drafting of the U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Act in 1977 and which is reflected in the extremely severe provisions of the Act.

Today, the situation of atomic energy development is quite different. Instead of the growth foreseen in the early 1970s, nuclear energy is in full recession, and that recession is likely to be with us for many years to come. The somewhat ironic result of this is that the entire U.S. nonproliferation policy imbedded in the NNPA, which was tailored for the booming nuclear world of the early 1970s, is now being implemented in a period of nuclear standstill. Given this evolution, it is important to recognize that instead of an urgent, drastic and unilateral "solution," proliferation can now be dealt with thoroughly and on a multilateral basis because there is time to do so.

Second, the current nuclear recession helps reduce the magnitude of some of the key issues involved in the management of the fuel cycle. As a result of the overall reduction in power plant construction and orders throughout the world, the present situation is one of oversupply in the enrichment market instead of the shortage foreseen a few years ago. The fact that enrichment supplies will be available from U.S., Soviet and European sources (through EURODIF in France, and URENCO, which is a consortium of the U.K., the Netherlands and West Germany) makes irrelevant one major argument for the proliferation of national enrichment facilities and for the widespread use of plutonium recycling in thermal reactors.

Third, much of the earlier controversy on the plutonium economy is now, if not totally academic, at least largely out of proportion to the real status of breeder and reprocessing programs throughout the world. Whereas, in the nuclear euphoria of the early 1970s, breeder reactors were expected to prove "H. G. Wells' dream of ubiquitous, reasonably cheap energy, essentially forever"⁷ through rapid deployment by the mid-1980s, it now seems that at most four or five countries will have a handful of reactors of this type in operation by the turn of the century.

In addition, widespread environmental opposition to large-scale reprocessing plants has also considerably slowed down the development of this industry. In this connection, the decision taken in

⁷ Alvin M. Weinberg, "Nuclear Energy: A Prelude to H. G. Wells' Dream," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1971.

May 1979 by German authorities to “freeze” the large Gorleben reprocessing project provides a particularly striking illustration of the many ironies of the current nuclear and nonproliferation situation: what the United States could not enforce upon Germany through coercion (NNPA) or persuasion (INFCE) was done by German environmentalist groups skillfully using the domestic political and legal system of the Federal Republic in order to effectively halt a project to which Bonn was and remains staunchly committed.

v

The post-INFCE nonproliferation picture which emerges from the preceding analysis is thus a very mixed one. The many instabilities of the current international system, combined with the necessarily ambiguous conclusions of the Evaluation and the rigidity of U.S. legislation may well lead to a new period of crisis. Conversely, the growing convergence between the key Western actors and the relative freeze of the nuclear scene may be used constructively in order to avert this crisis, and, beyond that, to lay the groundwork for a gradual improvement of the international nonproliferation regime.

Managing nonproliferation after INFCE will therefore be a delicate task. However, it can be achieved provided that a conscious effort be undertaken *now* to elaborate an approach to nonproliferation which would be tailored to fit the rapidly changing political and economic realities of our time, rather than to satisfy a series of abstract and obsolete concepts belonging to the past.

The first objective should be to identify the realities of proliferation politics today, and the second to discover the means best suited to deal with the situation.

What are these realities?

—First, contrary to what was foreseen a few years ago, there *is* time to deal with proliferation from civilian fuel cycles;

—second, too much time and energy has been wasted fighting the wrong battle over the wrong problem. While Americans and Europeans have been busily quarreling over the future of the plutonium economy—which, in any case, they alone are technically and economically able to develop—clandestine proliferation involving developing countries using small-scale facilities has managed to proceed apace;

—third, the controversy between the United States, Europe and Japan is less one of substance, for everyone recognizes the need to reconcile energy security and military security, than one

of methodology, namely the reliance on unilateral versus multilateral action to check proliferation.

Underlying the above observations is a fundamental fact of life of contemporary international nuclear politics, and one which should become the cornerstone of future nonproliferation efforts, namely that the United States can no longer control proliferation on its own, and that it needs the full participation of key nuclear actors in Europe and Japan. To put it differently: "Without the collaboration of the other, neither the United States nor Europe can accomplish much in preventing the emergence of troublesome new nuclear weapon owners."⁸

To be sure, even the recognition of this fact is not easy. For over three decades American leaders and policymakers, relying on the combined strength of U.S. diplomatic influence abroad and U.S. industrial domination of the world nuclear market, have been accustomed to thinking that nonproliferation is a special American responsibility and that the United States can handle it pretty much on its own. Indeed, the very history of international nuclear politics since 1945 actually blends in with the evolution of U.S. foreign nuclear policy. The 1946 Baruch Plan, the Atoms for Peace Plan of 1953, the creation of the IAEA in 1957, the Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968, the formation of the London Suppliers Group in 1974 and the launching of INFCE in 1977—each of these landmarks in the history of nonproliferation has been the product of U.S. policy.

Given this background, the tendency to rely on unilateral actions in order to "educate" the rest of the world and "solve" the nonproliferation problem according to the prevailing American view of the issue remains very much alive. Indeed, such a tendency explains much of the U.S. foreign nuclear policy in recent years. It is particularly visible in the recent NNPA, which is, in effect, an attempt on the part of the Congress to legislate for the rest of the world.

However, the conditions which once made it possible for the United States to control proliferation unilaterally are no longer present. The decline of U.S. political and military power in many regions of the world, coupled with the end of American industrial supremacy in the reactor and fuel markets,⁹ demand a truly

⁸ Horst Mendershausen, *International Cooperation in Nuclear Fuel Services: European and American Approaches*, The Rand Corporation, P-6308, December 1978.

⁹ Thomas L. Neff and Henry D. Jacoby, "Nonproliferation Strategy in a Changing Nuclear Fuel Market," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979; Paul L. Joskow, "The International Nuclear Industry Today: The End of the American Monopoly," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1976.

multilateral approach to nonproliferation. This, in turn, requires a change of mentality on the part of American leaders. Many of the risks to be faced after INFCE stem precisely from the fact that many U.S. policymakers and legislators continue to believe and to behave as if nothing had changed in international nuclear politics. Indeed, the greatest achievement of the Evaluation would be to help change this mentality within the United States itself, just as the Evaluation has helped to develop in Europe and elsewhere a greater awareness of the security implications of nuclear power development.

VI

Priority should be therefore given to the establishment, upon the conclusion of INFCE, of an institutional mechanism whose purpose would be to generate an international consensus, while inhibiting the risk of conflicting unilateral actions in the near term. In suggesting such a course of action, the objective here is not to add yet one more institutional model to the dozens of such institutions which have been proposed since the mid-1970s, such as the so-called regional fuel centers, the International Nuclear Fuel Authority, the plutonium banks or storage centers and the like. While institutional arrangements may contribute to the management of fuel cycle activities in the long run, the prerequisite to building such institutions is a political consensus which has yet to be found. Nor would it be effective to launch another crusade for some new Baruch Plan. This would only serve to reopen the eternal and unsolvable issue of verification and control, as well as the link with general disarmament or "vertical proliferation." The end result of such a process would likely be the acceleration of the demise of the current IAEA-NPT regime.

Rather, the objective should be to work toward a compromise by setting up an informal but effective mechanism of consultation among a small group of key supplier and recipient nations (these could be selected from the members of INFCE's Technical Coordination Committee). The group would allow the continuation of the multilateral process which began in INFCE and would inject a political dimension into the technical findings of the Evaluation. In effect, this group would be a *multinational management mechanism* which could readily adapt—given its informal structure—to the rapidly evolving problems and opportunities arising in contemporary international nuclear relations. In many respects, this mechanism would be comparable to the discreet U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) which monitors the

implementation of the SALT Agreements.¹⁰ Like the SCC, this Standing Consultative Group on Nuclear Energy (SCGNE) would look for informal and effective solutions to problems as they come up. While carefully avoiding the traditionally legalistic approach to the settlement of international issues, the group would search for de facto compromises wherever possible.

One area where this mechanism would be very useful in managing a very difficult and divisive issue is the question of the plutonium economy. This involves not only the long-term future of nuclear energy (because of the shift to fast-breeder reactors), but it also goes to the heart of the problem of discrimination, which remains the focal point of the entire debate on nonproliferation. Given the special proliferation risks attached to the plutonium economy, there is a consensus that some formula must be found to solve the issue.

One formula, originally advocated by the Carter Administration, is to forego the technology altogether: in so doing, no nation would be put in a discriminatory position, the United States itself having decided to abandon both reprocessing and the Clinch River Breeder Reactor. The trouble with this approach is that, given the commitment of several industrialized nations to this technology, the United States has been unable to impose its rule, despite the attempt of the Congress to enforce it upon the rest of the world through the NNPA.

The second formula consists of accepting discrimination as a fact of international life and concluding that the "problem is not sensitive materials and technologies as much as sensitive countries."¹¹ Thus, the key issue is to draw the line between those "safe" countries (whether nuclear or non-nuclear weapons states), which can have these facilities on their territories, and the rest of the world.

At present, after nearly three years of bitter U.S.-European and U.S.-Japanese controversies, the State Department's position has gradually shifted from the first formula to the second. Thus, in the aftermath of INFCE, the question becomes how to discriminate in the reprocessing/breeder area without totally breaking up the existing international nuclear regime. Practically speaking, the

¹⁰ See: Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission, December 21, 1972. See also the ABM Treaty (Art. XIII), the 1972 Interim Agreement on offensive weapons (Art. VI), and the SALT II Treaty (Art. XVII).

¹¹ Mason Willrich, "A Workable International Nuclear Energy Regime," *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1979.

solution is to allow Germany and Japan to operate reprocessing facilities and breeders, and then sell this compromise to the developing world. The worst way to do this would be for the supplier nations to write down the compromise in a legal form *now* and present it to the IAEA. A more effective way to settle this issue would be to leave it open deliberately and to deal with it within the informal framework of the Standing Consultative Group described above, at the correct time (i.e., *if* and *when* the German Gorleben reprocessing complex is built).

If and *when* necessary, the group could then establish at the appropriate time a series of practical ad hoc arrangements whereby developing nations able to introduce breeder reactors could have access to fuel cycle services from large commercial facilities located in Western Europe and Japan. Such arrangements could be modeled on some of the existing European nuclear ventures such as EURODIF. This process of gradual contractualization would then pave the way for a more ambitious plutonium spent-fuel management scheme through the IAEA.

The central idea behind this reasoning is that we *do* have time to deal with these issues and that given the fluidity of the current situation it would be counterproductive to try to negotiate now a legalistic, universal charter for a technology that is still very far from having reached its maturity and acceptability.

The approach advocated above may appear too modest and too pragmatic to some. It may also lack a grand philosophical design. However, it is time to abandon an era of abstract and rigid principles, which had to be changed each time a new proliferator came along. Instead, what is needed is generalized political acceptability in order to avoid a new confrontation in the aftermath of the Evaluation and to gradually build a network of contractual arrangements which will eventually turn out to be more effective than many of the unilateral and coercive actions of the past.

Ulf Lantzke

EXPANDING WORLD USE OF COAL

Last year this article would have started with a call to double world coal production by the year 2000 as a response to the inevitable leveling off of world oil production. Today, however, experience in 1979 alone has lowered expectations of future OPEC oil production and reinforced the trend to a slowing down of nuclear energy capacity. Hence, it now appears that world coal production must at least triple by the end of this century if we are to have adequate energy supplies to accommodate even moderate levels of economic growth.

Such a level of increased coal use would require the movement in world trade of at least 700 million tons of coal a year—the energy equivalent of about the current level of oil production from Saudi Arabia, 9.5 million barrels of oil per day. It would require an annual coal production increase of five percent. In quantitative terms these are major targets, yet they are modest in terms of the vital objective of assuring the future of the world economy.

We have the tools at hand to achieve such expansion. Coal is widely available; the technology for coal production, transport, use and conversion into synthetics is known and is constantly improving. Why, then, does further growth of this promising fuel of the future seem to be stalled? Why is there a 20 percent overcapacity in the United States today, resulting in 20,000 unemployed miners? Why do potential European and Japanese coal importers suspect that major producers such as the United States and Australia will not in fact export significant quantities of coal in the future? And why do major producers not believe that possible importers will not expand their coal usage to handle increased quantities in their energy systems?

These are difficult questions. To answer them one must inspect each part of the coal system—from production to transport to eventual use, domestically and internationally. The potential is

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clearly there. The major limitation is our ability to handle the difficult institutional, political and environmental issues. All are solvable; none have easy solutions.

II

The elements of the world energy balance are now, I believe, generally understood by those who seek seriously to assess the present situation and future prospects. In particular, the International Energy Agency, bringing together 20 nations within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), has produced a series of progressively more pessimistic appraisals. Alas, while these are apparently accepted by leading governments, their implications do not seem to have sunk in to the requisite degree in the public opinion of central nations, including the United States.

As recently as two years ago, most observers believed that the major oil-exporting countries, grouped in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), could, in the medium to long term, produce approximately 40–45 million barrels per day (mb/d) and that this meant that a significant gap between oil export availabilities and the demand levels of consuming countries might not emerge until at least the late 1980s. Even last year, however, the best estimate by IEA of OPEC oil production had been reduced to 38 mb/d. Today, we foresee that such production may well be held to a level not much above 35 mb/d, with a likely situation of no growth, or next to no growth, in OPEC oil exports henceforth. In essence, this means that if overall energy demand continues to increase, it will have to be met increasingly with our own resources and ingenuity, a harsh reality not readily accepted.

Thus, even on optimistic assumptions about some of the underlying energy supply and demand factors, oil supplies cannot meet projected demand. The “gap” could grow from relatively minor shortfalls in 1985 to 10 mb/d in 1990 and 28 mb/d in 2000, even if between now and the year 2000:

- economic growth is moderate (3.4 percent per year);
- the energy/GNP growth ratio is reduced from historical levels of 1.0 to 0.8, reflecting gains in conservation;
- OPEC production goes up to 38 mb/d with Saudi Arabia contributing up to 15 mb/d;
- coal use and production are doubled;
- natural gas use and production are doubled;
- nuclear energy increases 12-fold.

In the real world, of course, there is no such thing as a gap. Already signs are appearing that oil supply and demand will be balanced in 1985 by a combination of a reduction in economic growth, more improved efficiency of energy use than presumed, and some addition of non-oil fuels. But beyond that date the balance would require far more draconian adjustments.

There are several available means by which the large differences between desired energy demand and expected supply can be reconciled over the longer term. Energy demand can be reduced through market reaction to limited supplies leading to sharply higher energy prices, which would result in either more efficient use of energy or a slowdown of economic activity, or a combination of these. Additionally, energy supplies can be increased beyond those assumed in the scenario.

The key point is that, if effective action is not taken on the demand or supply side, the only outcome will be lower economic growth. A reduction of the economic growth assumption over the period by one percent would "save" the equivalent of 9 mb/d in 1990 and 20 mb/d in 2000. The cost of such an adjustment would be an annual loss of GNP in the OECD of nearly \$800 billion (in 1978 dollars) in 1990 and \$2 trillion in 2000. In effect, both the industrialized countries and developing countries that lack oil would be faced with a situation of virtual economic standstill, with growth rates far below those of the postwar period, and in the case of the developing countries barely above anticipated population growth rates. But of course averages never begin to tell the story of what would be happening to lower income countries and groups within countries, or to the industrialized countries that are already in difficulty. A world of reduced growth seems to appeal to some who take their present good fortune for granted; to others less fortunate, and indeed to the political stability and security of the world as a whole, the result can only be described as critical and potentially disastrous.

So it is to avoid such a prospect that one must look extremely hard at the potential areas of increased energy supply within this time frame. Given the uncertainties which surround nuclear power development, the limited number of available sites for hydro-power, the embryonic state of development of other solar energy technologies (whatever their ultimate potential beyond 2000), and the grave uncertainties about additional oil and natural gas resources, the conclusion is inescapable that a tremendous expansion in the use and production of coal is fundamental.

In the study *Steam Coal Prospects to 2000*, published in late 1978

by the International Energy Agency, the potential for future coal production, use and trade was explored. Several different scenarios for future coal activity were examined. The "reference" case, which assumes present policy and a 50 percent real oil price rise over 1978 levels by 2000, showed a doubling of OECD coal demand by the year 2000—from current levels of 1,000 million metric tons of coal equivalent to 2,100 mtce.¹ World trade of coal in this case would amount to 504 mtce by the year 2000. If, however, coal development policies are accelerated, coal demand in the OECD would reach 2,600 mtce by 2000. Compared to the reference case, such an enlarged coal case would result in a reduction of the world energy gap in the year 2000, referred to earlier, by some 500 mtce or about seven million barrels a day of oil equivalent. World coal trade in this "accelerated coal use" case would be on the order of 700 mtce (of which 195 mtce would be trade in metallurgical coal).

The coming renaissance of coal will have to be strikingly different from the past record. Coal will be part of a more diverse energy demand and supply structure where new processing, conversion and energy transformation technologies will meet social and environmental requirements. The development of coal will be driven by international needs as well as domestic requirements. Coal will be a major factor in encouraging increased economic interdependence among potential coal consuming and producing nations, with reverberating consequences for their political and even strategic relations.

III

There are numerous reasons why coal can become the most significant substitute fuel for oil. First, reserves are abundant and widely dispersed. It is estimated that the world has recoverable reserves of 640 billion tons—enough for 250 years of consumption at present levels.

Second, coal is in wide use today. In 1978 coal provided about 30 percent of the world's energy, but this percentage varied from region to region. The Soviet Union and China consume coal for 50 percent of their energy, whereas the percentage drops to 20 percent for the OECD countries. In South Africa, almost three-

¹ A metric ton of coal equivalent is a standard unit of heating capacity, based on the average BTU content of hard coal (13,400 BTUs per pound). Coal with a below-average BTU rating needs more physical volume than the tonnage value, while high-grade coal requires less physical volume. In addition, for purposes of conversion to American units, a metric ton is 2,200 pounds.

On this basis, approximately 71.4 million metric tons of coal equivalent per year is the equal in energy value of 50 million tons of oil per year, or one million barrels per day of oil.

quarters of energy demand is supplied by coal.

The fact that coal starts from such a broad base has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, technology is known throughout the coal chain, from the mine ultimately to the consumer. Constraints are relatively easy to identify; strategies can be developed to overcome them. Coal is a known commodity to the consumer; its expanded use does not stir emotions like some other proposed alternatives to oil.

On the other hand, expanded coal use is frequently regarded as a return to the past. It raises important environmental and safety issues, and in some quarters it has the reputation of being a fuel limited by the ways it can be used.

Yet coal is, in many respects, much more adaptable than other alternatives. The major initial possibility for increased use of coal as an energy source (apart from metallurgical use by the iron and steel industry) is in the electricity-generation and industrial sectors. Already it provides 40 percent of OECD electricity, and its use in industrial processes is increasing again. Apart from feedstock requirements and processes requiring extremely clean fuels or precise temperature control, coal could potentially supply a large portion of the industrial sector's direct heat and process steam requirements currently supplied by oil and gas. For example, the process steam or heat requirements of the chemical, petroleum refining, paper, building materials, and food processing industries appear to be good candidates for coal substitution in the long run. Large coal-fired boilers will be needed for new industrial parks, district heating and combined heat/power facilities.

Over the longer term, new combustion technologies as well as coal conversion into synthetic gas or liquid fuels will promote greater penetration of coal into other markets. The National Coal Board in the U.K. is even experimenting with new ways in which it can be used directly for residential and commercial settings. The uses of coal are limited only by our imagination as to how to transform this abundant resource into practical use.

Third, even before the recent escalation of oil prices, coal was economically competitive with oil. Even at pre-Iran oil prices, a coal plant with full desulphurization facilities could produce baseload electricity at an average total cost during the first 20 years of operation 30 percent less in the United States and 15 percent less in coal-importing regions than the electricity produced in an oil-fired plant over the same period.

Whether these cost comparisons would continue into the future is of course debatable. The relatively large untapped resource base

of coal would suggest that costs might be held reasonably constant. Yet some observers believe that coal prices are primarily a function of world oil prices, that coal production and transportation costs will rise more rapidly as output increases or that the increased market power of those participating in the coal supply chain will allow a wider margin between coal costs and coal prices in the future.

All of these factors may indeed operate to increase the price of coal in the future. Rising oil prices can affect the price of coal both directly (through increasing production and transportation costs) and indirectly (by increasing demand). But oil prices are unlikely to be the main determinant of coal prices as some believe—and of course the widespread shift to lower cost coal, where it can substitute for oil, will tend to limit the rate of oil price increases in the future. Rather, the major determinant of future coal prices is likely to be the extent of effective competition among coal suppliers and coal transporting systems, and in some countries the competition between coal and nuclear power in the electricity sector. And it is at least hopeful that competitive forces in the international coal markets are today strong. The resource base is widespread and abundant, and there is a lack of corporate concentration and few institutional restraints to entry and competition. Furthermore, the promised development of new coal burning, cleaning and blending technologies will allow greater use of a wider variety of coal types leading to increased competition among coal suppliers.

The competitive position of coal-fired electricity generation vis-à-vis nuclear power in the OECD is less definitive than the choice between coal and oil. The important conclusion to be drawn here is that both coal and nuclear power are likely to produce electricity at a lower cost than oil-fired plants in future years. In some respects, to the extent that there are obvious advantages associated with diversifying the sources of electric power, coal and nuclear power may be more complementary than competitive.

Fourth, large-scale expansion of coal consumption, production and trade would have a major and positive impact on overall economic activity. Demand for coal mining, processing, transportation and combustion equipment, and ancillary and spin-off demands could trigger economic regeneration in centers where coal will be produced, processed, shipped and consumed.

IV

There are, however, very great problems to be overcome. To

begin with, many utilities, industries and public authorities are locked into energy systems, infrastructures and cost/pricing structures which evolved during the era of rapid oil growth. Decisions to switch from oil to coal will present complications of *structural reform*.

In the case of power generation—an obvious sector where coal can effectively substitute for oil—outright prohibition of the construction of new oil-fired power plants may not be immediately possible in all countries, although Germany has implemented such a system, requiring that all new power plants be designed to provide their base loads by other fuels. Restructuring of refineries may also prove to be a constraint. In addition, boiler conversion is a difficult and timely task. Space is often a limiting factor to quick coal retrofitting; added handling equipment, coal crushers, and environmental equipment are all required. There must be transport facilities such as railroad or barge facilities to deliver the coal as well.

But in time it should be possible to accomplish the required structural adaptations. Even in cases where oil-fired capacity must remain in operation for economic reasons, efforts should be expended to limit oil-fired generation progressively to middle or peak load requirements, using coal and other appropriate fuels for base load generation.

Industry faces similar problems to those encountered by utilities. It takes a great deal of effort in industry to convert oil-fired boilers to coal; it is (and was) much easier the other way round. Conversion to coal in many cases requires the use of different boilers and heat exchangers, as well as allocation of space for the coal pile, installation of coal handling equipment, provisions for ash collection and disposal, dust control, and other environmental equipment. There are also limits to the existing distribution system's ability to supply smaller scale industrial demands in diverse locations at reasonable costs.

The substitution possibilities and ease of conversion between oil and gas currently provide industry with flexibility and security minus the high capital expenditure required for conversion to coal. The relatively low price of natural gas in some existing long-term contracts and the regulated price of natural gas in certain markets also reduces the incentive for coal substitution in the near term.

Nevertheless, coal is currently a competitive fuel in large-scale industrial boilers for electrical generation and process steam, and in certain heat applications. In the longer term, successful com-

mercialization of fluidized bed combustion technology, and improvements in coal cleaning, blending and distribution systems will help resolve some of the current environmental constraints, space limitations, and other objections to industrial coal substitution. Several other promising developments loom on the horizon. Improved interaction between energy and regional development planners could foster the development of industrial parks where the energy requirements of many smaller firms (which might find conversion to coal impractical on their own) could be supplied by central coal plants, giving them full advantage of the scale economies and higher efficiencies offered by cogeneration.

I have already referred to the highly competitive and fragmented structure of the coal industry as basically healthy. Yet it is also true that an industry that comprises hundreds of companies in the United States is to some extent an obstacle to rapid adaptation. In recent years, the major oil companies have been stepping up their acquisition of coal properties, so that they currently produce about 20 percent of U.S. production, a figure estimated to rise to 50 percent by 1985. This has given rise to some concern and to suggestions for legal prohibitions or restraints. In such a situation, a non-American should speak cautiously, but it is my impression that the prospective degree of concentration shows no signs of threatening the essential competitiveness of the industry, and that in terms of the enormous size of most open-pit mines and the necessary infrastructure development, especially in the western coal region, large entities would be in a position to overcome more rapidly the numerous bottlenecks in coal systems from the mine to the consumer.

Beyond the problems of transition and adjustment, a longer term constraint is how to greatly expand coal production, trade and use in *an environmentally acceptable manner*. This problem is particularly acute for *surface mines*, which must be relied upon for a very substantial proportion of increased global coal production, especially in the United States, Canada and Australia. Surface mining imposes considerable demands on the local environment, so that rigid control over material movement, restoration of the topsoil and landscaping of the mine area must be maintained.

An example of successful handling of these problems is the recently developed mine in Wyoming, known as Black Thunder, which at any one time will disrupt only 600 acres for the total mining operation. Its planned annual physical production is over 20 million short tons, or the equivalent of about 200,000 barrels of oil per day. Such high production on relatively little land

enables the producers to reinvest heavy sums in land reclamation and to carry out such reclamation rapidly.

All told, it is estimated that an extra 300 million tons per year produced from the western United States would involve a mining surface area of less than 10,000 acres per year requiring movement of about 400 million tons of rock and soil. This surface area would be divided for production purposes among individual mines widely separated in different states. The large resource base would provide a wide choice of possible sites, allowing enhanced opportunity to select areas which will be less harmful to the environment and community.

The problem in these areas is of course the preservation of agricultural land. Even more complex problems may arise where the coal is located in proximity to highly populated areas. But here too there are outstanding examples of successful handling.

Perhaps the world's most impressive coal development with regard to community and environmental concerns exists in the Rhine area of Germany. During the last three decades, more than 50 communities west of Cologne containing more than 24,000 inhabitants have been relocated to make room for mines. The major coal developer in this region is the Rheinische Braunkohlenwerke, or Rheinbraun. Under the Brown Coal Act of 1950, Rheinbraun is required to perform extensive land reclamation efforts subject to proper safeguards. That law enables Rheinbraun, which owns almost all of West Germany's 56 billion tons of brown coal reserves, to exploit veins over a 2,500-square kilometer area irrespective of the use being made of the ground above the coal.

A sophisticated system to protect communities and individuals has been established; before mining begins, extensive planning and consultations occur over months or years between company executives, government officials and representatives of the local population. But once a plan for a new coal mine is approved, residents and property owners must negotiate with Rheinbraun and come to terms with the firm on compensation and relocation. The company has never had a major open-pit coal mine project rejected and generally has had an extraordinarily successful record in relocating populations to their satisfaction. (In one instance, after procedures had been closed and planning of mining was to be changed, some people who were ready to be relocated under previous plans protested when they learned they had to stay under the new plan.)

In short, experience does suggest that if the need for increased production is accepted, and a procedure for consultation with the

local population developed, it is now politically as well as technologically possible to deal with the environmental problems associated with surface mining.

In the case of *deep mining*, which will still have to provide substantial amounts at least in the United States, the problem of safety is a major one; in Britain today, it is estimated that deep coal mining entails a loss of life at the rate of one person for every two million tons of coal mined, while U.S. experience is roughly comparable. Plainly, every effort must be made to reduce these figures.

Deep coal mining also has its own environmental problems. The disposal problem for solid waste is severe. The amount of spoil per ton of coal produced varies greatly from mine to mine, but the quantity might be 30 percent of the coal produced. Only some of this is likely to be marketable as land fill, and ultimately the material has to be spread as a surface tip or the expense of transporting it back into the mine will have to be incurred. Acid mine drainage and the residue from any local cleaning are additional problems requiring control. Existing techniques and new technology under development, including the use of new fluidized combustion technology to burn waste at the mine mouth to produce useful power, can make these problems manageable.

Next, there is the problem of *solid wastes* at the combustion site, which may be quite unfamiliar to industries replacing oil with coal. A 1,000-megawatt (electric) power plant may have to dispose of 320,000 tons per year of ash, and on a national basis the United States and Canada would have an ash production of over 100 million tons per year by 2000 on foreseen levels of coal use.

But such a level does not pose serious obstacles. Fly ash can be used to make cement, and is also used in road construction. Another solution which has been adopted in Japan, and which could find application elsewhere, is to use the ash for creating new industrial sites in shallow water offshore.

More serious is the problem of *pollution*, especially from sulphur oxides. One might suppose that this problem, already substantial, would grow proportionately with much greater coal use. However, this is not necessarily so. The likely areas of major increase in OECD coal production (western United States, Canada and Australia) contain much lower sulphur-content coals than eastern North American or most European coalfields. Though OECD coal production might increase in the "accelerated coal" case from 950 million metric tons of coal equivalent to over 2,400 mtce over the next 25 years, it is expected that low-sulphur coal production

will grow from about 160 mtce to 1,200 mtce and that the proportions of high- and medium-sulphur coal will sharply decline.²

The technology for keeping sulphur oxide emissions to environmentally acceptable levels is available and in use today. The problem is primarily one of cost—at the estimated target levels of U.S. coal production and use, the installation of regenerable flue gas desulphurization capacity would involve an estimated cost of about \$35 billion (in 1978 dollars), or 20 percent of the estimated power station construction bill. But with such installation, sulphur oxide emission quantities in the United States could actually be lower in 2000 than in 1976.

A major difficulty is that capital expenditures in the United States for such equipment are currently more difficult to recover from the state utility commissions in rate increases than outlays for other costlier fuels, which can be quickly passed on to consumers. Such institutional constraints will have to be remedied.

Finally, there are a number of environmental concerns surrounding the expansion of synfuel plants for producing liquid fuels from coal. The water requirements for such plants are very large, and in many parts of the United States the adequacy of water supplies for other uses is already marginal. But there should be enough areas where the problem is manageable to make a start, and over time it should be possible to develop technologies that minimize water usage.

A possible longer term and more profound objection to increased reliance on energy from fossil fuel combustion (not just coal combustion) is doubt about the inherent ability of the earth's environment to absorb and recycle the *carbon dioxide* produced, and about the consequent effect on the earth's climate.

The amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has steadily increased from about 313 ppmv (particles per million by volume) in 1958 to 334 ppmv in 1978. Continuing increase might cause a "greenhouse effect" by altering the radiation balance of the atmosphere. A global temperature increase and major climatic changes might result.

At present concentrations of carbon dioxide, no global temperature rise has been detected above the "noise level" of natural variations. Some computer models, based on necessarily very uncertain assumptions, predict that, if the CO₂ level in the

² These are figures for *production* within the OECD countries and thus differ from the potential demand figures cited earlier in the text. The balance of production and demand between OECD and non-OECD areas is given below in Tables I and II.

atmosphere were to double in the next century, the temperature would rise by 2°C in the tropics and 10°C at the poles and there would be a seven percent increase in average precipitation and evaporation.³

The mechanism of CO₂ transfer in the atmosphere and its return to the oceans and earth is very complicated. Knowledge of the whole carbon cycle, involving plant and animal growth and decay is not yet sufficient even to be sure how much of the observed seven percent increase over 20 years is due to fossil fuel combustion. Deforestation and other land modifications are also known to have a major effect, but their magnitude is so uncertain as to be thought by some to be half as large and by others to be twice as large, as the effect of fossil fuel combustion.

CO₂ production from greatly increased coal consumption may turn out to be a long-term problem if coal use were likely to continue indefinitely at high rates. So far, the evidence seems too weak to prevent coal from playing a major part in the energy supply over the next 50 years, but there is a continual need for careful study of the level of carbon dioxide and for the acquisition of knowledge of the mechanism involved in CO₂ transfer.

Closely related to the environmental issue is that of *coal transport*. Efficient, economic and environmentally acceptable coal transportation systems must be developed that can service expanded trade and use. This will be particularly challenging in the United States where both unit trains and slurry pipelines must be used to move the West's vast coal reserves to market.

Major problems must be resolved. Railways are restricted by the topography of the route and there may be environmental objections to greatly increased traffic from residents along the route. Slurry pipelines need a ton of water for each ton of coal and so are restricted to regions with adequate water supply at the origin; and there are considerable environmental problems in disposing of the dirty water at the destination. Slurry pipelines also face legal constraints due to problems of obtaining right of way.

All of these problems are solvable if sensible economic, environmental and political planning is done today. The current dispute between railroads and slurry pipelines should be resolved to allow a role for both. Each system is needed to move the vast western coal reserves to market. Slurry pipelines cannot do the job alone, because severe water constraints would be encountered, and rail-

³ Related estimates and source citations will be found in Charles F. Cooper, "What Might Man-Induced Climate Change Mean?" *Foreign Affairs*, April 1978, pp. 500-520.

roads could not move all the western coal because this would involve too much heavy traffic through communities by unit trains.

However, a combined effort between the two forms of transportation should eliminate any insurmountable constraints. Rail is most suitable for local movements and for low to moderate quantities, or where maximum flexibility is required, and slurry pipelines are most economical for high-volume consistent demands. And competition between the two systems could help assure against steep tariff increases.

In addition to moving coal within the country, strategies for major export of coal from the United States will have to include plans for broadening the country's export capacity. Although the United States is today the world's leading coal exporter, *port facilities* are generally deficient. Further, the United States has very limited capabilities to accommodate larger vessels being built throughout the world. The majority of East and Gulf Coast ports can only accept vessels with 35- to 45-foot drafts. Massive efforts will have to be made to develop and expand deep-water port facilities for loading, receiving and transshipment to handle increased trade volumes and large carriers.

In sum, the expansion of coal production and use does entail serious environmental problems, and acceptable solutions to these (and to the problem of adequate transportation) will entail very great expenditures as well as some additional technological innovation. The impact will inevitably be particularly great in areas of greatly increased production.

The essential political problem is to minimize these destructive effects. The capacity to do this through intelligent planning and investment clearly exists. The problem is to persuade people in affected regions to take a national (and indeed a global) view which recognizes that failure to make the coal available would have equally, if not more, severe impact on other local communities. And if such communities lack the energy needed to manufacture the clothes, machinery and automobiles, and to produce and process food, those local communities in potential coal-producing regions would suffer just as much as others.

This fundamental interrelationship between producers and consumers of energy is in many respects at the heart of the energy problem both within individual nations and among the nations that might produce and consume coal through international trade. Let us turn our attention to the international arrangements and adjustments that will be needed.

Table I, below, shows the present shape of world coal trade, and the way in which such trade might expand if one assumed simply a continuation of present national policies, a moderate rate of expansion of overall energy demand, and reasonable estimates in the evolution of particular energy sources. (In particular, the table makes a "low nuclear" assumption, which, however, still assumes that nuclear energy would be expanded roughly tenfold in the time frame 1976–2000.) On this basis, in terms of millions of metric tons of coal equivalent, with the plus signs indicating oil imports and the minus signs indicating oil exports, world coal trade might appear as follows:

TABLE I
PROJECTED WORLD COAL TRADE
(assuming present policies)

	<i>ACTUAL</i> 1976	1985	1990	2000
Canada	+3	–6	–9	–14
United States	–54	–68	–79	–129
OECD/Europe	+55	+94	+153	+311
Japan	+60	+96	+123	+181
Australia/New Zealand	–31	–57	–90	–195
TOTAL OECD	+33	+59	+98	+154
Centrally planned economies	–38	–43	–49	–66
Developing countries	+7	+11	+2	–10
South Africa	–6	–34	–60	–90
Other	+4	+7	+9	+12
TOTAL WORLD COAL MOVEMENT ⁴	128	208	287	504

The table shows a present volume of world coal trade of approximately 130 mtce. If present policies were to continue, such trade might expand by the year 2000 to approximately 500 mtce. The table makes clear that, on any assumption, the United States, Australia, and the "centrally planned economies" (principally the Soviet Union and the East European countries) are and will remain the major exporters of coal, and that Japan and the West European members of the OECD are and will remain the principal consumers.

If one then looks at the possible future shape of world coal trade, assuming "accelerated coal" policies, the picture does not

⁴ All the above totals, in Table I and Table II, exclude coal trade movements within the indicated broad areas, for example trade within OECD Europe and between one developing country and another. The amounts involved, however, are relatively minor.

alter in its fundamentals, but the changes in magnitude are, of course, very great indeed. Table II, below, is a projection, using the same units and indicators as Table I, of what world coal trade might become if individual nations adopted clear-cut "pro-coal" policies, and if the nations of the world were able to cooperate on the necessary trade arrangements.

TABLE II
PROJECTED WORLD COAL TRADE
(assuming pro-coal policies)

	<i>ACTUAL</i> 1976	1985	1990	2000
Canada	+3	-6	-12	-29
United States	-54	-68	-81	-214
OECD/Europe	+55	+116	+179	+468
Japan	+60	+101	+142	+231
Australia/New Zealand	-31	-82	-136	-259
TOTAL OECD	+33	+61	+92	+197
Centrally planned economies	-38	-43	-44	-66
Developing countries	+7	+10	+2	-56
South Africa	-6	-34	-58	-90
Other	+3	+6	+8	+9
TOTAL WORLD COAL MOVEMENT	128	233	331	708

How, then, might the world move from the kind of projection in Table I to that in Table II? (Indeed, even the attainment of the coal trade levels indicated in Table I cannot be assumed.) Obviously, major adjustments would be involved, both in consuming and producing countries.

Energy-deficient countries which have not traditionally used significant quantities of coal must face the prospect that oil imports will simply not be available in sufficient quantities and at reasonable prices to balance energy demand. They will then be forced to rely on coal imports to meet a proportion of their energy needs. Coal-rich countries will need to arrange for rapid expansion of their export supply, and must encourage installation of the necessary infrastructures. National coal policy measures can complement and reinforce each other through international planning, thus inducing substantial economies of scale and increasing the magnitude of coal's contribution to overall energy supply.

The concept of an international free-trading market in coal analogous to other major commodity markets must be present throughout the planning process. Such a market could ultimately develop in a fashion similar to today's international oil market—that is, it might be characterized by multinational energy enter-

prises active in various stages of coal production, transportation, processing and trade. Significant volumes would be traded in spot and cargo markets as well as under long-term contracts. A large degree of cross-investment could be expected, with coal-consuming enterprises such as utilities and industrial consumers securing a long-term interest for a sizable proportion of their supply sources.

To these ends, ministers from the twenty IEA countries, in May 1979, agreed on a set of Principles for IEA Action on Coal which are designed to stimulate expansion of world coal trade by providing a governmental umbrella for commercial negotiations between consuming and producing countries.⁵ In an accompanying communiqué on coal, all IEA governments agreed that coal production, use and trade must be expanded to make up in part for inadequate future supplies of oil. Perhaps most important, detailed political commitments were made which seek to create a balance between the interests of consumers and producers.

On the one hand, potential coal-importing countries agreed to adopt strong coal utilization strategies, to impose no new restrictions on imports inconsistent with the Principles, to implement measures to support domestic production by measures which do not limit growth in coal consumption, and to encourage the development of the required infrastructure. On the other hand, the agreement encourages potential coal exporters to produce coal for export, to establish an investment climate conducive to coal development, to encourage development of the required infrastructure, to impose no new restrictions on coal exports inconsistent with the Principles, to implement existing coal export control systems so as not to limit the growth in overall coal consumption, and refrain from interference in long-term contracts.

Since such government decisions cannot be carried out without full industry cooperation, the IEA Governing Board has also established a Coal Industry Advisory Board, composed of high-standing individuals from coal production, transport and industry, to advise governments on existing bottlenecks to expanded world use of coal.

These are important steps. They represent the first coherent framing of agreed multilateral policies to promote the expansion of world coal trade, as well as its production and use within individual OECD countries. But of course there remain major problems in achieving the necessary balance of interests, which in

⁵ The Principles were adopted by the Governing Board of the International Energy Agency meeting at ministerial level in Paris on May 21-22, 1979. The same group also adopted a Decision on Procedures for Review of IEA Countries' Coal Policies.

turn can create mutual confidence. Such confidence is particularly important in the initial stages, when sizable investments must be committed that will make an expanded coal system a reality. Already, two specific key problems can be identified.

The first of these is the protection of domestic coal industries. For example, Germany and Britain as traditional coal-producing countries face the prospect that a liberal world coal-trading regime would allow cheaper coal imports to undercut domestic supplies which are of high quality but much more difficult and costly to mine. In some cases, such higher cost domestic production benefits from substantial state subsidies for reasons of national security or maintaining employment. It will be necessary in such cases to ensure that governmental protection given to such production over the short term does not inhibit imports of coal in the longer term. Perhaps the best way out of the dilemma is to link such protected production to specific uses and to permit imported coal to meet any demand in excess of such uses. Thus, specific short-term needs can be met without jeopardizing the overall thrust of an international effort to expand coal's role in the energy economy.

Second, a stable climate for international coal investment is vital. The major proportion of investment capital in key areas will of necessity have to come from private sources, and investors' decisions are bound to be influenced by their perception of and confidence in a reasonable economic and regulatory climate during the life of the investment. Governments and public authorities should attempt to avoid excessive revisions in legal, administrative or environmental regulations and procedures which would disproportionately increase costs and reduce confidence. What is especially needed are long-term policies that will stimulate adequate capital investment at an early stage and thus substantially minimize lead times.

But the most basic problem is the development of confidence between major coal-consuming countries and major coal-producing countries. For the United States and Australia, the potentially largest coal exporters among the industrial nations, secure access to coal markets in Western Europe and Japan is a vital first step to obtaining sufficient capital for the building of coal export infrastructures. Similarly, European and Japanese utilities will tend to be nervous about building up reliance on coal exporters from these areas without adequate assurance that such exports, particularly those negotiated under long-term contracts, will not be subject to arbitrary controls and that, even in energy supply emergencies, export consumers will be treated no less favorably

than domestic consumers.

What is needed most of all, at this stage, is a major U.S. commitment to the export of steam coal. A similar commitment by Australia is also essential, and this will require careful negotiation, especially between Australia and Japan, which is likely to be the major consumer of increased Australian coal exports. But it is the United States that must be the real bellwether of an expanded world coal system, for the simple reason that 65 percent of the recoverable coal reserves of the OECD countries are located in the United States.

Specifically, Table I, which projects a level of U.S. coal exports of 129 million metric tons of coal equivalent by the year 2000, means that coal production in the United States would need to increase from 550 mtce today to 1,180 mtce by 2000. In the "accelerated coal" policies case (Table II) U.S. coal exports are projected to increase to 214 mtce by the year 2000, which means that total U.S. production would have to reach a level of 1,500 mtce annually by that date. In terms of physical volume, the amounts of coal required are actually greater than these figures by approximately 35 percent, since the bulk of increased U.S. coal production for export would have to come from the western United States, where the BTU content of coal reserves is somewhat below the standard employed for the "coal equivalent" unit.⁶

VI

Will the United States make such a commitment? The stakes, I believe, are enormous in its doing so, not only for the sake of American interests but for the sake of the entire structure of cooperation among the industrialized nations, and ultimately for the future health of the world economy as a whole.

Looking at the matter initially from the standpoint of U.S. interests alone, it is evident that a major expansion in U.S. coal production—both for domestic use and for export—would have a very favorable impact on the U.S. balance of payments. In terms of 1978 dollars, an export volume of 214 mtce (roughly 250 million tons in terms of physical volume because of the below-average BTU content of western U.S. coal reserves) would mean \$6 billion in foreign exchange earnings even at current coal prices. And the roughly 1,300 mtce retained for domestic consumption

⁶ Most western coal has a BTU rating of 9,000 BTUs per pound. A rough estimate is that a volume of 100 million metric tons of western coal per year would equal 71.4 million metric tons of coal equivalent, which as noted earlier would be the equivalent in energy value of one million barrels per day of oil.

would substitute, in substantial part, for what would otherwise be a need for oil imports costing additional tens of billions of dollars even at current prices.

Apart from its financial implications, a major expansion in U.S. coal production would at least limit, if not eliminate, the present critical dependence of the United States on imports of oil from unstable areas of the world and from countries that in some instances may have political differences with U.S. policy. President Carter has now announced a ceiling on U.S. oil imports at 1977 levels (8.5 million barrels per day), not permitting that level to be exceeded in the future and indeed looking toward a reduction in the oil import level. It seems inconceivable that such targets, adopted in the national interest of the United States itself, can be achieved without the kind of expansion of coal use envisaged here.

If this is a fair assessment of the stakes from the U.S. point of view, it must be accompanied by recognition of the massive scale of the effort required, and of its evident difficulties and problems. One careful estimate of the scale of effort (by experts at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) calculates that an increase in U.S. coal production capacity from 500 million metric tons in 1975 (in physical volume) to 2,000 million metric tons by 2000—roughly the physical volume required to meet the “coal equivalent” targets stated—would require:

- a 13-fold increase in western coal production;
- a doubling of eastern underground mining;
- a combination of nine new slurry pipelines and expanded rail facilities involving 1,400 new coal unit trains and 3,200 new conventional trains;
- 500 new coal barges and 9,400 new coal trucks;
- a major expansion in port facilities to handle large coal-carrying ships.

All told, the estimated capital requirements for both mining and transportation in this study were \$118 billion in 1975 dollars—a figure which is almost certainly on the conservative side.

Obviously, the problems in mounting an effort of this scale are in themselves formidable. But the root difficulties may be less economic and financial than political. As we have noted in Section III of this article, the technological means exist to make expanded coal use acceptable from an environmental standpoint; the question is whether the American public and its officials at all levels of government are prepared to accept the importance of the task

⁷ Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies, *Energy: Global Prospects 1985–2000*, New York; McGraw Hill, 1977, Chapter 5.

and hence to make the necessary adjustments on a coherent basis that will permit the industry to move ahead.

In addition to the problems already noted, one may perhaps call attention to others specific to the United States. One of these is the fact that much of the incremental coal will have to come from the western coal reserves, where it is estimated that 80 percent of the recoverable reserves are owned by the federal government. Currently a moratorium is holding up leasing and therefore development. Efforts must be made to open up federal lands at the earliest possible time.

Realization of the coal export potential of the United States as well as the domestic coal conversion program will require not only an improved and expanded U.S. transportation network but a competitive one in terms of transport costs. I have suggested that a combination of slurry pipelines and expanded rail facilities will surely be needed. Each entails the granting for the necessary rights of way and other facilities, at the political level and as promptly as possible.

And there are certain concerns that may arise connected to the prospect that a significant part of expanded production will be destined for export. European utility managers, as well as a few American coal and utility officials, are worried that some American communities will resist expansion of coal mining operations, especially surface mining in the West, when done under contract to export markets, or even more so, if done by partially foreign-owned companies. However, these concerns usually rest on intuition or casually formed impressions. The experience of communities with either export-oriented or foreign-owned companies has often shown that any early resistance ebbs with the creation of new jobs and tax revenues by these companies. Often the most vocal opposition comes not from the producing community, but from potential domestic consumers who fear an advance in price or temporary shortage of the commodity because exporters are outbidding domestic buyers. But the supply of western U.S. coal is abundant and export demand is not likely to bring about higher prices or shortages. Expansion for export might even bring about better economies of scale, allowing lower prices for all concerned.

The nature of the transition to production for export could be an important psychological element in improving public opinion on export. The public should be brought along step by step. Initially, local communities would probably be more receptive to surface mining, especially in the West, by American-based companies producing coal for domestic markets. As the community

began to accept mining and was convinced of its positive contribution to the community and satisfied with the program for restoration of the environment, expansion for export, even by partially foreign-owned mining companies, would probably be easier. This does illustrate, however, that unless the United States settles its own domestic coal problems in the first place, there will be little chance of significant coal export.

Doubtless, these problems are only illustrative of the kind of adjustments and political decisions that will be needed in the near future within the United States. But the national stake in overcoming such obstacles does seem to point to the possibility that an aroused public opinion will be able to overcome them.

VII

The emergence of coal as a key commodity in world trade would have wider consequences beyond the scope of energy considerations, encompassing economic and political factors as well. The fact that specific energy-policy strategies may enhance or hinder a nation's freedom in matters of broader economic policy, or in the conduct of its foreign relations, is well known to all nations. The Western industrial nations, either as regional groups or collectively, have a common interest in ensuring that energy issues do not constrain world economic growth or cause divisive conflict in political or strategic relations.

By satisfying a large proportion of their energy demand from an alternative energy source, industrial countries would also be responding to the expressed desire on the part of OPEC and non-OPEC developing countries to moderate growth in demand for oil imports. In addition, the development of a world coal market would facilitate the efforts of developing countries to include it as a credible energy alternative in their own supply planning and thus further contribute to reduced tension in the world oil market.

In addition to a number of developing countries that are also potential coal producers on a significant scale (India, Colombia, Mozambique, Venezuela), recent developments in China offer the prospect of possible active Chinese participation in the world coal market. Chinese efforts to seek greater interaction with the world economy as part of its modernization drive could well depend to a significant degree on energy exports, including coal. Indeed, there already are indications that China is counting on coal export revenues to help finance foreign currency purchases of equipment, plant and technology imports.

Coal's impact on world trade would be considerable. Even at today's prices, a volume of 700 million tons moving in international trade would represent about \$30 billion worth of trade in 1978 dollars. The evolution of a much larger world coal market and infrastructure would stimulate world economic integration. Linking the major industrialized and industrializing areas of the world through substantial trade in a key energy commodity would reduce the present instability due to the unbalanced world oil market. For Europe and Japan in particular, international arrangements that guaranteed access to coal supplies on a reliable long-term basis would reduce uncertainty over the security of energy supplies. This in turn could not fail to contribute to more vigorous economic and political leadership in partnership with the principal suppliers.

Strong coal policy action will have a positive effect on political relations. At first sight it may appear that there is very little connection between the rather technical issue of promoting coal programs and overall political relations among nations. But this is to ignore the alternative of conflict and tension due to energy supply and price difficulties that are certain to arise if coal is not developed at a pace sufficiently fast to provide adequate alternative supply. One has only to imagine the disastrous impact of competitive bidding-up of scarce oil supplies (the famous scramble for oil) to realize that political relations and cohesion among leading industrial nations could not survive unscathed. A vigorous effort to step up coal development on a reliable international basis would not only help remove the threat of energy supply and price difficulties but would also put political links on a stronger footing and enable more effective resistance to external threats.

It is now over five years since the 1973-74 energy crisis transformed our perceptions of the world energy situation. Some progress has been made since 1973, including conservation gains, new oil production emerging from the North Sea and Alaska, and a serious discussion in the United States on energy coupled with some legislative action.

However, recent events in Iran have again forcefully revealed the extent of our vulnerability. We must honestly face the insufficiency of our actions to date; measures adopted have proved to be too leisurely or too weak. It is now time for political leaders in governments and legislatures to halt the promotion of various sectional or regional interests at the expense of others and to wake up to the grave peril to our economic and political system threatened by our present energy situation.

The vast potential of coal makes active coal development a central element in any strategy to resolve the international energy problem. Constraints exist, but they can be overcome. Expanded coal utilization, production and trade is a major challenge. Success will bring benefits not only in terms of increased energy security, but also in the form of concrete and real benefits to our economies and political systems.

Miles Kahler

RUMORS OF WAR: THE 1914 ANALOGY

IT'S THE THIRD WORLD WAR" headlines an Italian satirical newspaper during the 1979 Chinese-Vietnamese conflict. From the Balkans, appropriately enough, a warning: in the summer following interventions in Ethiopia and Zaïre, Yugoslavian President Tito, the only remaining European leader who can claim to have fought in both world wars, decries "the renewed threat to peace from power politics and the persistence of the terrifying arms race. . . ." In London, a group of retired military officers publishes a best seller. Its topic: the fictional history of a global conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that begins in August 1985.¹

Perhaps these are simply the efforts of an old continent to shrug off its recurrent bad dream, a jittery unwillingness to believe that the longest span of European peace since the Great War could persist. Whatever credence is awarded such anxieties, the imagery is significant. In the United States the Munich analogy has pervaded our thinking about foreign affairs. Memories of the 1930s have shaped our perceptions of a ceaselessly expanding adversary and contributed to our distrust of diplomatic solutions.² In Europe, even for the conservative authors of *The Third World War*, the 1914 analogy has a far more powerful hold. It is assumed that we could recognize another Hitler, but could we discern a second Sarajevo?

Toying with historical analogies is at best an imprecise exercise, at worst a polemical game. Nevertheless, the lingering strength of the "lessons" of the 1930s in the United States and our national distance from the events of July 1914 make a reexamination worth the risk.

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¹ General Sir John Hackett *et al.*, *The Third World War: August 1985*, New York: Macmillan, 1978. A less convincing effort at prophecy is Shelford Bidwell, ed., *World War 3*, London: Hamlyn, 1978.

² For a recent example of the 1930s analogy, see Walter Laqueur, "The Psychology of Appeasement," *Commentary*, October 1978, pp. 44-50.

II

The existence of two preeminent great powers has been a convention in the analysis of international politics since 1945. By the late 1970s, however, the historical bipolar configuration at the level of military power was modified. The apparent military strength of the Soviet Union had increased, while the potential for a greater element of multipolarity grew as China embarked upon a program of military modernization and the Sino-Soviet split showed no signs of dissipating.

Many in the West voiced alarm at the achievement of equivalence in strategic armaments by the Soviet Union and at the modernization of the Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. But these were spheres in which the existence of Soviet military power had been a fact for decades. A more startling change was the use by the Soviet Union of new capabilities for projecting its political influence into regions such as Africa, far distant from its traditional spheres of interest. The contrast between the 1950s, or the early 1960s, and the 1970s is stark: sabre-rattling over Suez in 1956 and paltry contributions to Lumumba's cause in the Congo; a massive airlift in support of Egypt and Syria in 1973 and large-scale logistical support of the MPLA in Angola and of Mengistu in Ethiopia. Such dramatic maneuvers followed a decade of Soviet naval expansion and an apparent shift toward the use of the fleet for diplomatic ends.³

The emerging pattern of superpower competition begins to suggest the rivalry between England and Germany that characterized the years from the turn of the century until the First World War. On the one hand, the established maritime hegemon; on the other, the continental challenger, seeking its place in the sun through a *Weltpolitik* based upon naval power and the spread of its influence in the non-European world. Some would make the analogy even more explicit by comparing Admiral Gorshkov, who has sounded at times like a disciple of Mahan, to Admiral von Tirpitz, the father of Germany's Imperial Navy.⁴

The analogy is appealing but flawed. The Soviet fleet is not

³ See Robert Legvold, "The Soviet Union's Strategic Stake in Africa," in Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, ed., *Africa and the United States: Vital Interests*, New York: New York University Press, 1978, p. 158. Contrasting views of Soviet naval intentions can be found in James M. McConnell and Bradford Dismukes, "Soviet Diplomacy of Force in the Third World," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1979, pp. 14-27, and Michael T. Klare, "Superpower Rivalry at Sea," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1975-76, pp. 86-96, 161-167.

⁴ The analogy is made by Hedley Bull in "Sea Power and Political Influence," Adelphi Paper No. 122, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976, pp. 4-5. The "Mahanian" explanation is also accepted by the authors of *The Third World War*, pp. 335-336.

justified by the peculiar logic of the "risk theory" that Tirpitz and the Kaiser employed—as a lever to compel Britain's concession of German equality and perhaps a diplomatic realignment as well. While the exertion of political and military influence, the establishment of Soviet prestige, and other tasks characteristic of a "world policy" may be functions of the Soviet fleet, they are accompanied by the more mundane tasks of protecting an expanding commercial and fishing presence and acting against the American marine-based deterrent. The Soviet navy does not have the same crucial place as a symbol of national unity and middle-class patriotism that the German battle fleet held in the fragmented society of Wilhelmine Germany. Finally, the German naval challenge became the core of rivalry with England, overshadowing other long-standing sources of friction; the Soviet "world policy" has only appeared after decades of conflict with its principal adversary, the United States.⁵

The response of the hegemonic power in each case, however, has been outrage at any suggestion that the existing balance of forces could be regarded as unjust or subject to change. In each instance the appearance of the challenger has forced the dominant power to evaluate the meaning of its rival's new "world policy." What are the intentions of Germany (or the Soviet Union)? What measures, if any, should be adopted to meet the challenge? Among historians, debate over German designs continues: Fritz Fischer and his school argue that Entente policy before 1914 was legitimate containment of a Germany bent upon European hegemony, hegemony that foreshadowed the later expansionist aims of Hitler. Others more sympathetic to the German dilemma suggest that "perhaps the proper lesson is not so much the need for vigilance against aggressors, but the ruinous consequences of refusing reasonable accommodation to upstarts."⁶

The earliest debate on the upstart's intentions, and one that remains fresh, took place in the first decade of this century within the British Foreign Office. The British diplomat Eyre Crowe represented the ascendant attitude, hostile to Germany; Lord

⁵ The best recent account of Imperial Germany's naval program is Jonathan Steinberg, *Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet*, New York, Macmillan, 1965. Michael McCwire has derided the "puberty theory of seapower" that forces Soviet naval program and deployment into the pre-1914 model in "Maritime Strategy and the Superpowers," Adelphi Paper No. 123, *op. cit.*, pp. 19–20.

⁶ David Calleo, *The German Problem Reconsidered: Germany and World Order*, Cambridge: The University Press, 1978, p. 6. The principal works of Fritz Fischer are *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, London: Chatto & Windus, 1967; *War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914*, London: Chatto & Windus, 1975; and *World Power or Decline: The Controversy Over Germany's Aims in the First World War*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975.

Sanderson, diplomat of an older generation, took a more relaxed view of German intentions.⁷ The outline of their argument has been echoed in the recent American questioning of Soviet aims, particularly in the apparent difference of views between the National Security Council and the State Department. For Crowe, the history of German actions displayed "direct and unmistakable hostility to England" and "a disregard of the elementary rules of straightforward and honorable dealing." While noting that a German plan of European and then world hegemony was a possibility, he accepted the more likely explanation that Germany was exploiting those opportunities available, and, perhaps, down the road, hoping that preponderance would be achieved. The justice of Britain's established rights and closed preserves, under challenge from Germany, was self-evident to Crowe; moreover, every German gain was a British loss.

In the more detached view of Sanderson, "the British Empire must appear in the light of some huge giant sprawling over the globe, with gouty fingers and toes stretching in every direction, which cannot be approached without eliciting a scream." Sanderson saw a more complicated explanation for German actions, not simple hostility toward Britain or a ceaseless striving for world hegemony. German behavior could be understood as the result of an *arriviste* mentality—"impatient to realize various long-suppressed aspirations and claim full recognition of its new position"—and as influenced by the insecurity of being flanked by "two powerful, jealous and discontented neighbors." While Crowe urged the defense of the status quo and an end to a policy of "concessions made without any conviction either of their justice or of their being set off by equivalent counter-services," Sanderson warned that "a great and growing nation cannot be repressed," and counseled accommodation.

Apart from the sharpness of its prose, the Crowe-Sanderson debate bears rereading in light of the renewed Soviet-American competition in the 1970s. It throws into relief the questions that remain central, stripped of vestiges of a cold war mentality. What are the aims of the Soviet Union and how do they differ from those of other great powers, including the United States? What changes in the configuration of power would be acceptable, if any? Does the Soviet Union display that combination of insecurity and confidence in its power that characterized pre-1914 Germany?

⁷ The debate between Crowe and Sanderson took place in early 1907; the memoranda are reproduced in G. P. Gooch *et al.*, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, Vol. 3, London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1928, pp. 397-431.

Many, like Crowe, continue to argue that the intentions of the Soviet Union are of little import; a prudent adversary will prepare to thwart either the carefully laid plan or the haphazard exploitation of circumstance. Nevertheless, while Crowe's view triumphed, Sanderson's caution had the better of the argument. Interpretations of intentions do shape policy, in this case and in others. Tentative rapprochements were dismissed out of hand by the Foreign Office, and the worst light was placed on every German deed.

More important, such readings of motivation shape actions vis-à-vis other powers as well. The Anglo-German rivalry was viewed in a blinkered way by Crowe and those who shared his views; it was *the* principal rivalry in the international arena. They chose to treat less seriously its implantation in other competitive and hostile relations, whether among the great powers or within regional balances. In similar fashion, the superimposition of renewed Soviet-American competition upon new elements of multipolarity in the system and the confusion of that rivalry with festering local quarrels may prove the most dangerous similarity with the 1914 case.

III

The early 1970s saw an American effort to nudge the world toward multipolarity: Japan and Europe were anointed as potential great powers and the same role was conceded to China despite its nuclear inferiority and its antiquated military forces. The attempt to promote Europe and Japan, even as "civilian" great powers, failed. The "Year of Europe" proclaimed in 1973 seemed to represent renewed American desires to subordinate its allies. Meanwhile, European integration moved forward at its own halting pace. Japan has been even less willing to pursue independent initiatives, although some have detected a withering of internal obstacles to greater diplomatic and military activism, produced in part by the diplomatic bullying of the Soviet Union. By any of the traditional measures of great power status—particularly an independent diplomatic and military role outside their regions—these two candidate great powers did not pass the test.

The only serious new contender for great power status in the 1970s, then, was China, despite its limited diplomatic and military means. And China raises the question, not of the possibility of a multipolar system with several great powers, but of its desirability. The naïve belief that such a world would necessarily be less conflict-ridden and more peaceful than a bipolar system was

challenged at the peak of Soviet-American duopoly by Kenneth Waltz.⁸ Waltz argued against a technological determinism that awarded nuclear weapons pride of place in averting war and establishing the predominance of the United States and the Soviet Union. That technological point of view persists in the attention that continues to be fixed upon the strategic arms race, even though the link of arms races to conflict leads through diplomatic and political considerations that are often ignored. The erosion of bipolarity, as Waltz argued, might not result in a world less prone to war or tension; certainly the historical record does not support an optimistic view of a multipolar world.

The element of disturbance (or flexibility) introduced by America's opening to China was muted at first by the economic and military constraints produced by China's internal political struggles, which culminated in the defeat of the Gang of Four in 1976. On the side of the United States, the advantages of the triangular relationship were limited by domestic political bars to full normalization of relations between the two states, obstacles multiplied by the collapse of South Vietnam. When those barriers were overcome in December 1978, the beginning of full diplomatic relations was coupled with hints of change in the balancing act between the Soviet Union and China. Talk of "playing the China card" and of a "fundamental realignment of global politics" was heard in some quarters; leaning toward China, it was argued, would curb an increasingly serious Soviet threat. Most of the support for a tilt seemed to come from the National Security Council staff; the State Department resisted an end to the even-handed policy. Nevertheless, by November 1979, it seemed that a trade agreement granting China most-favored-nation status would be completed before the Soviet Union was awarded similar standing.

A diplomatic tilt toward China by the United States and its allies would be amplified by the economic ties that are being busily constructed, despite the most recent scaling-down of China's economic plans. The new economic strategy signaled by the consolidation of Premier Hua Guofeng in power and the reemergence of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping also has implications for military policy. China has embarked upon a program of modernizing its conventional forces, and it intends to obtain the means for such modernization from the West. Although arguments have been advanced for a Chinese-American military re-

⁸ Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus*, Summer 1964, pp. 881-909.

lationship, the United States has only gone so far as to accept the sale of weapons by Britain and France. The potential for moving from a limited economic tilt to closer diplomatic and military ties is clear to all.

The risks inherent in this latest American encouragement of multipolarity become clearer in examining once again British policy at the turn of the century. Disturbed by rumors of a continental coalition during the Boer War, the British government concluded that isolation was less than splendid and engineered an exit from Britain's exposed position, first in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 and then through the Entente Cordiale with France, concluded in April 1904. The Entente was a limited agreement, concerned principally with colonial questions; both Britain and France sought a relaxation of tension because they feared involvement in the looming Russo-Japanese War. The accord was *not* negotiated by Britain as an anti-German measure, nor was it regarded as such at the time. But gradually, and particularly after the German effort to break Anglo-French cooperation in the first Moroccan crisis of 1905, the limited agreement was shaped to fit the anti-German mold of the Foreign Office and the military, always with French encouragement. Bit by bit, beginning with the military staff conversations of 1905-06, a *de facto* military alliance was constructed, one whose obligations were first fully grasped by the British Cabinet only during the 1914 crisis.⁹

Whether the alignment with France and thus with Russia was in Britain's interest in light of the German challenge, whether Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, dealt frankly with his colleagues, whether a less ambiguous or a more distant British stance would have been more likely to avert war in 1914—all of these issues have been debated. What is not debatable is the gradual, and, to the public and members of the Cabinet, imperceptible way in which a "continental commitment" was constructed. There was no great debate over the wisdom of Grey's strategy. The only written obligations were the Grey-Cambon letters of November 1912, which committed the two governments to consult in a crisis, and joint military plans that emphasized their mutual dependence. Yet, even without the invasion of Belgium in the final crisis, the British government would have found it difficult to evade military support for France. The lesson by 1914 was clear:

⁹ The best accounts are G.W. Monger, *The End of Isolation*, Thomas Nelson, 1963; and Samuel Williamson, *The Politics of Grand Strategy*, Harvard University Press, 1969.

a multipolar system might offer less flexibility than its proponents then and now would have us believe.

The China card presents some of the same attractions for the United States that the Entente offered Britain: China's status as the underdog in its rivalry with the Soviet Union, interest in and growing friendship for China among the elite, a cyclical popular fascination with the country, potentially close economic and military ties. The dangers are similar—involvement in conflicts on the Asian mainland that may not affect American interests and a threat to the increasingly tenuous relationship with the Soviet Union. Soviet fears of encirclement should be taken seriously. From the Soviet point of view, China could represent the worst fears instilled in Wilhelmine Germany by the Franco-Russian alliance: irredentist claims, a rapidly expanding economic and military potential, the added explosive of racial fears. For Soviet leaders obsessed by Bismarck's *cauchemar des coalitions*, the China card is a nightmare that might drive them to extremes.

IV

Ambiguities in the structure of power among the great have been accompanied by a diffusion of power to the middling and the small. At least one small country, Vietnam, can claim to have fought two of the great powers to a draw; another, Israel, has defied its great power patron on significant questions of foreign policy. Applauded by many, particularly on the Left, the loosening of the postwar blocs has also produced two sources of great power confrontation that recall the combination of rigidity and fragmentation in the international order before 1914.

First, the bloc structures themselves, particularly those areas contiguous to the great powers, have come to be regarded as essential elements of security and international status. Since such regions as the Caribbean and Eastern Europe have been for so long *de facto* spheres of influence, little thought has been given to the consequences of a crumbling of external control or internal orthodoxy. The recent uproar over Soviet troops in Cuba demonstrates, however, the sensitivity of these areas; any policy of pinpricks is unlikely to be treated with the nonchalance that might be found elsewhere. Even if political change occurs without the involvement of another great power, as it has in Nicaragua and as it may in Eastern Europe, there are strong pressures to impute meddling and malevolence to one's adversary.

And, in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia presents the special case of a country that detached itself from the Soviet sphere and might

at some point be threatened with forcible reabsorption by the Soviet Union (an action the United States has pledged not to take with respect to Cuba in the Caribbean). Such a unilateral attempt to reimpose the writ of the great power might in itself be viewed as a provocation by others: Sir John Hackett's Third World War begins with a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia, designed to stifle the threat of disruptive change in its East European sphere. These sensitive and potentially unstable regions require special care and a considerable measure of foresight. Yet, just as Britain neglected its policy in the Balkans, where two nations saw their future great power status at stake, so the United States prefers to set aside examination of future responses toward Eastern Europe.¹⁰

The long-standing sources of instability within or adjacent to established spheres of influence is now complemented by renewed competition between the Soviet Union and the United States outside those spheres. It is an outcome that was hardly expected in the early 1970s: in response to the Vietnam War and the apparent growth in power on the part of weaker states, many alleged that the efficacy of intervention had declined. The Soviet Union seemed to be acquiring the trappings of global power at a time when those old-fashioned means of influence had lost their clout. For the United States, these assumptions fitted well with the Nixon Doctrine and the nomination of regional powers—the “new influentials” of recent years—to accompany the United States in the emerging multipolar world. Those powers, it was hoped, would undertake some of the interventionist tasks that the United States, for political reasons, no longer desired.

The new strategy of devolution seemed to come apart in the late 1970s. America's relaxed attitude toward events in the Third World was jolted by Soviet and Cuban interventions in Angola and Ethiopia; the new regional policemen were not expected to cope with great power intruders. The collapse of the Shah's regime in January 1979 made clear the fragile political accomplishments of such states, while the surge of American concern over the oil-producing areas of the Middle East made that sphere seem too important to leave to the care of others.

As Soviet advisers entered combat in Afghanistan, French paratroopers landed at Kolwezi, and an American military mission was dispatched to Yemen, it seemed that a new age of imperialism had dawned. Exacerbated dependence upon imported oil shaped

¹⁰ Charles Gati, “The Forgotten Region,” *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1975, pp. 135–145; F. Stephen Larrabee, “Balkan Security,” Adelphi Paper No. 135, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977.

American strategy in the "arc of crisis" to the model of classical British strategy in the region. In place of that great pole of empire, India, the United States became obsessed with the security of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf. The littoral of the Indian Ocean, never a prominent security interest of the United States in the past, assumed the same importance that it had held for Britain's elite in the age of empire. Move and countermove closely resembled the "Great Game" played out by Britain and Russia in the nineteenth century. One can discern the same futile hopes for modernized buffer states (the Ottoman Empire for Britain, Iran for the United States), the same attempts to employ financial means of influence on the part of the United States and military means by Russia, the same expansion of the demands of security to absurd lengths: British security in India came to depend upon a foothold in Egypt, which in turn pointed to the annexation of Uganda. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Adviser, has spoken with approval of future "Fashodas" in which the great powers would test their strengths. Perhaps unwittingly he fixed upon the pinnacle of imperialist irrationality, when Britain and France came close to war in 1898 over French claims to an economically and strategically worthless part of the Sudan.¹¹

Even the Fashoda crisis, however pointless, was a confrontation of the Powers without intermediaries. In the late 1970s renewed great power involvement has most often been accompanied by reliance upon proxies, clients, surrogates or "friends." The pattern is a familiar one: the epoch of pre-1914 imperialism was also studded with episodes in which one or another of the Powers was forced into a confrontation by a weaker state: the Crimean War was brought about in part by Turkey, playing Britain against Russia; the Panjdeh crisis of 1885, which nearly resulted in another Anglo-Russian war, was very probably provoked by Afghanistan.¹² Terrorist groups were employed as well: the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand which precipitated the 1914 crisis was connected through the Young Bosnia group to the secret nationalist society, the Black Hand, whose leader was also the chief of the Serbian military secret service; the foreknowledge of the Serbian government is still debated. Serbia in turn was viewed by Austria and Germany as a proxy for Russian ambitions

¹¹ Elizabeth Drew, "Brzezinski," *The New Yorker*, May 1, 1978, p. 110. The best account of the Fashoda crisis and the Marchand mission that touched it off can be found in G.N. Sanderson, *England, Europe, and the Upper Nile, 1882-1899*, Edinburgh: The University Press, 1965, especially Chapter 15.

¹² David Gillard, *The Struggle for Asia, 1828-1914*, London: Methuen, 1977, pp. 90, 144.

in the Balkans. One diplomat reported that the Serbian government undertakes "no measure, makes no decision of any importance, without seeking the decision of the representative of the Czar in Belgrade."¹³

The complications introduced by great power rivalry superimposed upon local conflicts have pervaded recent crises between the Soviet Union and the United States. Charges and countercharges illustrate the psychological tendency to attribute unity and control to one's opponent beyond what the facts admit: your servile mercenaries, my unruly allies. The United States overestimated the role of the Soviet Union in starting and stopping the 1970 Syrian intervention in Jordan; Henry Kissinger, then National Security Adviser, warned the Soviet chargé d'affaires, Yuli Vorontsov, "You and your client started it, and you have to end it." The most anxious moments of the 1973 October War came as Israel and Egypt jockeyed for a favorable military position, while their patrons issued warnings and sought restraint. The Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola led the American government to allege in 1978 a remarkable chain of control: from the Soviet Union to Cuba to the Angolan government to the Katangan gendarmes who invaded Zaïre during the Shaba crisis in May.

The record of great power competition before 1914 would lead one to expect the pursuit of rivalry by means other than direct confrontation to reappear. But proxy or client relations are even more uncertain and risky than they were in the earlier epoch, and the stakes are larger; economic development and the competition for resources have made the "loss" of states seem an insufferable injury to the great power. Efforts to build up regional powers, such as Iran, have had as their ironic consequence that a lapse into neutrality or movement into the "other camp" seems far more significant. And the "other camp" may at times be much harder to define: at one point in the conflict between Ethiopia on the one hand and Somalia and the Eritreans on the other, the supporters of Ethiopia included Israel, Kenya, the Soviet Union, Libya and Cuba, while their opponents included a mixture of conservative and radical Arab states. Not only are the stakes in this contemporary competition higher, the means of influence or control available to the powers have become less potent; some, such as the Soviet reliance upon military advisers, may be more likely to lead to escalation. Arms sources have been diversified and localized; turning off the arms tap, as the United States did during

¹³ L.C.F. Turner, *Origins of the First World War*, London: Edward Arnold, 1970, p. 30.

the Nicaraguan civil war, no longer suffices to halt conflicts.

The loosening of the cold war alignments has diminished great power control over lesser actors, but it has not reduced concern over their fates. The weaker powers have more resources and greater autonomy than they had before 1914 to embroil one protector or another in their quarrels. And the competition that has revived outside immediate spheres of influence, while it may not lead directly to conflict, can, like the pre-1914 confrontations in Morocco, embitter relations and contribute to a dangerous sense of insecurity. Such parallels with the imperial competition of an earlier epoch do not permit one to share Brzezinski's sanguine contemplation of future Fashodas.

v

The most recent explanations of the outbreak of war in 1914 have emphasized less the Realpolitik logic of what happened than the ways in which domestic policies influenced state action. Foreign policy in the imperfectly democratized societies of Europe was not simply directed outward at potential foes or allies. International security mirrored domestic insecurity, and foreign policy provided a means of escape.

The link between domestic instability and foreign expansion has been applied most often to Germany and to the ramshackle eastern empires of Austria-Hungary and Russia.¹⁴ The political impasse had its most explosive international consequences in the case of Germany—the Reich's "world policy" was born of efforts to construct a coalition between the middle class and agrarian conservatives; the collapse of that coalition and the increasing electoral power of the Social Democrats led some to toy with the idea of an escape through war. Austria-Hungary faced a dual threat, democratic and national. The latter had a direct connection with foreign policy through the South Slav question and the Serbian threat. Despite a stabilization in Russia after the 1905 Revolution, rapid industrialization and continued political backwardness combined with pan-Slav sentiment to push the czarist regime toward risky ventures. The absolutist states relied increasingly upon nationalist appeals to maintain support against exaggerated external threats. The old social order made its last stand in the higher civil service and the officer corps, which were awarded unusual power and often escaped firm political control.

Domestic conflict does not automatically translate into foreign

¹⁴ Eckhart Kehr was the intellectual forebear of this school; contemporary exponents include Fritz Fischer, Arno Mayer, V.R. Berghahn, and many others.

adventure, whether in Europe before 1914 or in contemporary international politics. The dynamic is often puzzling. In Britain, the impending crisis over Ireland seemed to distract the political elite from foreign questions during the summer of 1914.¹⁵ Political stalemate in Austria-Hungary had often induced paralysis in foreign policy rather than the determination to stave off decline that Vienna displayed in 1914.¹⁶ The greatest incentive to risk-taking is present when the internal prospects do not foreclose action altogether but are bad enough to encourage a foreign move that might aid in consolidation, particularly when this perception is coupled with an international setting that can still be challenged but with declining probability of success. From 1912 on, this set of perceptions came to be shared by the elites of Austria-Hungary and Germany.

And it is this dual calculation that Sir John Hackett imputes to the Soviet leadership in his scenario of the Third World War: plagued by internal difficulties in the Warsaw Pact that threaten to spread to the Soviet Union, facing a military balance relatively favorable but likely to grow less favorable by the late 1980s. Is such a scenario probable in the nuclear age? Has the coincidence of preponderant military power with remarkable political stability in the United States and the Soviet Union been just that, a coincidence? Perhaps the presence of nuclear weapons has raised the stakes too high for the use of foreign policy for political ends. Yet there are hints that Hackett's scenario may not be so far-fetched in the world that is emerging, and that the dynamic described may not be restricted to the Soviet Union.

For the Soviet Union, something akin to Hackett's "German" scenario seems to be accepted as a possibility by the intelligence community: the combustible combination of a relative military apogee with growing economic and social difficulties. A major social impasse might be produced by a projected slowing of industrial growth, a perpetually stagnant agricultural sector, a temporary petroleum production ceiling, a slowing in workforce growth—all shared by other maturing economies. Another demographic shift may have more political significance—the steady erosion of the population balance away from the Slavic and particularly the Great Russian population toward the Muslim

¹⁵ Zara Steiner, *Britain and the Origins of the First World War*, London: Macmillan, 1977, pp. 62–64.

¹⁶ Such paralysis was apparent in 1903–1906; in 1913, the finance minister had predicted economic collapse if the empire went to war. F.R. Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972.

nationalities. Like the nationalities dilemmas of previous polyglot states, there is an external dimension—the potential for attraction or meddling by neighboring China or by Muslim states.¹⁷

From the first statement of the containment policy, Western observers have overestimated the internal strains on the Soviet system. These latest challenges may be met by accommodation or by more far-reaching transformations, with few external effects. At least one observer, Alexander Yanov, has suggested a more drastic possibility, based upon the growing influence of what he terms “the Russian New Right.” To meet its crisis of legitimacy and the growing economic malaise, the regime might turn to the old themes of Russian Slavophile nationalism, themes with a wider resonance among the Russian population than Marxism or liberalism. This strategy *would* have international implications, not only in the renewal of internal repression, but in the possible attempts to establish tighter control in Eastern Europe (including Yugoslavia), and in dealing with China, the archfoe of the nationalist demonology that Yanov describes.¹⁸

Forecasting Chinese foreign policy on the basis of domestic developments is even more hazardous. During periods of relative leadership stability, the conduct of Chinese foreign policy and attitudes toward the use of force seem an easily explicable response to the international situation. The border war with India in 1962 resembled a *Kabinetkrieg* in its restrained aims, despite the hysterical response of the West. At other times, foreign policy maneuvers may have been instruments in the internal power struggle. The border conflict with the Soviet Union, for example, has been traced to Premier Zhou Enlai’s struggle with Defense Minister Lin Biao.¹⁹ The Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February–March 1979 has been compared to the border conflict with India: a response to provocation that had become unbearable, hence limited retaliation for the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam. But the military maneuver may also have been linked to the consolidation of Deng Xiaoping in power; the invasion served to support Deng’s case for the modernization of conventional military forces.

Whatever the mix of calculated Realpolitik and domestic maneuver in this Chinese action, there is little assurance that Chinese

¹⁷ Michael Rywkin, “Central Asia and Soviet Manpower,” *Problems of Communism*, January–February 1979, pp. 1–13. See also William G. Hyland, “Brezhnev and Beyond,” *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1979, pp. 51–66.

¹⁸ Alexander Yanov, *The Russian New Right*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, p. 152; and *Détente After Brezhnev*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, Chapter 3.

¹⁹ Roger Glenn Brown, “Chinese Politics and American Policy,” *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1976, pp. 3–23.

foreign policy is on a stable future course. Pragmatism in domestic policy has been accompanied by ever more strident denunciations of Soviet designs abroad; such opposition to at least one of the other great powers may be required internally as the leadership departs from Maoist orthodoxy as interpreted by the defeated Gang of Four.²⁰ Although Sinologists dislike admitting the record, China has experienced more intense struggle within its elite than the other great powers, and there is some evidence that the instability has been translated into foreign action.

Claiming democratic legitimacy and bipartisan support for foreign policy, American leaders have vigorously rejected allegations that they might be "playing politics" with foreign policy. When a reporter intimated that the worldwide military alert ordered in October 1973 was designed for domestic as well as diplomatic requirements, Henry Kissinger, then Secretary of State, heatedly replied, "It is a symptom of what is happening to our country that it could even be suggested that the United States would alert its forces for domestic reasons." During recent domestic political crises, however, foreign policy has been used for domestic ends, even though the uses to this point have been relatively harmless.

Although the military alert ordered in October 1973 by a rump meeting of the National Security Council remains something of a mystery, U.S. foreign policy during our most recent domestic crisis—Watergate—resembled the British model of 1914 rather than the German: policy stumbled, attention turned inward. Richard Nixon attempted to escape his domestic troubles by portraying himself as the indispensable peacemaker, embarking on two unnecessary trips (to the Soviet Union and the Middle East) at considerable risk to his health. At least part of the inept handling of the Cyprus coup during the summer of 1974 can be attributed to the distractions of the deepening impeachment crisis.

Despite the relatively happy (in international terms) conclusion to the Watergate crisis, the final weeks of that most imperial of presidencies resembled an absolutist monarchy in its twilight, with courtiers and family playing a prominent role. The United States was spared a major crisis at an awkward moment and the foreign policy apparatus was insulated from the scandal. One can only wonder about the outcome if these favorable circumstances had not prevailed.

At least two trends may tempt U.S. leaders to employ foreign

²⁰ Lucian W. Pye, "The Puzzles of Chinese Pragmatism," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1978, p. 134.

policy for domestic ends in the years ahead. First, a major domestic political impasse—energy—has clear international links. Dependence upon imported petroleum has already stimulated U.S. concern about Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean; military planning to meet threats to the Persian Gulf oil supplies has been underway for some time, including the formation of an intervention force that appears to be designed for the Middle East. While most alternatives are offered publicly as hedges against Soviet actions, the possible use of military force is also envisioned against “radical” moves to take over significant oil-producing states and against oil suppliers that reduce their output too drastically.²¹ The bias toward intervention will increase, if, as seems likely, measures of conservation prove inadequate, and our strategic reserve of petroleum remains virtually nonexistent. The means to break a debilitating political stalemate at home through military action would be available to a future American president—always, of course, at the risk of a Soviet response.

The final breakdown of the fraying bipartisan consensus is another encouragement to risk-taking. The Easton meeting of Republican leaders in February 1979 signaled a new partisan stance. If the Republican Party adopts a strident nationalist appeal, the pressure upon a future president to “do something”—the Mayaguez syndrome—is likely to increase for fear of political losses. Such pressure was resisted during the Iranian revolution and again during the recent outcry over Soviet troops in Cuba, but resistance could weaken in a future crisis. The object of our next effort to demonstrate continuing great power status might not be as helpless and friendless as Cambodia was in 1975.

All of these forecasts of possible political pressures are “worst cases,” but not completely fanciful ones. In drawing comparisons with 1914, one can at least derive some reassurance from the firm political control of the military that is likely to persist in all of the powers and from the absence of any aristocratic military ethos such as helped to push the European states toward the brink in 1914. The remaining domestic impetus toward risky behavior could produce a crisis with great potential for escalation and enormous obstacles to negotiation, rooted in the political requirements of each state. Perhaps the possibility of nuclear war will continue to restrain such temptations to evade domestic stalemates and to cut through national dilemmas with foreign adventures.

²¹ Drew Middleton, “Oil Price Rise Stirs Review of U.S. War Moves in Crisis,” *The New York Times*, July 5, 1979, p. A-3.

The 1914 analogy hardly encourages complete reliance upon such restraint.

VI

Shaping both the international and the domestic perceptions of the elites in 1914 were what James Joll has labeled the "unspoken assumptions," underlying beliefs about the nature of international reality. Social Darwinist notions of struggle and competition were particularly pervasive. In the 1970s two ideological mutations may be the new unspoken assumptions for our *fin de siècle*: the decline of internationalism (and the concomitant rise of nationalism) and slowly changing attitudes toward the use of force.

Internationalism in its liberal and Marxist variants has rarely appeared so weak. Cuba remains faithful to its vision of revolutionary advance, and the Soviet Union is at times influenced by similar sympathies (as in Ethiopia). China, on the other hand, has embarked on a course in which the overriding determinant of relations with other states is a carefully constructed anti-Soviet strategy. Supping with Mobutu, the Shah and President Pinochet of Chile has not been too high a price to pay for thwarting the "social imperialism" of the polar bear. The Communist International that shaped a generation of leaders is now only a memory. Radical movements of all kinds are increasingly intent upon nationalist goals and nationalist appeals: pan-Arabism is in decline; the Sandinista guerrillas claim that they are building a new Nicaragua, not a new Cuba. Within Western societies, disillusionment with revolutionary models is also profound, and the efforts of trilateralism and human rights to evoke a common cause seem tepid replacements for the ideological appeals of the cold war years. The United Nations, the most potent symbol of liberal internationalism, has seldom attracted less attention or respect.

To those who viewed the ideological struggle of the cold war as a dangerous contamination of international relations, the apparent triumph of nationalism might seem comforting. A Bismarckian China may well seem safer than the (misperceived) revolutionary juggernaut of the 1960s. But ideology added a certain predictability to international politics and, while stimulating some international divisions, such as the Sino-Soviet split, also served as a stimulus to cooperation and compromise that could override pure national self-interest. Most important, it gave to the great powers a certain confidence in their historical role and their futures.

The triumph of nationalism has meant as well the disappearance of domestic constraints imposed by those groups most at-

tached to the internationalist cause. Accounts of the 1914 crisis often omit the strength of pacifist and antiwar sentiment in Europe. Working-class movements in all of the major European countries were growing in electoral strength, criticizing military budgets, threatening strikes on the outbreak of war, seeking to establish ties to their counterparts in other countries. Liberal peace societies flourished, and the years before 1914 were marked by growing interest in the procedures of international arbitration and law. Such political bars to international conflict foundered in 1914. Today, even these restraints are lacking. Working-class internationalism is dead in the major industrial countries—the American labor movement has long taken the most nationalist positions on questions of foreign policy; even the French Communist Party has given itself over to chauvinist appeals. The web of restraints woven by internationalism, whether egalitarian or hegemonic, has unraveled.

The rise of nationalism has been accompanied by renewed interest in that relic of the *belle époque*, geopolitics. Used and misused by spokesmen for starkly different points of view, geopolitics fits most neatly with the nationalist and conservative side of the political spectrum, where it was born. Geopolitics is useful as a restraint on the diversion of resources to domestic welfare ends, since it posits requirements for any great power that wishes to retain its status. Through the liberal use of terms such as “rimlands,” it urges an endlessly expanding strategic role for the great power and justifies renewed competition in the Third World. The geopolitical frame of mind also fits well (as it did before 1914) with a vision of international competition and struggle that denies the possibility of sustained cooperation.

Connected ideologically with the geopolitical revival is a second shift in the unspoken assumptions, one concerning the use of force. Conventional military conflicts have dotted the history of international politics since the appearance of nuclear weapons, even though the direct confrontation of two nuclear powers (apart from the Soviet-Chinese border skirmishes) has been avoided. In the absence of undisputed internal support, however, the bar to invasion, pure and simple, has been a strong one, particularly among weak states with few claims to historical legitimacy. On three occasions within the last two years, such invasions have taken place, all defended as a response to border “provocations”: Tanzania against Uganda, Vietnam against Cambodia, and China against Vietnam. The international response to these actions was surprisingly mild. The Left was embarrassed by the

human rights records of the victims and by conflicts between socialist states; the Right watched gleefully as tyrannical regimes were overthrown in two instances and two socialist states battled one another in the third.

In the China-Vietnam conflict, the potential for escalation to a great power confrontation was evident; other future objects of the use of force may also have powerful supporters. It is at the nuclear level, however, that a more significant erosion of restraints is taking place. The military forces in pre-1914 Europe were not viewed as deterrents; "they were instruments for fighting a war which was widely regarded—and not by the soldiers alone—as being inevitable, necessary, and even desirable."²² The transition to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence after World War II took some time, but after its acceptance the assumption that nuclear weapons would be used to deter the use of force by one's adversary remained unshaken into the 1970s. Now that doctrine is challenged by those who see in the growth of Soviet nuclear armaments the obsolescence of the Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine and argue that nuclear weapons should be made "usable."²³ Coupled with technological threats to the stability of the nuclear balance that may emerge in the 1980s, these new arguments on the fighting of a nuclear war raise a final parallel to the pre-1914 system in the military givens of world politics: a bias toward preemption, a willingness to undertake a conflict that is assumed to be short and "winnable." It is unlikely that advocates of war-fighting see such a conflict as "inevitable, necessary, and even desirable," and the debate is hardly over. But the attack on the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction may mark a first step in revising our own unspoken assumptions.

VII

But wait, some will say, the age-old game of military and diplomatic competition has been transformed in the latter half of the twentieth century by the growth of economic interdependence between states and by an overriding concern for economic welfare within states. It is no disparagement of these arguments, which the author endorses in large measure, to note the prevalence of similar observations before 1914. Normal Angell (*The Great Illusion*), H. N. Brailsford (*The War of Steel and Gold*) and many other liberals and socialists believed that there would be no more war

²² Michael Howard, *Studies in War and Peace*, London: Temple Smith, 1970, p. 104.

²³ Leon V. Sigal, "Rethinking the Unthinkable," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1979, pp. 35–51.

among the principal powers of Europe, in large measure because of the economic irrationality of such a conflict.

The blighting of their hopes in 1914 does not, on the other hand, lend support to the competing argument that economic rivalry was central in stimulating international tensions that ultimately led to war. Prototypes of the military-industrial complex were powerful and sought to continue the armaments build-up, but colonial competition had slackened by 1914 and was far from the center of concern in the final crisis. Business interests had hardly been in the forefront of conflict in any case—in Morocco, for instance, French and German interests seemed to cooperate, while their political leaders lurched toward confrontation. The Anglo-German commercial competition that had so alarmed British opinion in the 1890s had largely dissipated as well, and the levels of trade interdependence between the naval rivals was high. The interests of the financial community were hardly served by war; the Foreign Office was in fact suspicious of the City of London's "pro-German" ties.²⁴ The two chessboards of diplomatic and economic competition did not perfectly coincide; very often, the diplomatic and strategic exploited the economic. A world characterized by high economic interdependence, unparalleled prosperity, and relative openness still went to war.

Today, the level of economic linkage among the great powers is far lower by most measures: there is no unified international monetary system based upon London; trade between East and West is heavily constrained by political considerations; emigration is likewise restricted. One form of economic dependence, upon external sources of natural resources, may well be higher than in earlier periods, but it is more likely to spur competition than cooperation. There is little reason to expect economic interdependence to prove a more serious barrier to the use of force by insecure nation-states than it did before 1914.

VIII

Competing American strategies for the more ambiguous world that has emerged can already be discerned. For the authors of *The Third World War*, whose model of Soviet intentions lies closer to the 1930s than to 1914, the lessons are simple: deterrence may fail if military strength is permitted to erode; a prudent statesman will therefore increase military expenditures and prepare to fight and win a war if the worst case materializes. Diplomatic strategies

²⁴ Zara Steiner, *op. cit.* footnote 15, p. 62.

have also appeared: the trilateralism-plus-China school of modified containment; the balanced approach to relations with the Soviet Union and China; those who would prefer to disengage from the great power game and rely upon the increasingly important influentials of the developing world for support.

The 1914 analogy points to weaknesses in our dominant mode of thinking about relations with our adversaries, especially in deterrence theory (an image powerfully shaped by the supposed lessons of the 1930s), and to flaws in the cruder treatments of power and the use of force.²⁵ A few modest guides could profitably be derived from the 1914 analogy:

1. *Reexamine your adversaries' intentions and the sources of their behavior.* The simplified political model that dominated U.S. foreign policy after World War II assumed that the Soviet Union and China were irreducibly hostile and could not be appeased. The totalitarian construct seemed to satisfy the need for explaining their foreign policies; the possibility of changing the intentions of adversaries was seldom considered. Although scholarship has amended simplified views of Soviet and Chinese foreign policy, the gap between military intelligence, which often increases the perception of threat, and political and diplomatic intelligence, which might reduce it, has widened. The least that can be proposed in the more ambiguous world of the 1980s is a constant reevaluation of deeply appealing theories about one's adversaries. Perhaps Germany *was* irreconcilable in its rivalry with Britain before 1914, but there can be no doubt that Eyre Crowe and his associates would have dismissed any German change in direction as meaningless.

2. *The survival of your opponent may save your life.* Containment was not concerned with the internal stability of the Soviet Union; in George Kennan's earliest statement, the policy was designed to promote "either the break-up or the mellowing of Soviet power."²⁶ The 1914 analogy suggests that heavily armed states faced with internal strains may commit risky and dangerous acts. Austria-Hungary did not go to war in 1914 because of imminent internal disintegration, but the Serbian challenge to Austria's great power status did have an internal dimension. Paul Schroeder has argued that British policy was guilty of failing to recognize Austria's plight; the rules of the system dictated British efforts to ensure the

²⁵ The criticisms of deterrence theory have been summarized by Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," *World Politics*, January 1979, pp. 289-324.

²⁶ "X" (later identified as Mr. Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947, p. 582.

survival of an endangered member of the European Concert.²⁷ Perhaps Austria-Hungary was doomed by the forces of nationalism and destined to fall apart; even so, a state facing similar prospects must be treated with care—its doom may be the doom of others. We have grown accustomed to seeing danger in self-confident, expansionist states, but a world of great powers that sense themselves in decline and at the same time increase their military strength may be even more prone to crises and serious conflict.

3. *Label surrogates and proxies carefully.* One reason that Britain failed to take Austria-Hungary seriously was the conviction of the germanophobe Foreign Office that Vienna's foreign policy was simply an extension of Berlin's. Not only did this belief reinforce insensitivity to the decline of Austria-Hungary, it hid the instabilities that existed between the Central Powers: "In the final crisis, the solidarity of the Dual Alliance powers was more the product of their mutual distrust than of *deutsche Treue*."²⁸ The false notion that Austria-Hungary had lost any capacity for independent action made impossible even a self-interested Entente policy of inducing a more independent course within the monarchy. The assumptions underlying long-standing American policy toward Vietnam and Cuba can be questioned on similar grounds.

4. *Bargaining over influence may be more advantageous than spurring competition.* As great power rivalry progresses in Africa, the Middle East and other parts of the world, the United States will appear increasingly like Sanderson's "huge giant," screaming at the appearance of Cuban doctors in yet another country. Rather than the pattern of counterintervention sought by Henry Kissinger in Angola, the United States would do well to specify which types of influence in which countries are objectionable. A true reversion to the "new imperialism" would lead to agreements limiting the range of influence permitted to the powers in key areas (along the lines of the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907) or, even better for the hapless objects of great power attention, the exclusion by agreement of certain forms of influence or presence.

5. *Do not be lulled by crisis management.* After two Balkan wars in as many years, European diplomats in the summer of 1914 assumed that yet another crisis in that troublesome region could be solved. Success had bred overconfidence, and unnoticed, one power (Austria-Hungary) had given up on the Concert of Europe,

²⁷ Paul Schroeder, "World War I as Galloping Gertie: A Reply to Joachim Remak," *Journal of Modern History*, September 1972, pp. 319-345.

²⁸ Bridge, *op. cit.* footnote 16, p. 375.

abandoning any hopes that its vital interests would be considered fairly within that mechanism of resolving conflict. As the roster of postwar crises successfully surmounted grows, so does the potential for unwarranted complacency at a time when innumerable pin-pricks and irritations are likely to appear in far-flung areas.

These limited suggestions will be challenged by those who object to such singleminded concentration upon the great power game and by those who argue for the transformation, not the moderation, of that game. One can only reply that so long as great powers continue to act in the ways that they have historically acted, efforts to restrain their competition, their misperceptions, their limited vision will be crucial. Ironically, the final service of the 1914 analogy is to induce skepticism about forecasting of the future of international politics. Even when predictions are terribly pessimistic, our fundamentally liberal view of history is based upon the extrapolation of existing trends, whether favorable or unfavorable. We omit the notion of the unexpected, of the crisis that was not included in the plans. Given our long-standing obsession with the 1930s, a decade that seemed destined to end in war, a return of our gaze to the war that emerged suddenly from Europe's last untroubled summer may at least introduce an element of healthy doubt.

McGeorge Bundy

VIETNAM, WATERGATE AND PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

O

ne of the most important questions about the working of the United States government is the nature and location of the authority to use the armed forces of the country against an adversary. It is not an easy matter. Doctrinaire readings of the constitutional grant of the war power to the Congress are as misleading as executive reliance on the role of the President as Commander in Chief. The formal treaties that bind the United States to allies in Europe, Asia and this Hemisphere are couched in language that quite deliberately skirts the question of who would do what, and by what process of decision, at the moment of truth. Even greater uncertainty surrounds the largely untested War Powers Resolution of 1973. And in all our complex debates on strategic deterrence we seldom ask ourselves just how one would square the possible requirements for rapid executive action with the rights of the Congress, let alone the people.

In this situation one guide to understanding is history, and it is therefore a matter of some importance when doubtful interpretations are offered by persons who deserve to be taken seriously. This is what has just happened in Henry Kissinger's book, *White House Years*. The author's importance and the gravity of his distortions combine to justify a careful analysis.

II

On page 1373 of this massive volume Mr. Kissinger addresses briefly but eloquently the question of the propriety of certain private assurances given to President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam in the course of the strenuous and eventually successful efforts of the Nixon Administration to secure his acceptance of the agreements with Hanoi that ended the longest of all our wars. The crucial sentences in this paragraph deserve quotation:

As to the American response to violations, I reiterated Nixon's assurance that in the event of massive North Vietnamese violations the United States would act to enforce the agreement. The argument was later advanced that it was not within the President's power to give such assurances without explicit authorization by the Congress. This idea not only did not occur to us; it would have struck us as inconceivable that the United States should fight for years and lose 45,000 men in an honorable cause, and then stand by while the peace treaty, the achievement of their sacrifice, was flagrantly violated. Diplomacy could not survive such casuistry. Negotiations would become exercises in cynicism; no agreement would ever be maintained. In Vietnam this meant the agreement would have been a blatant subterfuge for surrender. We could have done that earlier and with much less pain.

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Honor, decency, credibility, and international law all combined to make it seem beyond controversy that we should promise to observe the treaty and see it enforced. What else could be the meaning of a solemn compact ending a war, ratified by an international conference? The point was made privately to Thieu and his associates. It was also made publicly by Nixon, Elliot Richardson (when he was Secretary of Defense), me, and other officials. It seemed to us the least controversial of the issues raised by the agreement. We thought we would be in a better moral and political position to assist Saigon to maintain its freedom in the name of a peace program in which the American people could take pride than in the context of open-ended warfare tearing our country apart. Whether the judgment would have been vindicated in normal times will remain forever unknown. Soon after the agreement was signed, Watergate undermined Nixon's authority, and the dam holding back Congressional antiwar resolutions burst.

This remarkable passage is not easy to analyze. Let us begin with a question of fact: Mr. Kissinger asks us to believe that whatever point was made privately to Thieu was made publicly by the Administration. Is it so?

The United States government has never published a full record of the exchanges with President Thieu that marked the intense negotiations between Hanoi's decisive concession in October 1972 and the Paris agreements of January 1973. But associates of Thieu made public two such messages at the end of April 1975. At the time Mr. Kissinger was evasive about these letters, but he prints their two most important passages in his book.

On November 14 Mr. Nixon told Thieu:

But far more important than what we say in the agreement on this issue is what we do in the event the enemy renews its aggression. You have my absolute assurance that if Hanoi fails to abide by the terms of this agreement it is my intention to take swift and severe retaliatory action.

And on January 5 he wrote again:

Should you decide, as I trust you will, to go with us, you have my assurance of continued assistance in the post-settlement period and that we will respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam.

This second assurance, given in the context of the recently ended Christmas bombing of Hanoi, must have struck Thieu as strong indeed.

Did the Administration make this same point with equal force and clarity to the American people, as Mr. Kissinger would have his readers believe? The claim is buttressed by a footnote reference to eight public statements of 1973 and a whole compendium of others. What do these statements say?

Let us begin with Mr. Nixon, the source for three of these statements. (I quote from his *Presidential Papers*.)

On March 15, in responding to a question about cease-fire violations, Mr. Nixon directed attention to what he called "another violation," excessive infiltration from North Vietnam. He said that this "could lead to serious consequences—we do not believe it will; we hope it will not. . . ." He said that the North Vietnamese had been informed of our concern, and he added:

I would only suggest that based on my actions over the past four years, that the North Vietnamese should not lightly disregard such expressions of concern when they are made with regard to a violation.

This is the strongest of the three Nixon statements, indeed the strongest of all the eight. The second, on March 29, says simply: "The leaders of North Vietnam should have no doubt as to the consequences if they fail to comply with the agreement." And the third, in a joint communiqué with Thieu on April 3, says: "Actions which would threaten the basis of the Agreement would call for appropriately vigorous reactions."

None of these statements suggests a definite U.S. commitment to use force in reply to violations. Each is Delphic, not categorical. All three are evidently intended to say more to Hanoi or Saigon than to the American people. Taken together they led so sophisticated an observer as James Reston to conclude on April 8, 1973 that the truth was that Nixon had no intention of resuming the war; "He merely wants to talk about it."¹ Indeed, during the Thieu-Nixon talks of early April, Administration sources made it clear beforehand that the President would resist any definite commitment to military action, and pointed out afterward that "the communiqué said nothing about who would make the 'reactions'," implying that they might be by the South Vietnamese alone.² One need hardly underline the distance between all this and Mr. Kissinger's retrospective view of what was plainly required by "honor, decency, credibility, and international law."

The second most important witness is Mr. Kissinger himself. The footnote offers us one reference to him—to a broadcast interview with Marvin Kalb on February 1. The interview is sufficiently important for us to quote the relevant exchange in full.

KALB: Dr. Kissinger, shifting south for a moment to South Vietnam: Now that the peace agreement has been signed, how would you define the nature and depth of the American commitment to Saigon?

KISSINGER: We have been allies in a bitter and difficult war and we have a responsibility to give those with whom we've been associated an opportunity to shape their own future. Therefore, we have a responsibility to continue a program of economic assistance along the lines as—that has been developed. We also will, as the President pointed out in his speech announcing the peace, we will continue those—that degree of military assistance that the agreement permits and which is made necessary by the military situation. Now, the agreement permits us to replace weapons that are used up, destroyed, damaged or worn out. Needless to say, if there's no conflict, the amount of replacement military equipment that is needed will be much less than it was during the war. In the longer term, it has always been our intention to enable the South Vietnamese to take over the burden of their own military defense and we believe we've left them in a position where they can handle most of the challenges that we can now foresee.

KALB: Dr. Kissinger, I think what I was trying to get at is what happens—And I suppose this question must be asked. In the best of all possible worlds the cease-fire is going to hold; in the world that we live in it may not. President Thieu said, in an interview tonight on CBS, that he would never call upon American troops to go back to Vietnam, but he would feel free to call upon American air power to go back. And Ambassador Sullivan said only last Sunday that there are no inhibitions—I believe his words—on the use of this air power. Is that correct?

KISSINGER: That is legally correct. The question is—

¹ *The New York Times*, April 8, 1973, page E15.

² *The New York Times*, April 4, 1973, page 1, and April 3, 1973, pp. 1, 4.

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KALB: Politically and diplomatically?

KISSINGER: We have the right to do this. The question is—It's very difficult to answer in the abstract. It depends on the extent of the challenge, on the nature of the threat, on the circumstances in which it arises. And it would be extremely unwise for a responsible American official, at this stage, when the peace is in the process of being established, to give a checklist about what the United States will or will not do in every circumstance that is likely to arise. For the future that we can foresee, the North Vietnamese are not in a position to launch an overwhelming attack on North—on the South, even if they violate the agreement. What happens after a year or two has to be seen in the circumstances which then exist. Most of the violations that one can now foresee should be handled by the South Vietnamese.

KALB: So that for the next year or two, if I understand you right, there would be no need for a reinvolverment of American military power?

KISSINGER: Marvin, we did not end this war in order to look for an excuse to re-enter it. But it would be irresponsible for us, at this moment, to give a precise checklist to potential aggressors as to what they can or cannot safely do.³

The questioning shows plainly that Mr. Kalb was trying to find out just what assurances the United States had given to Saigon. A straightforward answer would have been that we had promised "full force" if necessary, or even that any other position would have been "inconceivable" and made the agreements "a blatant substitute for surrender." But instead Mr. Kissinger directs attention to economic and military assistance, very different matters indeed. If Mr. Kalb had not asked his follow-up question, nothing whatever would have been said about any use of U.S. armed forces. And when the question is posed inescapably, Mr. Kissinger asserts the existence of a legal right of retaliation but hurries on to explain that its use in the foreseeable future is most unlikely. The only way to reconcile this passage with page 1373 is to assume that Mr. Kissinger thought a clear and unquestionable national obligation to go back to war if necessary was so obvious that it was needless to discuss it. It may be doubted that his listeners understood him so.

Elliot Richardson is cited three times in the footnote. He was and is a much more moderate and straightforward man than Mr. Nixon or Mr. Kissinger; his comments reflect that. Here they are:

1. On "Meet the Press" on April 1, he agreed that the instruments of any possible retaliation could include all those used before; he refused to add or subtract from Mr. Nixon's own warnings, but he agreed that he could give no "categorical assurances" that the United States would never send forces back to Indochina.
2. Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 2, he refused to say that the United States had any commitment to "come back with its airplanes" if there was a renewed offensive, and in any case this testimony was off the record at the time; it was not public at all.
3. Before a group of newsmen on April 3 he justified *the then existing* bombing in Cambodia, and the *possibility* of early bombing in other places, but in the context of achieving a cease-fire, not of repelling a new large-scale attack.

In sum, Mr. Richardson limited his own assertions to the quite narrow claim that existing bombing in Cambodia, and possible bombing elsewhere

³ CBS News Special Report, "A Conversation with Henry Kissinger," Feb. 1, 1973.

(which never in fact occurred) "to achieve a cease-fire" was part of the President's residual authority to end the war. He stayed well away from any public avowal of any commitment whatever to "full force" retaliation against renewed aggression. It seems unlikely, indeed, that he even knew about the private assurances to Thieu.

A final source cited in the footnote is a "Meet the Press" interview on January 28 with William Sullivan, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and a senior assistant to Mr. Kissinger in the negotiations. He did indeed assert that "there are no inhibitions upon us," thus creating the ambiguity that, as we have seen, Mr. Kissinger walked away from four days later. But Mr. Sullivan was as vague as his superior on whether in fact we ever would or should use force again. Like Mr. Kissinger he refused to discuss the subject at all until the question was pressed repeatedly, and he refused to talk of threats to Hanoi. The most he would say is that Hanoi was aware of U.S. strength in Thailand and in the Pacific and could "draw some conclusions." But all that he really adds to the record is a categorical denial that there are any pledges at all of this sort to Saigon. Given Mr. Sullivan's reputation for energetic candor, this statement makes it seem likely that he too was ignorant of the private assurances to Thieu.

This is all the material directly cited in the footnote. There are other remarks cited indirectly; they were collected in 1975 in an effort to persuade Senator Stennis that the record showed "many statements to the effect that the United States would give adequate aid, economic and military."⁴ They are, as the footnote-writer undoubtedly knew, even less persuasive on the present point than these eight.

It remains to consider what is not cited. The footnote does *not* tell us that in their opening statements on the agreement, on January 23 and January 24, neither Mr. Nixon nor Mr. Kissinger said one word about any express or implied obligation or right to go back to war. Indeed, Mr. Kissinger, at this most public and dramatic moment of all, took great pains to draw attention away from any such prospect. Here are two questions, and his answers:

Q. If the peace treaty is violated and if the ICC proves ineffective, will the United States ever again send troops to Vietnam? . . .

A. I don't want to speculate on hypothetical situations that we don't expect to arise.

Q. What is now the extent and the nature of the American commitment to South Vietnam?

A. The United States, as the President said, will continue economic aid to South Vietnam. It will continue that military aid which is permitted by the agreement. The United States is prepared to gear that military aid to the actions of other countries and not to treat it as an end in itself and the United States expects all countries to live up to the provisions of the agreement.⁵

It would take a most remarkable interpreter to reconcile these comforting words with the plain language of the assurances to Thieu.

⁴ *Emergency Military Assistance and Economic and Humanitarian Aid to South Vietnam*. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st sess., Washington: GPO, 1975, pp. 19-24.

⁵ *The New York Times*, January 25, 1973, p. 21.

So it is clear that the public record and the private assurances are poles apart. But the public record is helpful to us as we turn to consider another of Mr. Kissinger's remarkable claims, that what really destroyed the Vietnam Accords of 1973 was Watergate. He says it on page 1373—and still more forcibly in his final comment on the matter, a hundred pages later (page 1470):

We sought not an interval before collapse, but lasting peace with honor. But for the collapse of executive authority as a result of Watergate, I believe we would have succeeded.

This assessment of responsibility may provide some ardent doves with their first good reason to rejoice in Watergate, and its self-serving value to Mr. Kissinger is apparent. But is it true?

What we have seen so far is that the Administration in early 1973 was not ready to tell either the public or the Congress what it had repeatedly told President Thieu. But that is very far from justifying any conclusion that its assurances were cynically offered. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that the assurances were offered in full good faith, and to this degree the sense of grievance exhibited on page 1373 is understandable. Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger really did believe that such assurances were a matter of course in this situation, and there is ample evidence in their books that they believed they must be ready to redeem these assurances by action. Back on December 6, 1972 Mr. Kissinger had cabled the President that an agreement "will certainly require from us a posture of constant readiness and willingness to intervene..." (page 1432). And a day later he said it again: "We will probably have little chance of maintaining the agreement without evident hair-trigger U.S. readiness, which may in fact be challenged at any time, to enforce its provisions." (page 1435) These comments have the ring of unvarnished conviction.

Why then was the Administration so vague in public? The answer is obvious to anyone who remembers the national mood on Vietnam at the time—and again it is reinforced in this very book. The problem was that neither the country nor the Congress was the least bit eager to go back to war in Vietnam for any reason whatever. Any assertion that we must be ready to do this, or admission that the President had given an "absolute assurance" of such action, if need be, would have produced an explosive reaction.

But at the same time it was considered necessary to try to keep Hanoi in some doubt and fear; the assessments in the Kissinger cables were not all wrong. So the President, followed by his senior advisers, fell back on a quite personal threat: be careful of *me*, because you know from *my* record what *I* will do. And this threat, in fairness, they did make public, hedging it all the while by offering soothing syrup in the back room to the Restons of the world. This image of the fierce and single-handed Richard Nixon is what Mr. Kissinger almost surely has in mind when he uses the sonorous phrase "executive authority." And this Nixon did indeed have a record; he had dared to mine Haiphong on the eve of his cherished Moscow summit, and he had dared to bomb Hanoi on the eve of Christmas and the brink of peace. Reinforced by his achievement of peace, as by his assured four years of office, what might he not do if provoked?

But the precise trouble with these vague warnings of Nixonian wrath was that they were plainly audible also to a Congress that, *quite without Watergate*, was deeply out of sorts with single-handed war-making. Mr. Kissinger understood this sentiment as well as anyone, though he neither loved nor respected it. He recognized, for example, that the November election had produced a shift of three votes against the war in the Senate (p. 1416), and he knew ahead of time that the Christmas bombing would be "another time of trial that would deepen the domestic wounds." (page 1445) And if he hoped for reconciliation and reinforcement *on this issue*, after the Paris agreements, events swiftly disabused him—and not Watergate events at all.

We move here beyond the period of *White House Years*, but the evidence we have found from its misleading footnote is still helpful. There was indeed a test of "executive authority" in early 1973, and it came over the question of the source of authority for continued bombing in Cambodia. In defending this bombing, for which there was a reasonable case on the ground, the Administration was almost immediately forced to find an answer to the question of the source of its right to act. Its response was extraordinarily feeble. The running was left, in the main, to Elliot Richardson, in the early April statements listed above. His argument was, in essence, that this was a residual power of the same sort as the war power the President had exercised up to the signing in Paris; until he got a cease-fire in Cambodia as well as in Vietnam and Laos (where the Administration in these months usually claimed more peace than there was), he could bomb. Senators, to put it mildly, were skeptical. Before the Paris agreements the Administration had claimed that its right to make war was based on its inherent obligation to protect American forces on the scene. (It had not contested the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1970; that resolution may have had disputed origins, but it certainly provided a measure of formal congressional authority for the war.) But now the troops were coming out. What war-making power remained?

The Administration wriggled with this question and came up with nothing better than the Richardson claim. More important, it was driven to concede that continued use of force in Vietnam, by the executive branch acting alone, could be justified *only* as part of the "windup" of the war. Mr. Kissinger himself joined in this distinction, according to Representative Jonathan Bingham, as quoted in *The New York Times* on March 30. And so, in defending what it was still doing in Cambodia, the Administration was forced to give up its deeply held reliance on the single-handed ferocity of the lonely Mr. Nixon as its decisive long-run deterrent to Hanoi.

There is no evidence at all that this result was caused by Watergate, and much that it was not. Once the question was clearly posed, the Congress was absolutely certain to insist on its right to share in any new use of force, and any Administration, however nobly led, would have been compelled to concede that right. The leaders of the Senate in this matter were not limited to, or led by, the chief critics of Watergate. They included such durable friends of the Nixon Administration as Senator John C. Stennis and Senator Hugh Scott, the latter the Republican leader and the former the man the President would seek out six months later in his effort to protect his tapes.

The simple truth is that the Cambodian bombing, not Watergate, quite literally *forced* the Administration to explain itself, and that the lameness of its explanation made congressional action inevitable. When the Congress was confronted with the question whether it thought Mr. Nixon had a one-man

right to go back to war, it could give only one answer, and indeed the Administration never found a counterargument, for the deeply simple reason that there wasn't any. So the decisive Congressional action of July 1973, which outlawed the use of any force in Indochina after August 15 (unless this ban should be repealed in advance) was quite simply inevitable. Mr. Nixon was prohibited from going it alone. The reason had been stated by Senator Stennis, with massive authority and simplicity, from his hospital bed in April:

In the long run the only stable basis for continued confidence in our Government is to have the people participate in the major decision of whether we are to have war or peace. The only practical way for the people to participate is through their elected representatives—the Congress.⁶

Here we have the fundamental error in Mr. Kissinger's apologia. In the abstract his rhetoric is formidable: "inconceivable" to "stand by" "while the peace treaty" was "flagrantly violated," "diplomacy could not survive such casuistry"; "no agreement would ever be maintained." Eloquent indeed (if totally absent from the record of 1973). But leave aside the distortion of using the word "treaty" for Vietnam peace accords that were never presented to the Senate for approval. Leave aside the improbability of the notion that Mr. Kissinger found "inconceivable" the very public fatigue and disenchantment with Vietnam that was on his mind every day as he worked for an agreement. What we are left with is contempt for the clear opinion of the Congress, and ultimately contempt for democracy itself.

For in the United States of America the use of force and threats of force are not entrusted to the President alone. To be able to use the armed forces of the United States in more than a one-shot action like the Mayaguez affair in 1975 (very Kissingeresque, and also very questionable), you must have the public strongly with you, and you also need the Congress. By 1973 the public was worn out with Vietnam, and the Congress was tired of being impotent. Nothing was more plainly predictable, as that year began, than that anyone who wanted to maintain a right of "speedy and severe retaliation" would have some persuading to do. No one in the Nixon Administration ever made the slightest effort in this direction.

The reasons for this behavior are not easy to sort out. A simple one is the obvious difficulty of the task, but I find it too simple; these men had plenty of courage and daring in other contexts. There may be some explanation in the curious psychology of the President himself—in the loneliness that made him uncomfortable with the persuasion of others (except when he could ask a silent majority to hate a vicious liberal establishment). More probably, both Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger, preoccupied with adversaries and allies abroad, allowed themselves to neglect the constitutional and political question of the post-Paris war power until it was too late. This question had never been their main concern before; there is no discussion of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, or of the basis for their residual authority to prosecute the war in Southeast Asia, in either of their books. Here in this neglect of democratic process, in this assumption that if a power is needed it exists, there may be some confraternity with the causes of Watergate—but nothing that makes one the cause of the other—and not enough, really, to satisfy.

⁶ *The New York Times*, April 13, 1973, p. 10.

It is instructive to compare all this with what was done after the 1953 armistice in Korea. There, within ten days of that armistice there was a public declaration by the representatives of the United States and fifteen other nations that in the event of renewed North Korean aggression, "we should again be united and firm to resist," and in due course the American part of this commitment was confirmed by a Treaty of Mutual Defense that received the consent of the Senate. There are ways and ways of making sure that a policy of deterrence has public understanding and congressional support. The one used in the Korean case has worked for 26 years.

But of course that case was different, as different as the open Eisenhower from the secretive Nixon. Korea divided us, but not as Vietnam did, and South Korea was after all a country (*"d'ailleurs un pays,"* to borrow de Gaulle's decisive classification of India). It was also more populous and potentially stronger, not smaller and irreparably weaker, than its communist opponent. The two aggressions may have been fundamentally the same (I have always thought they were), but most of our allies never saw it that way, and neither did many of our own people. Domestic opposition over Vietnam had no counterpart over Korea, and it may not be surprising that I have some sympathy with Mr. Kissinger's lack of respect for many of that opposition's arguments.

Vietnam was indeed different. And if in the end the Administration won the fragile peace it did by a resolute and skillful use of force (and here I think Mr. Kissinger has a good case), the President really did wear out the patience of the Congress in the process. Mr. Kissinger makes it most painfully clear that once Hanoi had made the offer it did in October, the will for peace on Capitol Hill left him little room for further maneuver.

Yet he is entirely right in one of the sentiments in the paragraph we began with:

We thought we would be in a better moral and political position to assist Saigon to maintain its freedom in the name of a peace program in which the American people could take pride than in the context of open-minded warfare tearing our country apart.

The trouble is precisely that a peace program which included a dependence on "hair-trigger" presidential "readiness" to send bombs away on his own unsupported authority was not one in which the American people could take pride; it was not one the Congress could be expected to permit; it therefore failed the ultimate test of realistic analysis: it would never work.

Was there a different course that had greater promise? How much could have been achieved if Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger had limited their assurances to those that could have been made public, could have been defended and might have had a chance of sustained public and congressional support? Presumably such a course would still have included assurances of economic and military assistance—matters on which the Administration had a stronger case than it ever made. The Administration could also have reinforced the acceptability of these aid undertakings by an assurance that U.S. forces would not be sent back to battle without congressional approval; such a public position would surely have strengthened congressional and

public support for the rest of the peace program, just as the foredoomed attempt to protect a single-handed right of military action weakened it.

Such a course would have required more qualified assurances to President Thieu on the question of renewed American military action. At a minimum any such assurances would have to have included some clear reference to our constitutional processes (which is not at all the same thing as the "explicit authorization by the Congress" in advance that is made a straw man by Mr. Kissinger in the passage from page 1373 of his book quoted at the start of the article). Thieu would not have liked this more modest way of handling things, but Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger should have been the last to suppose that Thieu's preferences should be their guide on such an inescapably American issue.

Indeed the guidance for such a course is suggested, once again, in Mr. Kissinger's book. In a later discussion of what he considers to be the obvious right to enforce peace agreements (the book is nothing if not repetitive), Mr. Kissinger suggests that the secret assurances to Thieu were comparable to those later given by the Carter Administration in 1979, when it publicly promised to help sustain the Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt (page 1413). This claim leads one to wonder whether Mr. Kissinger ever read Mr. Carter's letters on that occasion. Not only are they not assurances of "full force," as the secret Nixon letters to Thieu were, but in referring to the United States taking "such other action as it may deem appropriate," the very first sentence of each letter says that everything in it is "*subject to United States Constitutional processes.*" (Emphasis mine.)⁸ Mr. Carter showed exactly the respect for the rights and responsibilities of Congress that one cannot find in Mr. Kissinger's record of his own behavior.

If in fact Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger had shown such respect for Congress and indeed for the Constitution itself, they would surely have been better placed to set a course that might have been sustained. One may doubt, as I do, that anything would have worked in the long run, but for this alternative course one can at least make the claim that it could have been honestly defended and explained in public. Given the degree to which both justified and excessive mistrust had fueled the wartime controversy, this advantage, never trivial, would have been great indeed. It would have had the special and multiplying value of reopening a process of honest exposition that could have speeded up a recovery of the national confidence and will so badly sapped in the Southeast Asian jungle. But of course this way of going about it would have been out of character for both Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger. So they did it all in their own secretive and deceptive way, breaching the limits of Presidential power as defined even before mid-1973. Mr. Kissinger should not now pretend otherwise.

v

The fact that the special pleading here reviewed is a discredit to its author does not demonstrate that in fact Mr. Kissinger or his President could have conducted the 1969-73 phase of American Policy in Vietnam decisively better than they did. Their method and style had some advantages in the extrication from Vietnam, and that effort as a whole was not so badly handled that I

⁸ *Department of State Bulletin*, May 1979 (Vol. 79, No. 2026), page 15.

think it ripe for harsh criticism from one who shared in earlier and fateful decisions to try to help South Vietnam to survive.

Indeed my last point is almost the opposite. It was not Watergate that in the end made Saigon's survival impossible; it was the relative weakness of the unhappy non-communist society of South Vietnam, and the fatal and enduring imbalance between what it would have needed from us and what our own society would let us provide. If all Americans had been as determined as Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon surely were, and thought their countrymen should be, the result might well have been different. But that is a condition contrary to fact; the country was not that stern. Given the reality as we can now see it—and as many, to their credit, saw it at the time—the basic error was not in any one failure but in the attempt itself. Although Mr. Kissinger never opposed that attempt when he was a professor, he bears no responsibility for it. So perhaps it is not too much to hope that in due course, perhaps in his second volume, he will help to light that candle of understanding, and not seek ignoble self-protection by cursing the darkness of Watergate.

COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

TURKEY AND CYPRUS

To the Editor:

In his portrayal of "Turkey's Travails" in your Fall 1979 issue, Dankwart Rustow points to one of the major factors contributing to Turkey's inability to deal effectively with the problems confronting it: the system of proportional representation which in effect gives a veto to one or both of the extreme right-wing parties. Mr. Rustow has emphasized Turkey's economic difficulties and need for external assistance: constitutional reform is one thing that Turkey can do for itself. If Turkey's two main parties could work together long enough to bring this about before the next election, both would benefit sooner or later, and stronger, more credible governments would be the result.

Constitutional reform could result in more moderate Turkish positions on Cyprus and on the Aegean issues with Greece and put an end to the current stalemate. In March 1978, in talks with Caramanlis at Montreux, Switzerland, Ecevit agreed to international arbitration of the Aegean dispute, but his decision was reversed by Ankara the following month. In May of this year, *The New York Times* reported that General Haig had been unsuccessful in his attempt to promote a compromise in efforts to reinstate Greece as a full member of NATO. While Greece had expressed a willingness to modify its former exclusive control in the Aegean, Turkey continued to insist on being given military responsibility for airspace within 30 miles of its coastline, including airspace over a number of Greek islands. As a result, Greek reentry into NATO remains blocked by Turkey's veto.

There are a number of errors in Mr. Rustow's article, most of which concern Cyprus. He states that the Ankara government invoked its right of intervention in Cyprus in July 1974 without awaiting any reaction from Washington. On the contrary, while military preparations did begin immediately, Ecevit gave every indication of waiting for Washington's reaction. This turned out, unfortunately, to be one of ignoring initial Turkish demands for the return of Makarios, of stating that there had been "no outside intervention," and seeming to accept the results of the coup. Whether or not an alternative reaction—such as joining the British and the Turks in denouncing the Greek junta for its actions, demanding the withdrawal of Greek officers from the island, and insisting on the restoration of the legal government of Cyprus—would have deterred the invasion cannot be known, but it certainly would have removed any justification.

Mr. Rustow refers to the northern portion of the island as "mainly Turkish-inhabited" at the time of the invasion. In fact, the Turkish population of the two northern districts of Kyrenia and Famagusta was only 13.7 percent and 16.5 percent, respectively, according to 1973 figures; Turkish Cypriots were scattered throughout the island in Turkish and mixed villages in addition to the enclave just north of the Green Line in Nicosia. The central district of Nicosia was 19.9 percent, while two of the three southern districts were over 20 percent Turkish Cypriot. It was for this reason that the federation desired

by the Turks had been considered not feasible.

Mr. Rustow makes reference to the "Sampson coup" and "Sampson's desperate scheme," yet according to news reports shortly after the coup, Sampson was not the first or second choice of the Greek junta to head up the illegal government; Sampson later claimed he was the junta's fifth choice.

As for anyone but Turks remembering that Turkey's action "was based on its right of intervention under the Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee," some argue that the terms of the Treaty do not include the right to use military force. In any case, the Treaty is superseded by the U.N. Charter; Article 53 specifically rules out the use of force under regional arrangements in cases before the Security Council unless such action has been authorized by the Council. Mr. Rustow does not mention that the Treaty of Guarantee permits intervention only to reestablish the state of affairs established by the Treaty.

I would also argue that the position of the island's 18 percent minority was not "precarious" in 1954; a number of British sources have referred to the relative harmony between the two communities in comparison with the friction between Greeks and Turks elsewhere. Their position became precarious as Turkey's role in assisting Great Britain in denying self-determination fanned Greek Cypriot resentment. Even then, sources such as the Facts on File book, *Cyprus 1946-68*, indicate the responsibility of the extremist Turkish Cypriot group Volkan for beginning the intercommunal killings in 1957 in an excessive response to a few EOKA killings of Turkish Cypriot policemen. The EOKA killings seem to have been mostly inadvertent, as EOKA had strict orders to leave all Turkish Cypriots alone.

The Cyprus constitution was certainly unworkable, but this was so largely because of the provisions insisted on by the Turkish government. The dismal example of the minority regimes set up after World War I ought to have discouraged such arrangements. As Lee Buchheit concludes in the reference to Cyprus in his book *Secession*, "Where the group lacks a geographical homeland, therefore, the problem is more amenable to a solution involving minority protections within the existing framework than to a 'political' secession." Had the Turkish Cypriots been accorded normal minority rights and safeguards, a proportion of the government and civil service in line with their numbers, their veto limited to that which was essential to ensure their rights, and had the right to intervene and to veto basic constitutional changes not been accorded Greece, Turkey and Great Britain, Cypriots would have had a better chance to work out a mutually acceptable future.

The constitution was widely recognized as inequitable to the majority. Majority rule is at least workable; providing for a minority veto guaranteed a deadlock (as Turkey itself had demonstrated under a coalition government). An end to majority grievances and the elimination of foreign troops would have done far more to enhance the security of Turkish Cypriots in view of the role played by mainland Greek officers in 1967 and 1974. This is surely still the case. Cyprus can function independently only as an economic unit; the bizonal federation envisaged by the Turkish side will make inevitable for the north continued dependence on and domination by the Turkish mainland. A stable solution is far more likely if both parts of the island are mutually dependent, and independent of external interference.

ANNE RICE
Great Falls, Va.

Mr. Rustow replies:

I quite agree with Anne Rice that without proportional representation Turkey would have "stronger, more credible governments," and be in a better position to help solve the Cyprus and Aegean questions. But few laws are as hard to change as the very rules by which the lawmakers themselves are selected. Even Ben-Gurion fought in vain against proportional representation in Israel—whose diplomacy these days also might benefit from stronger, more unified governments. The basic difficulty becomes apparent if we imagine the fate of a resolution in the U.S. Senate which, in the name of "one person, one vote," would give the eight most populous states of the Union 50 rather than 16 of the 100 seats. Actually, Turkey, even with proportional representation, elected National Assemblies with one-party majorities in 1965 and 1969; and bipartisan agreement on constitutional reform is just conceivable as one way out of the impasse created by the recent by-elections.

On the Cyprus question of 1974, Ms. Rice argues, Washington should have acted more decisively—not so much (if I understand her) by opposing Turkish intervention as it occurred, but rather by removing "any justification" for it beforehand. Thus we might have joined Turkey and others in demanding "the return of Makarios" and "his legal government," "in denouncing the Greek junta," and in insisting on "the withdrawal of Greek officers from the island." Again, I heartily agree. Incidentally, by recalling that Sampson was the fifth choice of the Athens junta to head the coup in Nicosia, Ms. Rice makes his scheme sound even more "desperate" than I did.

The Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 (art. 4) gave the Guarantor Powers "the right to take action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty," without specifying—or excluding—any type of "action." For the July (but not the August) 1974 phase of Turkey's intervention, it can be convincingly argued that it constituted the precise kind of "action" for "reestablishing the state of affairs" which the Treaty contemplates: forcible opposition to an attempt at forcible overthrow of the constitutional *status quo ante*. Whatever the correct interpretation of article 4, I do not see how it could have been "superseded" by any provisions introduced into the U.N. Charter 15 years earlier.

Ms. Rice calls the 1957 Greek Cypriot killings of Turks "inadvertent," and the Turk Cypriot killings of Greeks "excessive." Turk Cypriot observers would claim "inadvertence" for themselves and charge "excesses" to the other side. The history of fratricidal struggles on Cyprus, in Ireland, in Lebanon, or anywhere else, is replete with suspicion, inadvertence, excess, and sheer inhumanity.

I am glad, therefore, that Ms. Rice and I agree that "the Cyprus constitution," which gave rise to its share of excesses, "was certainly unworkable." I am, however, left a little puzzled about her preferred alternative. After deploring "the dismal example of the minority regimes set up after World War I," she proceeds to advocate "normal [post-World War I?] minority rights and safeguards." And having condemned the Ankara government for the constitutional provisions on which it insisted in 1960, she appears to advocate many of these same provisions, including ethnic quotas in the public service, and mutual veto rights—but with the notable omission of outside guarantees. My preferred alternative remains a bizonal federation. And I hasten to add that, of course, such a federation should "function independently" as a single "economic unit"—another central point on which Ms. Rice and I are agreed.

In speaking of the "northern, mainly Turkish-inhabited portion of the island" (p. 94 of my article) I (inadvertently!) misstated the complex ethnic geography of the island. Some permanent relocation of Cypriot Greeks and Turks in different parts of the island, it seems to me, will be indispensable if peace is to come to Cyprus under a bizonal federation or any other arrangement. Such an ethnic population exchange was undertaken, on a scale of several times the total present population of Cyprus, between Greece and Turkey under the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. The result was a half century of peaceful relations between Turkey and Greece, including the friendship treaty negotiated by Venizelos and Atatürk in 1930, joint membership in NATO after 1952, and the Balkan pact of 1954. In view of the dangers of revolution, regional war, terrorism, and Soviet expansion that today engulf the few democracies of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, the most urgent need for the democratic heirs of Venizelos and Atatürk—and for their friends abroad—is to rediscover these proven principles of Greek and Turkish understanding.

ISRAELI ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE

To the Editor:

Ann Crittenden's article, "Israel's Economic Plight," in your Summer 1979 issue, while presenting a generally well-rounded description of Israel's economic position, does contain a number of errors and misleading statements that should be corrected. First, it is quite obviously not correct that Israel's "government budget last year was almost as large as the national output; in the previous year it was actually bigger." Second, per capita income in Israel is not \$2,100 as Crittenden claims. GNP per capita in 1977 was about \$3,800 and GDP per capita was about \$4,800 (at current exchange rates). It is with figures of these magnitudes that Crittenden should have compared foreign indebtedness and transfer payments to Israel.

Ms. Crittenden's discussion of Israel's receipts of transfer payments is incomplete. First, it is misleading to lump transfers by Jewish charity organizations together with intergovernmental grants in a discussion of "dependence." It is only the latter that can be considered a liability. Moreover, Ms. Crittenden did not mention two important sources of transfer payments to Israel, namely German reparations and personal remittances. The latter is largely the transfer of funds by immigrants and returning Israelis to themselves in Israel. These two sources of funds have together generally outweighed the amounts supplied by world Jewish charities, and up until 1972 they were generally larger than the charities and foreign aid combined.

Since so much attention in the article is devoted to the transfer issue, it should be put into context. Out of \$53 billion in foreign aid granted by the American government between 1948 and 1973, Israel received \$612 million. Out of the \$40 billion in military aid during this period (not including aid to South Vietnam), Israel before 1973 did not receive anything. Large-scale American aid to Israel began only after the 1973 October War, in large part as compensation to Israel for foregoing a clear military victory. This aid has been *less* than Israel's additional military burden since the war, and is hardly the subsidizing of the Israeli consumer indicated by Ms. Crittenden's statement that Israel is "dependent upon American assistance for its basic [non-military] needs."

Indeed U.S. aid is at least in part an offset to the increased supply of advanced U.S. arms to the Arab frontline states (e.g. Jordan and Saudi Arabia). Particularly when compared with the magnitude of U.S. aid to other allies against whom aggression was launched during the past 40 years, U.S. aid to Israel has been extremely modest.

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Oberlin, O.

Ms. Crittenden replies:

Mr. Plaut's letter is filled with misunderstanding about the Israeli situation, of which his allegations of errors in my article are evidently a result. I will attempt to clarify the issues he has raised, point by point.

First, I am not sure why he finds it so obvious that Israel's government budget could not be as large as the GNP. The facts are that in 1977 the national output was \$12.2 billion and the government budget totaled \$12.95 billion. The gap, as I explained in the article, was filled with American assistance.

Second, the differences on per capita income in Israel can be explained by the fact that I am using more recent data, for 1978 rather than 1977. Since the value of the Israeli pound dropped sharply after the pound was allowed to float in the fall of 1977, Israeli income in 1978 stated in dollar amounts is significantly lower than in the previous year.

Third, the dependence of the Israeli economy on transfers by Jewish fund-raising organizations abroad is irrefutable, as those organizations' own literature stresses so emphatically. As the article points out, one-third of the Israeli development budget, representing capital investment in the country's infrastructure, is provided by the sale of bonds abroad.

Fourth, on the question of remittances of immigrants and returning Israelis, in the past few years these have dwindled to a trickle. And more important, my major point that the Israeli economy is a dependent economy remains unchallenged.

Finally, Mr. Plaut's comments on U.S. aid transfers to Israel simply reinforce one of my major points, which is that such aid took a dramatic leap after 1973. Nor is there any question that the transfers subsidized consumption in Israel which, all economists agree, would be drastically reduced if the state had to meet its military requirements out of its own resources.

SOVIET JEWRY

To the Editor:

Mr. William Korey, in his essay, "The Future of Soviet Jewry: Emigration and Assimilation" in your Fall 1979 issue, expresses the opinion that the Soviet regime is carrying out the solution to the Jewish problem suggested by the Procurator of the Holy Synod, Constantine Pobedonostsev. The Procurator saw the solution in the following way: one-third of the Russian Jews would die out; one-third would be assimilated with the Russian population; and one-third would emigrate." This view, expressed nearly a century ago, was never widely accepted and, according to the biography of Pobedonostsev written by Professor Robert Byrnes, Pobedonostsev thought that it was "a very remote and even unlikely solution". It is not my intent to defend the Procurator of

the Holy Synod, who was both a reactionary and an anti-Semite. But I must agree with Professor Byrnes that although this was Pobedonostsev's hope, he did not attempt to implement it; he was in fact opposed to pogroms.

Mr. Korey writes that two million Jews perished in Russia during the war and that the twin movements, emigration and assimilation, will finally end the existence of Russian Jewry.

First of all, let us be clear that the two million Jews who perished in the Soviet Union during World War II were victims of the Nazi war machine, not of the Soviet regime. And at the present time, there are three million Jews in the U.S.S.R. It is true that the official census of 1959 states that there were 2,268,000 Jews in Russia and the census of 1969-70 gives the Jewish population as 2,150,000, constituting a loss of over 100,000. However, the official figures are not correct. Many Jews, for various reasons, gave a nationality other than Jewish to the census takers. Moreover, due to the fact that the number of ethnic Russians is decreasing in proportion to the non-Russians in the Soviet Union, many Jews were "encouraged" by the census takers to state that they belonged to the Russian nationality. Nevertheless, in a brochure "Soviet Jews: Fact and Fiction," published by the official Novosti Press Agency in Moscow in the 1970s, it is stated categorically that "according to the 1959 census, there were 2,268,000 Jews in the country. By now there about three million."

Even if the Soviet government were to allow 50,0000 Jews to leave the country every year, the figure of three million would remain. The loss due to emigration is made up partly by the increase of the birthrate.

Mr. Korey further maintains that the number of Jews who speak Yiddish is declining from the 18 percent who declared it to be their mother tongue in 1959 and he predicts that in the new census only five percent of the Jews will give Yiddish as their mother tongue. However, the figures given in the 1959 census are not trustworthy. The late Soviet Jewish sociologist, Yakob Kantor, in his analysis of the census demonstrates that the question about languages which was asked in 1959 was ambiguous and led many respondents to reply in terms of the language used in their everyday life, which frequently differed from their mother tongue. The number of Jews, according to conservative estimates, who understand Yiddish is commonly accepted to stand at about one million.

The limited number of Yiddish theater performances given by wandering dramatic ensembles is attended by large crowds throughout the Soviet Union, as are the infrequent Yiddish concerts. The exhibition of Yiddish books at the recent book fair attracted surprising numbers of Jews, not only residents of Moscow, but those who came from distant cities; the number of potential buyers of Yiddish books, to judge by the quantity of questions (and requests to buy) was very large.

Most Jews—both within and without the Soviet Union—have steadfastly refused to accept the solution attributed to Pobedonostsev. They did not accept it then; they do not now. It would seem that the majority of Jews believe that the struggle for free emigration from Russia should be carried on and that all those who want to leave the U.S.S.R. should be permitted to do so. At the same time, the struggle for the right of those who remain to lead fully Jewish lives must be protected and insisted upon.

ELIAS SCHULMAN, *Editor*
Der Wecker
New York, N. Y.

Mr. Korey replies:

It is a misreading of my essay to state that I offered the opinion that "the Soviet regime is carrying out the solution" proposed by Pobedonostev. Using the apocalyptic comment of Pobedonostev as a point of departure, I focussed upon forces which are driving the Jews to either assimilation or emigration. And the latter development was, and is, scarcely a planned intent of the Kremlin.

The assertion that the Soviet census data on nationality understate the Jewish population figure is correct. Jews could, and did, suppress their national identity to the census taker. But that is precisely my point. The act of suppression, which will no doubt be more marked in the 1979 census data, is a measure of the extent of assimilation.

The 17.7 percent of Soviet Jews who declared in 1970 (not, as Mr. Schulman suggests, 1959) a Jewish language to be their mother tongue, came largely from Lithuania, Latvia, Moldavia, and, to a lesser extent, from the western region of Byelorussia and the Ukraine. It is these regions which have been heavily emptied of Jews as a result of the emigration process. The consequence, as a 1979 census will undoubtedly show, is a severe decline in Yiddish as a mother tongue.

That the cultural and linguistic rights of Soviet Jews should be defended is a value judgment with which I strongly agree. Regrettably, the trend is running in a quite different direction.

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

John C. Campbell

SUPERPOWERS AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT. By Carsten Holbraad. New York: St. Martin's, 1979, 178 pp. \$25.00.

The author first examines the pattern of Soviet-American crisis management in four conflict situations of the 1950s and 1960s, then turns to the more complex "triangular" power relationships of the 1970s. There is nothing startling about either the analysis or the conclusions, but along the way he manages to dispose of a number of theories put forward by others, and to argue for further clarification and better application of rules for regulating international disputes.

HOW NATIONS BEHAVE (2nd ed.). By Louis Henkin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979, 400 pp. \$25.00 (Paper, \$7.00).

Professor Henkin has given much thought to changes in world politics and in concepts of international law since he wrote the first edition of this book a decade ago. Like the previous volume, the new one, which takes due account of the increased influence of the Third World and the growing body of new law to meet new needs, reflects the author's respect for law and his concern for human rights and welfare.

WELTPOLITIK IN GRUNDBEGRIFFEN. VOL. I: EIN LEHR-UND IDEENGESCHICHTLICHER GRUNDRISS. By Reinhard Meyers. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979, 499 pp. DM. 39.80.

TRANSNATIONALE POLITIK. By Walter L. Bühl. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1978, 456 pp. DM. 98.

Meyers' study is essentially a history of ideas about the nature of international relations—from classical idealism and realism to today's theories of transnational politics and interdependence. Bühl describes and develops these later theories at greater length, drawing heavily on the extensive American literature.

INTERNATIONAL INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS AND THE TRANS-MUTATION OF POSTWAR SOCIETY. By Martin Peterson. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1979, 720 pp. Sw. kr. 133.

Interdependence, the realm between national sovereignty and supranationalism, is the main theme of this massive study by a Swedish scholar.

NOTE—BY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE MCGRAW-HILL BOOKSTORE, READERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAY OBTAIN NEARLY ANY BOOK PUBLISHED IN THE UNITED STATES AT THE PUBLISHER'S REGULAR LIST PRICE. WITHIN THE U.S., PLEASE ADD 95¢ PER BOOK FOR POSTAGE PLUS APPROPRIATE SALES TAX. IF OUTSIDE, PLEASE ADD \$1.50 PER BOOK FOR POSTAGE AND 95¢ PER ORDER FOR REGISTRATION. SEND ORDERS WITH CHECK OR MONEY ORDER TO: THE MCGRAW-HILL BOOKSTORE, 1221 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10020.

Looking particularly at the European Community and its member states, the bulk of the study is a detailed and well-informed account of the activity of farmers' organizations and their role in postwar Europe.

THE QUEST FOR SELF-DETERMINATION. By Dov Ronen. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979, 144 pp. \$15.00.

In a thoughtful essay, part historical research with comparative examples, part philosophical rumination, Dov Ronen interprets the idea of self-determination broadly to include not only classic nationalism but also the class struggles of workers and peasants, and the potential individualistic pluralism of the future. His critique of the modern nation-state is more original than most.

ACCESS TO POWER: POLITICS AND THE URBAN POOR IN DEVELOPING NATIONS. By Joan M. Nelson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, 463 pp. \$27.50 (Paper, \$6.95).

Recognizing that no sweeping theory on the political role of the urban masses—though there have been many—will fit the varying facts and situations in the cities of Asia, Africa and Latin America, Joan Nelson sets out to assemble some of the disparate pieces of this “large puzzle.” The book is the result of the labor of a decade, and considers such factors as class consciousness, traditional social relations, ethnic politics, and movements of reform and violent revolution. It is a good start toward understanding a problem that will have great international as well as national and local significance in the future.

AMSTERDAM TO NAIROBI: THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES AND THE THIRD WORLD. By Ernest W. Lefever. Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, Georgetown University; 1979, 114 pp. \$10.00 (Paper, \$5.00).

A criticism, and quite a harsh one, of the political stance of the World Council of Churches as it has moved from a “theology of order” at Amsterdam (1948) to a “theology of revolution” at Nairobi (1975), and especially of its recent grants of funds to the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia and SWAPO in Namibia.

THE ENCLOSURE OF OCEAN RESOURCES. By Ross D. Eckert. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1979, 390 pp. \$16.95.

The “enclosure” movement is the gradual shift from narrow territorial waters to the now generally accepted 200-mile limit for exploitation of ocean resources. Eckert finds this trend commendable and in tune with economic realities. His book also discusses other aspects of the Law of the Sea and has little good to say about the treaty emerging from the present U.N. conference on that subject.

DISASTER ASSISTANCE. Edited by Lynn H. Stephens and Stephen J. Green. New York: New York University Press (for UNA-USA), 1979, 337 pp. \$20.00 (Paper, \$8.95).

As newspaper readers know, disaster relief can be a political issue and not just an economic and humanitarian one. These papers prepared for a UNA-USA panel recognize this fact but concentrate on organization, method, technology and a number of related matters.

W.D., Jr.

General: Military, Technological, and Scientific

Andrew J. Pierre

ENDGAME: THE INSIDE STORY OF SALT II. By Strobe Talbott. New York: Harper, 1979, 319 pp. \$15.00

In this unique book, the diplomatic correspondent for *Time* takes the reader deep into the Carter Administration's handling of the SALT negotiations from the 1977 inauguration to the Vienna signing of the Treaty. Talbott seems to have had unusual access to the principal Washington policymakers and he describes their deliberations and struggles over the two and a half years with skill, apparent accuracy and considerable detail. The negotiations with the Soviets through the delegations in Geneva, the "back-channels," and the series of Vance-Gromyko meetings are recounted; only the unobtainable internal Soviet discussions are missing. In short, this remarkable book does for SALT II what John Newhouse's *Cold Dawn* did for SALT I, but it is made even more comprehensive by outlining the policy preferences of a wider range of bureaucratic actors. *Endgame* is short on analysis and interpretation, and one wishes the material were better organized. But this is the stuff of history upon which future analysts and historians will draw. The evidence makes clear why and how the Carter Administration erred in its initial approach of seeking "deep reductions" without first completing the Vladivostok agreement. The intricacies of the enormously complex tradeoffs on issues during the closing stages of the negotiations are set forth, and the reader is left with evidence to form his own judgment about the connections between such issues as human rights, "linkage", and China, and the Soviet-American arms negotiations.

THE NUCLEAR QUESTION: THE UNITED STATES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 1946-1976. By Michael Mandelbaum. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 277 pp. \$14.95.

This historical work is both more and less than its subtitle indicates. Stylishly written, it offers as much interpretation as chronology. The first three decades of the nuclear age are viewed within the context of the writings of Clausewitz and Bernard Brodie. Yet Mandelbaum gives so much credit for strategic doctrine and arms control innovations to the Kennedy-McNamara years (which take up more than half the book), that the next 13 years are seen as "a series of footnotes to the Kennedy Administration." To many, this will be a debatable proposition.

POLITICS OF ARMS CONTROL: THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY. By Duncan L. Clarke. New York: Free Press, 1979, 277 pp. \$15.95.

This first history of ACDA fills a lacuna in the literature. Comprehensive and balanced, the author is sympathetic to the aims of arms control while realistic in assessing the agency's limitations. ACDA's role and effectiveness have differed under each of its directors and within each administration; the politics of this situation are perceptively sensed in this interesting and valuable study.

ARMS TRANSFERS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Andrew J. Pierre, New York: New York University Press, 1979, 331 pp. \$22.50.

Reviewing the debate which led to the Carter Administration's policies on the transfer of conventional arms, various chapters include: a careful examination of political, military and economic costs and benefits of arms transfers; arguments about the feasibility of controlling the supply of arms into the Persian Gulf and Latin America; the evolution of policies governing conventional arms transfers in the U.S. Executive and Congress; an interesting inquiry into the economic importance of arms sales which finds them less substantial than is often assumed; and finally, an examination of possible multilateral restraints on arms transfers which would involve France, the U.K. and the U.S.S.R., as well as the U.S. This useful collection highlights the policy dilemmas which have plagued the Carter Administration's attempts to impose global standards and constraints upon conventional arms transfers.

Enid C. B. Schoettle

POSTURES FOR NON-PROLIFERATION: ARMS LIMITATION AND SECURITY POLICIES TO MINIMIZE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. By the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). London: Taylor and Francis, 1979, 168 pp.

Much of the recent literature and policy emphasis dealing with the spread of nuclear weapons has focused on the nuclear fuel cycle and export constraints. This closely reasoned analysis looks at political strategies of various kinds, such as nuclear guarantees designed to reduce the insecurity of non-nuclear states. The deliberations of the 1975 NPT conference are reviewed. A valuable addition to the nonproliferation bookshelf.

EUROPE WITHOUT DEFENSE? By General Robert Close. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1979, 250 pp. \$19.50.

This book by a senior Belgian officer attracted a great deal of attention when it was first published in Europe two years ago because of its dramatic thesis—that the Soviet Union could overrun Germany east of the Rhine within 48 hours. General Close's argument is open to debate; for example, he minimizes the deterrent value of NATO's tactical nuclear forces and the likelihood that there would be a number of warning signs before a surprise attack. Nevertheless, his views merit serious attention.

BURDEN SHARING IN NATO. By Gavin Kennedy. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979, 117 pp. \$22.75.

Chiefly of interest to specialists, this is a succinct study of the economic issues of cost-sharing within the NATO Alliance. The author, a professor at the University of Strathclyde, argues that the British share is now inequitably large and that there should be a redistribution of the burden.

SECURING THE SEAS: THE SOVIET NAVAL CHALLENGE AND WESTERN ALLIANCE OPTIONS. By Paul H. Nitze, Leonard Sullivan, Jr., and the Atlantic Council Working Group on Securing the Seas. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 464 pp. \$24.00 (Paper, \$12.00).

A thorough, impressive analysis of Soviet naval capabilities and strategies as well as their Western counterparts. The authors conclude that the U.S.S.R. is now capable of seriously interfering with essential shipping and of challenging other Western uses of the seas. The study constructively details a number of measures recommended to rectify this situation.

THE SEA POWER OF THE STATE. By S.G. Gorshkov. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979, 290 pp. \$17.95.

More than anyone, Admiral Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, is responsible for its modern development. This translation of a 1976 work is necessary reading for those interested in the Soviet Union's emergence as a world sea power.

NEW TECHNOLOGY AND MILITARY POWER: GENERAL PURPOSE MILITARY FORCES FOR THE 1980s AND BEYOND. By Seymour J. Deitchman. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 315 pp. \$24.00.

Coming at a time when there is a growing consensus in favor of more defense spending, this book makes a valuable contribution by suggesting what capabilities we really need in order to improve our non-strategic military forces. The author's purpose in weaving his way through the new military technologies is to help us to know how to choose wisely.

THE ROCKET TEAM. By Frederick I. Ordway III and Mitchell R. Sharpe. New York: Crowell, 1979, 462 pp. \$14.95.

A history of Wernher von Braun and his colleagues from Peenemünde to Huntsville. The chapters on the early years, when the V-2 rockets which were fired on London were being developed, are the most interesting.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

THE U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND THE SINKING DOLLAR. By Wilson Schmidt. New York: New York University Press, 1979, 157 pp. \$10.00 (Paper, \$4.95).

This excellent explanation of the balance of payments and exchange rates is aimed mainly at the mistakes of the media. As to policy, "the balance of payments does not matter if the exchange rate floats freely without management." The trouble starts because governments won't let it do so, and even if the Americans accepted the argument of the author (a former Treasury official), "there appears to be little that we can do" to make foreign governments keep their hands off the dollar.

U.S.-EUROPEAN MONETARY RELATIONS. Edited by Samuel I. Katz. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1979, 282 pp. \$10.95 (Paper, \$5.75).

It takes an effort to recall the state of the international monetary system in March 1977 when the conference covered in this volume was held. Inevitably, some of the discussion has lost its edge, but many good things remain in observations by experienced people about such lasting matters as the relationship between internal and external factors in shaping exchange rates and the international financial position of countries.

CHALLENGES TO INTERDEPENDENT ECONOMIES: THE INDUSTRIAL WEST IN THE COMING DECADE. By Robert J. Gordon and Jacques Pelkmans. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations/1980s Project), 1979, 147 pp. \$9.95 (Paper, \$6.95).

In their excellent introduction, Edward L. Morse and Thomas Wallin discuss how the politicization of international economics contributes to economic nationalism and how the lack of coordinated U.S. policy handicaps "country desk" diplomacy. For author Gordon, the U.S. is almost a closed economy, external shocks excepted. He is perhaps overoptimistic about con-

trolling future inflation, putting economic performance over monetary policy. Pelkmans wants to see a more open economy for all OECD countries and is disturbed at the tendency toward protectionism. Economic security will remain a major concern in the future, but he is hopeful about extending cooperative efforts based on long-term export growth. The lack of any discussion of U.S.-Canadian-Mexican relations in the coming decade is a noticeable gap.

Henry Simon Bloch

THE UNITED STATES, CANADA AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. Edited by Ervin Laszlo and Joel Kurtzman. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1979, 163 pp. \$15.00.

Official positions, interest-group statements and attitudes, and public opinion about 11 proposals concerning the NIEO are set out and, to a degree, analyzed by academics and consultants. The Canadian half of the book, by John O'Manique of Carleton, is an orderly, comprehensive account; the four U.S. papers are uneven and often colored by the authors' disagreement with what they are reporting. In starting this series of national volumes, UNITAR seems to be looking for ways to persuade more people in the industrial world that advance toward a NIEO would help them.

INTERNATIONAL INDEBTEDNESS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By George C. Abbott. White Plains (N.Y.): Sharpe, 1979, 308 pp. \$25.00.

DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT. Edited by Lawrence G. Franko and Marilyn J. Seiber. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1979, 306 pp. \$29.50.

An economist from Glasgow, Mr. Abbott sees ominous similarities between the piling up of Third World debt and the European-American debt and reparations problems of the 1920s. To avoid comparable results and to get on with the job of economic development, he would recycle debt payments into aid grants in an ingenious manner not likely to attract much support in the creditor and aid-giving countries. The Franko-Seiber volume presents substantial papers—some of them reprints—on many aspects of the subject, including history, case studies and policy questions.

MULTILATERALE WIRTSCHAFTSDIPLOMATIE ZWISCHEN WESTLICHEN INDUSTRIESTAATEN. By Hans Mayrzedt. Bern: Peter Lang, 1979, 625 pp. Swiss Fr. 98.

This is a very well-informed and clearly reasoned discussion of "multilateral economic diplomacy among Western industrial countries as a means of strengthening a liberal, multilateral trade policy." The author, who teaches at St. Gallen, Switzerland, appreciates past accomplishments in this field and is rightly worried about increased difficulties in the future, particularly as bilateralism becomes more popular among governments. The conventions of the *Habilitationsschrift* push writers to demonstrate their erudition in big books containing interlocking studies of a number of different subjects; among the best in this volume are those about the interrelations and changing character of GATT, the Fund and other international economic organizations.

MULTINATIONALISM, JAPANESE STYLE. By Terutomo Ozawa. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, 289 pp. \$16.50.

This is a valuable analysis and brief history of Japanese overseas direct investment in the postwar period. The links between private and public

activity, trade policy and the changing structure of Japanese industry, export promotion and the effort to obtain secure supplies of raw materials and oil are well brought out.

FOREIGN TRADE REGIMES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. VOL. X: LIBERALIZATION ATTEMPTS AND CONSEQUENCES. By Anne O. Krueger. Cambridge: Ballinger (for the National Bureau of Economic Research), 1978, 310 pp.

This is one of two volumes concluding a most ambitious study of trade policy in ten developing countries, carried out by the National Bureau of Economic Research. (Individual volumes have been reviewed as they appeared). Professor Krueger, a co-director of the project, here focuses on devaluation and the effect of the liberalization of trade and payments regimes on growth and the allocation of resources. There are too many factors at work to permit highly condensed generalization, but the evidence (as in the companion volume by co-director Jagdish Bhagwati, noted in *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1979) suggests that when governments take export promotion seriously they correct or avoid some costly errors.

ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY. By Romesh K. Diwan and Dennis Livingston. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1979, 255 pp.

APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGIES FOR THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT. Edited by Austin Robinson. New York: St. Martin's, 1979, 417 pp. \$32.50.

As their title suggests, Diwan and Livingston (who teach in American colleges) string together some very large subjects. They are at their best when showing that what makes technology "appropriate" depends on the aims of those in charge. Their analysis of conventional development (by now quite conventional itself) leads them to prefer alternative strategies. The International Economic Association's volume edited by Robinson provides much empirical analysis as well as many efforts to nail down the relationship between appropriate technology and economic efficiency.

THE ENERGY CONTROVERSY: SOFT PATH QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. By Amory Lovins and others. San Francisco: Friends of the Earth, 1979, 450 pp. \$12.50 (Paper, \$6.95).

WESTERN ENERGY POLICY. By Douglas Evans. New York: St. Martin's, 1979, 198 pp. \$18.50.

INTERNATIONAL OIL POLICY. By Arnold Safer. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1979, 163 pp.

Amory Lovins' article in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1976, drew a great deal of comment, much of it critical. Hugh Nash, a friendly editor, here reorganizes the attacks and rebuttals into more readable form than the congressional reports in which they were originally collected. Evans, a journalist from New Zealand, provides a clear but slightly dated account of the energy policies of major countries and concludes that price and competition are the best weapons to get "humane and efficient" results. Although Safer, an American consultant, believes that high prices will eventually produce an abundance of oil, he wants the United States to do a number of things in the meantime to drive down the OPEC price. These include subsidies and quotas on imports, less regulation at home and financing exploration abroad.

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NORWAY, OIL, AND FOREIGN POLICY. By John C. Ausland. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 140 pp. \$15.00.

Norway's oil provokes some interesting questions: relations with OPEC and IEA, the rate of development, the use of the resources to promote industrial development, and relations with the Soviet Union in the Barents Sea. This brief book by a former American diplomat who has long lived in Norway considers all these in an enlightening way. Not the last word, but an excellent survey.

LAW AND POLICY IN PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT. By Kamal Hossain. New York: Nichols, 1979, 284 pp. \$32.50.

To find and produce oil, developing countries usually need the help of foreign companies. To suggest what legal and organizational arrangements will both encourage exploration and give the government the largest possible return is the purpose of this study by a former Cabinet Minister of Bangladesh who is now at Oxford. His work, supported by the Commonwealth Secretariat, draws on the experience of ten quite diverse countries.

IMMIGRANT LABOR AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES: THE FRENCH AND BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1945-1975. By Gary P. Freeman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, 362 pp. \$20.00

Neither Britain nor France is typical of other countries in its relations to immigrant labor. Nevertheless, this well-documented study of the two countries' contrasting political reactions, economic policies and administrative methods adds a good bit to our understanding of what may well be a continuing and troublesome issue for rich industrial countries.

OBSTACLES TO MINERAL DEVELOPMENT: A PRAGMATIC VIEW. By John S. Carman. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1979, 200 pp. \$17.50.

These papers by a Canadian mining engineer with some 20 years of U.N. experience deal bluntly and vividly with, among other things, the fallacies of *The Limits to Growth*, the deficiencies of foreign aid, the damaging changes in Canadian taxation, inappropriate technology, small mining and the prevention of ghost towns. Among many interesting statements, the most important is the drubbing he gives mining companies and host governments for attitudes and behavior which imperil future production.

CRITICAL FOOD ISSUES OF THE EIGHTIES. Edited by Marilyn Chou and David P. Harmon, Jr. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1979, 420 pp. \$32.50.

Some general, some detailed, these very miscellaneous essays coming out of a Hudson Institute program deal with nutrition, technology, chemicals in food, farm policy, lifestyles, regulation and even energy.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

WHITE HOUSE YEARS. By Henry Kissinger. Boston: Little, Brown; 1979, 1,521 pp. \$22.50.

In every generation in this century, in the immediate aftermath of an epoch in American foreign policy, a commanding work by or about the President's most important adviser has appeared. In the 1920s we had *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, edited by Charles Seymour; in 1948 we had Robert Sherwood's

Roosevelt and Hopkins, now Kissinger's gargantuan *White House Years*, with another volume on the State Department yet to come. All of these works were the first to combine literary distinction with the revelation of great quantities of evidence not available to the outsider. They all illustrate the fact that the battle to control a historical reputation has only begun when the events are over. In time the works on Colonel House and on Harry Hopkins were corrected and challenged in considerable detail. The same fate awaits *White House Years*—but not for a long time, not until historians have access to the full archival record and the time to digest it.

Kissinger's literary monument to himself is a work of description, exhortation and scorn. He gives the reader more detail about the events of 1969–1973 than has yet appeared and he draws extensively on his famous notes and recordings as well as on secret memoranda and cables. He exhorts us to see the world as he does and above all to affirm (this is the major theme) that “diplomatic skill could augment but never substitute for military strength. In the final reckoning weakness has invariably tempted aggression and impotence brings abdication of policy in its train.” And nearly everywhere there is scorn—masquerading as condescending praise for Nixon, but explicit for colleagues like William Rogers, and for his critics. The work is worthy in every way of the achievements of the man.

THE CRISES OF POWER: FOREIGN POLICY IN THE KISSINGER YEARS. By Seyom Brown. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979, 194 pp. \$10.95.

A balanced critique of concepts, achievements, and failures. Brown argues that Kissinger's difficulties stemmed largely from “the inability of the Nixon and Ford Administrations to provide the domestic building blocks necessary to give the structure an immediate and secure foundation.”

THE MAN WHO KEPT THE SECRETS: RICHARD HELMS AND THE CIA. By Thomas Powers. New York: Knopf, 393 pp. \$12.95.

Although the author cannot penetrate Richard Helms' reserve, this is the most convincing of the many recent books on the CIA, and certainly the most temperate and objective. Powers seeks to explain, not indict. He demonstrates that the character and behavior of the CIA were shaped ultimately by the demands put on the agency by Presidents.

VIETNAM: THE DEFINITIVE DOCUMENTATION OF HUMAN DECISIONS. Edited by Gareth Porter. Pine Plains (N.Y.): Earl M. Coleman, 1979, 2 vols. \$60.00.

Although the editorial point of view is passionately anti-war, these two volumes are in fact a reference work, and a very convenient one. The most important documents from “The Pentagon Papers” and *Foreign Relations of the United States* are reproduced in logical order together with a useful selection from Vietnamese sources.

ANNALS OF AN ABIDING LIBERAL. By John Kenneth Galbraith. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979, 384 pp. \$12.95.

Delightful essays mostly about the personalities, policies and posturings of American leaders in the 1970s. Galbraith, the serious humorist, is the Mark Twain of our time.

NAZI PRISONERS OF WAR IN AMERICA. By Arnold Krammer. New York: Stein and Day, 1979, 352 pp. \$18.95.

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A fascinating account of German POWs in the United States (only a few of whom were literally Nazis). The story, well documented from archives and illustrated with photographs, tells of humane treatment, a few minor mistakes, and ideological struggles among the prisoners.

POWER ON THE LEFT: AMERICAN RADICAL MOVEMENTS SINCE 1946. By Lawrence Lader. New York: Norton, 1979, 411 pp. \$14.95.

A sympathetic, well-researched and well-written history and analysis of the persecution of the radicals in the 1940s and 1950s, the exuberant movements of the 1960s, and the fallow years of the 1970s.

CHARLES E. WILSON AND CONTROVERSY AT THE PENTAGON, 1953-1957. By E. Bruce Geelhoed. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1979, 216 pp. \$14.95.

Ten years ago historical scholarship based on archival material reached the Truman years. Now the Eisenhower Administration has been overtaken. This study documents and praises Wilson's administrative talents and his refreshing candor.

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By Michael Schaller, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, 208 pp. \$9.95.

An original synthesis especially cogent on the period of World War II and the early cold war (the area of the author's own original research).

The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

CANADA AS AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR. By Peyton V. Lyon and Brian W. Tomlin. Toronto: Macmillan, 1979, 209 pp. \$10.95 (Paper).

An informative analysis and critique of Canada's image, objectives and capabilities in foreign affairs. The authors suggest that Canada's "benign image was never fully deserved" and that the country has unrealized potential on the international scene.

G.S.

THE FUTURE OF NORTH AMERICA: CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND QUEBEC NATIONALISM. Edited by Elliot J. Feldman and Neil Nevitte. Cambridge: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1979, 378 pp. \$13.95 (Paper, \$6.95).

A vigorous and candid colloquy about Canada's problems and her relations with the U.S. Substantial papers by Canadians are paired with commentary by Americans. The topics include energy, commerce, communications, and perspectives on international affairs.

G.S.

PEASANTS AND POVERTY: A STUDY OF HAITI. by Mats Lundahl. New York: St. Martin's, 1979, 699 pp. \$37.50.

A long and intense analysis, basically economic, of every corner in the peasant sector, concluding, *inter alia*, that the Haitian peasant "is not being exploited by any of the typical villains of the rural economy. Instead, his main enemy is the Government." There are interesting observations on political lethargy, which dates from the abolition of slavery and the creation of a large freeholder class that evolved in isolation; and there is a hint of Toynbee:

"Inaction for more than a century has made the peasant incapable of making his voice heard."

BRAZIL AND THE QUIET INTERVENTION, 1964. By Phyllis R. Parker. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979, 147 pp. \$9.95.

The author concludes that the United States sympathized with the military takeover in 1964 and refrained from involvement only because it saw no need for it. Apparently surprised that the United States feels less concern at a rupture of the constitutional order in other countries by friendly rather than by hostile forces, she is no disciple of Realpolitik.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION, TECHNOLOGY, AND ANDEAN INTEGRATION. By Lynn Krieger Mytelka. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979, 233 pp. \$17.50.

Balanced in judgment and very detailed, this study embraces a wide range of Andean bloc developments: industrial programming, technology and licensing, trade gains, Decision 24 and so on. The author declares that "the divorce between regulation and planning . . . destroyed much that was unique in the integrative system" and that "the benefits generated by the integration process were below expectation."

CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE CARIBBEAN. Edited by Basil A. Ince. Trinidad: Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies; 1979, 359 pp.

The principal topics treated by the 16 contributing scholars, all from the Caribbean, and almost all from academia, are the Caribbean and the Third World, metropolitan ties, the political process in foreign policy, and economic development. The focus is almost exclusively on the Commonwealth Caribbean. An integrating chapter or introduction would have been helpful.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN LATIN AMERICA. VOL. II: POLITICS AND THE POOR. Edited by Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979, 262 pp. \$24.40 (Paper, \$9.50).

The second volume of a set which provides an overview of the participatory role of economically deprived groups in the political process. Peasants, workers and the urban poor share the focus in these 15 essays. The approach and tone are severely academic.

ISRAEL-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS. By Edy Kaufman, Yoram Shapira and Joel Barrami. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction, 1979, 256 pp.

An analysis of Latin American political support for Israel through voting in international bodies, concluding that "the pay-offs in terms of Latin American support for Israel have been consistently higher than those . . . of Afro-Asian countries, where Israel invested greater resources." This is most true of the smaller countries such as Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Uruguay, and least so of the major, more highly developed ones.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

THE GENERATION OF 1914. By Robert Wohl. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979, 307 pp. \$17.50.

An evocation of the literary youth of the major countries of Europe (save

Russia and Austria) and of the sense of themselves as constituting a particular generation, a sense confirmed by their experience in the Great War. Held together by notions of generational theory, the book is more than collective biographies—as if these biographies of figures both well-known and obscure would not be enough. A superb work of cultural history, a study of lives lived and sensibilities formed in the shadow of war and upheaval.

THE VISIBLE COLLEGE. By Gary Werskey. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979, 376 pp. \$12.95.

A valuable study of five British scientists of the interwar years—including J.D. Bernal, J.B.S. Haldane and Joseph Needham—and the evolution of their left-wing, often communist political views. The author, an American historian living in England, relates biography, social conditions and scientific thought as the background of political attitudes. A readable, serious effort at collective biography, full of telling quotes, written from an avowedly sympathetic perspective convinced of the relevance of earlier scientific socialism to Britain's present condition. The book is, however, marred by an extraordinary British insularity: Were these men really so isolated from their continental colleagues at that time?

NUREMBERG: A NATION ON TRIAL. By Werner Maser. New York: Scribner, 1979, 368 pp. \$16.95.

A well-known German historian reconstructs the fate of German leaders in Allied hands; a significant work, based on the proceedings of the International Military Tribunal and on additional extensive inquiries, which recall—among other things—the many pleas of ignorance and innocence. Thus Albert Speer: “It was known in Germany that a stay in a concentration camp was an unpleasant matter.” Maser thinks that Nuremberg would have had to be justified by subsequent acts of international justice—which did not occur.

A NOBLE TREASON: THE REVOLT OF THE MUNICH STUDENTS AGAINST HITLER. By Richard Hanser. New York: Putnam, 1979, 319 pp. \$12.50.

The moving story of the young Scholls, brother and sister, who by printing and distributing anti-Hitler leaflets in Munich sought to oppose the immoral regime. In 1943 the Nazis caught and killed them. Their courage and their uniqueness make a memorable moment in the annals of resistance, told here in the exasperating style of contemporary popular history: without citation of sources, with scant attention to historical context.

THE MURDER OF RUDOLF HESS. By W. Hugh Thomas. New York: Harper, 1979, 307 pp. \$9.95.

There has always been some mystery to Rudolf Hess's flight to Scotland in May 1941. A British consultant surgeon now claims that the present prisoner in Spandau, whom he has briefly examined, is not Hess—for he lacks the scars of chest wounds Hess suffered in 1917. In her introduction Rebecca West lends credence to the story of the missing wounds. Whose hoax?

TORMENTED WARRIOR: LUDENDORFF AND THE SUPREME COMMAND. By Roger Parkinson. New York: Stein and Day, 1979, 248 pp. \$12.95.

The author, a military historian, acknowledges that this is not a “definitive study.” It is, in fact, a thoroughly derivative effort to give Ludendorff his due—as a major military figure, exceptionally able and exceptionally twisted,

with an immense impact on German politics. A disappointing work on a central subject.

THE UNDESIRABLE JOURNALIST. By Günter Wallraff. Woodstock (N.Y.): Overlook Press, 1979, 180 pp. (New York: Viking Press, distributor, \$10.00).

Some exposés by a controversial German journalist who by deception obtains various jobs that allow him to investigate the deceptions and villainies of those in power. He often finds shocking misdeeds, but his accounts are thin and episodic.

OSTHANDEL UND OSTPOLITIK. By Michael Kreile. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1978, 242 pp. DM.42.

An inquiry into the links between West Germany's *Ostpolitik* and the FRG's successful drive for greater trade with the East. The book is timely and informative, valuable for its empirical data and its command of sources. The theoretical part—which is intended as a contribution to peace research—is turgid, as so many of these excessively ambitious and abstract discourses in theory tend to be.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

SOVIET DIPLOMACY AND NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR: EMERGING NEW CONTEXT FOR U.S. DIPLOMACY. By the Congressional Research Service for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Washington: G.P.O., 1979, 573 pp.

A comprehensive survey on a subject which has preoccupied Americans for half a century. Much of it represents summary and comparison of the series of negotiating experiences American officials have had with their Soviet counterparts, and of the conclusions they have drawn from that experience. But the author of the study, Joseph G. Whelan, gives what amounts to a running account of Soviet-American relations, putting diplomacy first in the old context and then in what may be the emerging new one of the 1980s.

UNCERTAIN DÉTENTE. Edited by Frans A.M. Alting von Geusau. Alphen aan den Rijn (Netherlands): Sijthoff, 1979, 329 pp. \$47.50.

Although these essays do not add up to a whole, they represent a more thorough airing and weighing of the issues of détente in Europe than can be found in any other single volume. Western contributors of the caliber of André Fontaine and William Griffith give a cool appraisal of the then current (1977) state of affairs; the Soviet and Polish contributions are predictable, the Yugoslav and Hungarian more interesting. The editor, who adds an epilogue on the Belgrade follow-up to Helsinki, finds the situation more discouraging than the book's title suggests.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION: FROM LENIN TO STALIN. By E. H. Carr. New York: Free Press, 1979, 191 pp. \$10.00.

No one in the West has explored and mastered the history of the first decade of Soviet rule as has E.H. Carr. Here in short compass he distills for the general reader the main lines and conclusions of his impressive ten-volume work on the period.

L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE ET LES ALLEMAGNES. By Renata Fritsch

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Bournazel. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1979, 259 pp. Fr. 100.

A competent survey of the course of Soviet policy on the German question and relations with the two Germanys from World War II to the present. Treatment of individual issues and episodes (especially in the realm of Soviet-GDR relations) is skimpier than the specialist might wish, but the overall success of Moscow in gaining normalization with the Federal Republic while maintaining firm control of the GDR is well described and well documented.

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION. By Roy Medvedev. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979, 232 pp. \$14.95.

Roy Medvedev, who continues to publish abroad while living and writing in the U.S.S.R., reinterprets the events and the meaning of the upheaval of 1917-18. The Soviet establishment will condemn the book, but Western historians should find its scholarship praiseworthy and its conclusions food for reasoned discussion.

NOVYI ETAP EKONOMICHESKOGO SOTRUDNICHESTVA SSSR S RAZVITYMI KAPITALISTICHESKIMI STRANAMI. Edited by A. I. Bel'chuk. Moscow: Nauka, 1978, 303 pp. Rubles 1.90.

Soviet economists describe the importance for the Soviet economy (including an improved standard of living as well as rate of growth) of the "new stage" in East-West economic relations reached in the 1970s. The growth of trade is the main story, but they also have something to say about industrial cooperation, joint ventures, technology transfer, and payments. Cooperation with capitalism—for the strengthening of socialism—is necessary and will continue.

STRANY SEV V MIROKHOZIAISTVENNYKH SVIAZIAKH. Edited by N. P. Shmelev. Moscow: Nauka, 1978, 295 pp. Rubles 1.70.

A highly interesting and revealing book by a group of economists at the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System, Soviet Academy of Sciences. Within the context of the recent Soviet trend that accepts active international cooperation as an important component of economic growth, the authors discuss the changes that ensue for intra-bloc relations, for aid and trade operations in the Third World, and for exchanges with the West.

Elizabeth K. Valkenier

MANIPULATED SCIENCE: THE CRISIS OF SCIENCE AND SCIENTISTS IN THE SOVIET UNION TODAY. By Mark Popovsky. New York: Doubleday, 1979, 242 pp. \$10.95.

A former popular science writer in the Soviet Union now resident in America tells how the scientific establishment in the U.S.S.R. has lost its birthright of creativity through subordination to the demands of the system. The author does not explore the broader effects of this state of affairs on the economy and the international position of the U.S.S.R.

COMMUNISM AND EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by Frantisek Silnitsky, Larisa Silnitsky and Karl Reyman. New York: Karz, 1979, 242 pp. \$19.95 (Paper, \$6.95).

A mixed bag of excerpts and essays by observers and critics of current Marxist orthodoxy in four East European countries. Despite useful accompanying background and commentary, the book lacks editorial discipline. The

essays themselves provide the real meat and they confirm the main conclusion: the diversity both of East Europe's communism and of its anti-communism.

OPPOSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by Rudolf L. Tórkés. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1979, 306 pp. \$22.50.

Tórkés and his colleagues get away from standard and static views to carry the study of government and opposition in East Europe into new dimensions. The currents of dissent here described are many and varied and they interact; some come from ancient and deep feelings (e.g., nationalism, resentment of Russia), while others reflect the changing nature of the economy and society; and the differences between countries are often striking.

THE INTELLECTUALS ON THE ROAD TO CLASS POWER. By George Konrád and Ivan Szelényi. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979, 252 pp. \$10.00

An original and powerfully argued study, written several years ago in Hungary but not published there, of the role of the intelligentsia in modern society. The analysis of socialism in Eastern Europe, the book's main but not exclusive concern, is centered on the rise and the social role of the intellectuals as a class, their relation to the ruling political elite, and the keys they may hold to the future. The authors are a novelist and a sociologist. The book does not read like a novel.

THE KREMLIN'S DILEMMA: THE STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. By Tufton Beamish and Guy Hadley. San Rafael (Cal.): Presidio Press, 1979, 280 pp. \$12.95.

A rundown on the status of human rights and freedom in six East European states, pointing up the differences among them. Not an exhaustive review of how the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act have been observed or violated, but rather a lively journalistic account giving a substantially accurate picture. The authors believe Helsinki has given the West a golden opportunity to challenge the Kremlin on this issue.

DREI JAHRZEHNTE AUSSENPOLITIK DER DDR. Edited by Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and others. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1979, 945 pp.

West Germany's leading experts on the German Democratic Republic have prepared this massive history of its foreign policy over 30 years. In an enterprise of such extraordinary difficulty there are inevitable gaps and weak spots, but the overall result is a monument to scholarship and hard work and a valuable reference. It covers GDR policy, and its relation to Soviet policy, within the Eastern bloc, on the German question, toward the West, and throughout the Third World.

GREAT BRITAIN, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE POLISH GOVERNMENT IN EXILE (1939-1945). By George Kacwicz. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1979, 255 p. Gldrs. 57.50.

The story of British wartime diplomacy concerning Poland told with due regard for the documentary and other evidence, but also with a very strong view of British and American policy as based on ignorance, illusions, cynicism and weakness of will.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE HERITAGE OF AGES PAST. Edited by Hans Brisch and Ivan Volgyes. Boulder (Colo.): East European Quarterly, 1979, 239 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor, \$13.50).

Succinct and stimulating essays by writers of established authority in their respective fields. The volume achieves unity through concentration on the elements of continuity in the historical experience of the Czech and Slovak peoples, which also was the theme of the final work of the late Josef Korbel, to whose memory the book is dedicated.

PASSIVE REVOLUTION: POLITICS AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK WORKING CLASS, 1945–1948. By Jon Bloomfield. New York: St. Martin's, 1979, 290 pp. \$22.50.

The revolution of 1948 which brought the communists to power in Prague was "passive" in the sense that the groups on the Left which helped it to succeed (socialists, trade unions and rank-and-file communists) had no real part in determining its aims, strategy, or the shape of the regime which followed, for the key factors were the few top leaders of the Communist Party and their links to Moscow. Bloomfield adds a good deal of information to that provided by earlier books on these critical years.

THE SLOVAK AUTONOMY MOVEMENT, 1935–1939. By Dorothea H. El Mallakh. Boulder (Colo.): East European Quarterly, 1979, 260 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor, \$16.00).

The underlying theme of this monograph is the continuity and constancy of the Slovak demand for autonomy, represented during these years principally but not solely by the Hlinka party. Prague badly underestimated it and Hitler easily exploited it. The book is enriched by the use of archival material from Prague, surprisingly provided by the post-1968 government.

SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1968. By Jiri Valenta. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1979, 208 pp. \$12.95.

Probably the best-grounded study yet done on the Soviet handling of the Czechoslovak affair of 1968 and an excellent case study on Soviet decision-making in general. Valenta brings forward a mass of diverse evidence and uses it skillfully—while recognizing where the gaps are—to show how the issues were seen by the Soviet leadership, what the factions were, and how and when the key decisions were made. The decision for invasion, which came very late (August 17), was the climax of a long internal controversy and search for consensus.

YUGOSLAVIA: SELF-MANAGEMENT SOCIALISM AND THE CHALLENGES OF DEVELOPMENT. By Martin Schrenk, Cyrus Ardalan and Nawal A. El Tatawy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for the World Bank), 1979, 392 pp. \$25.00 (Paper, \$9.50)

A report on the Yugoslav economy, sequel to an earlier 1974 volume also prepared by a World Bank team. Rather bland in its treatment and judgments (all Bank country reports are published subject to the agreement of the governments concerned), but it contains valuable statistical material and professional analysis.

DIE BALTISCHE KRISE 1938–1941. By Seppo Myllyniemi. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979, 167 pp.

Congratulations are due the author of this revealing, well-researched chronicle of the last years of the three Baltic Republics as they were absorbed in two stages into the U.S.S.R., then engulfed by Hitler's offensive. He shows how the drama was played out against the background of shifting Soviet-German relations and of the fate of Finland in the storm of war.

The Middle East and North Africa

John C. Campbell

THE PALESTINE TRIANGLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HOLY LAND, 1935-1948. By Nicholas Bethell. New York: Putnam, 1979, 384 pp. \$12.95.

It is not as if good books had not already been written on this subject. Nevertheless, the recent availability of quantities of British archival material ensures that waves of scholars will be exploring everything that happened from the Balfour Declaration to the end of the Mandate. Nicholas Bethell, combining scholarship with a lively style and more taken with the drama of events on the ground than with the intricacies of international diplomacy, has put together his story by use of those records plus conversations with some of the leading participants. He is especially severe on British policy and tends to see the conflict from the Jewish point of the triangle.

THE RABIN MEMOIRS. by Yitzhak Rabin. Boston: Little, Brown; 1979, 344 pp. \$12.95.

The former Chief-of-Staff, Ambassador and Prime Minister tells not quite all in his extensive recollections, which passed Israeli censorship only with some deletions. In writing of his own role in Israel's public life and diplomacy over 30 years he enlarges our knowledge of both. He is frank in treating the episodes of personal crisis and also in describing relations with colleagues, friends and adversaries including Ben-Gurion, Eshkol, Golda Meir, Dayan and (with bitter criticism) Shimon Peres. A significant contribution to the history of the time, though it will have to be balanced against the accounts of others.

ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY/POLITICAL RELATIONS: ARAB PERCEPTIONS AND THE POLITICS OF ESCALATION. By John W. Amos II. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1979, 382 pp. \$32.50.

Although the presentation and organization of this book are at times as confusing as the title, the wealth of material and the competence of the analysis make it a work of considerable merit. The centerpiece is the war of 1973, from which the author goes forward and backward to cover the perceptions and policies of Arabs, Israel, Russia and America, and the interaction among them.

PALESTINIANS: FROM PEASANTS TO REVOLUTIONARIES. By Rosemary Sayigh. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979, 206 pp. \$17.95 (Paper, \$6.95).

The story of the Arab Palestinians told as "popular history" and drawing heavily on the experience in Lebanon and on the recollections of individuals now in the refugee camps in that country. Special pleading, of course, but it captures the essence of Palestinian attitudes and of the revolutionary movement that came into being after the Six-Day War.

PRESS, POLITICS AND POWER: EGYPT'S HEIKAL AND AL-AHRAM. By Munir K. Nasser. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1979, 175 pp. \$15.50 (Paper, \$9.50).

Mohammed Heikal's extensive writings and genius for self-advertisement have already made the world aware of his exploits as editor, writer and confidant of statesmen. This compact biography, in relying heavily on inter-

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views with Heikal himself, tends to reflect his own self-estimate, but is nevertheless an honest effort to assess his place in Egypt's public life and to establish the facts on such matters as his troubled relations with Sadat.

WORLD POLITICS AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. Edited by Robert O. Freedman. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1979, 342 pp. \$20.00.

Much of the material in this symposium is already familiar, but the effects of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the internal politics of Israel, Syria, Egypt and the PLO are here presented with a specialized knowledge that gives the book a distinction not duplicated elsewhere. Freedman's able editing binds the contributions together, though careless errors appear in the text.

GREAT POWER INTERVENTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Edited by Milton Leitenberg and Gabriel Sheffer. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1979, 347 pp. \$18.50.

Although there is some general discussion of intervention, which runs into problems of definition and of generalization from specific cases, the bulk of this volume is devoted to topics such as the transfer and use of conventional arms and nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. The level of the individual papers, most of them written for a conference at Cornell University in 1977, is uniformly high.

THE LEFT AGAINST ZION. Edited by Robert S. Wistrich. London: Valentine, Mitchell; 1979, 309 pp. (Totowa, N.J.: Biblio, distributor, \$19.50; Paper, \$9.95).

Scattered pieces covering the complex of history, politics and prejudice that includes anti-Semitism in Russia and Eastern Europe, anti-Zionism in communist theory and practice, Soviet pro-Arab strategy in the Middle East, and the pro-PLO stance of the "New Left."

IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY UPHEAVAL: AN INTERPRETIVE ESSAY. By Sepehr Zabih. San Francisco: Alchemy Books, 1979, 103 pp.

A brief, preliminary, but perceptive assessment, by a longtime student of Iranian politics, of the forces of opposition to the Shah and the process by which they overthrew him.

QATAR: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN OIL ECONOMY. by Regaei El Mallakh. New York: St. Martin's, 1979, 183 pp. \$21.95.

For those who need to know about the economics of Qatar—oil, development, finance, aid and trade—it is all here, thanks to a well-known economist from the University of Colorado. But, as he says, Qatar "is not one of the giants" of OPEC.

THE ECONOMIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST. By Rodney Wilson. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979, 209 pp. \$33.50.

An economist's country-by-country survey which provides the general reader with a reasonably accurate picture not only of the size and character of the various national economies but of how they work in practice.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

IMPACT OF INTELLIGENCE REASSESSMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS FROM KOREA. Hearings before the Investigations

Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, June 21 and July 17, 1979. Washington: G.P.O., 1979, 101 pp.

Background on the revised U.S. intelligence estimates of North Korean troop strength which shows that Pyongyang has a much larger army than was thought in 1977 when the Administration's combat troop withdrawal plans were announced. A fundamental question raised—but not answered—is why the North Korean buildup, which evidently began in 1970 or 1971, was not discovered until 1978.

THE UNITED STATES, CHINA AND JAPAN. A Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Washington: G.P.O., 1979, 46 pp.

The report of a delegation of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which visited China and Japan in April 1979, this short pamphlet provides a good, brief summary of developments in China since Mao and of Japan's recent domestic and foreign policy. It also offers some balanced views on U.S. policy toward East Asia.

BEYOND NORMALIZATION: REPORT OF THE UNA-USA NATIONAL POLICY PANEL TO STUDY U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. New York: United Nations Association of the U.S.A., 1979, 79 pp.

The most complete survey yet of U.S.-China relations since normalization. The product of a team of experts who commissioned papers and made a two-week study tour through East Asia, it provides excellent sections on the legal, economic, strategic and scientific aspects of Chinese-American relations. There is a particularly interesting section on Taiwan, which suggests that a process of "Taiwanization" of the political system is now under active consideration by the KMT leaders on the island.

YELLOW EARTH, GREEN JADE: CONSTANTS IN CHINESE POLITICAL MORES. By Simon de Beaufort. Cambridge: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1979, 90 pp. \$8.95 (Paper, \$3.95).

A not very startling discovery that the Chinese revolution has not substantially altered traditional Chinese social and political behavior, but the author does a thoughtful job of showing how Chinese culture influences the contemporary Chinese scene.

THE MIDDLE EAST IN CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1949-1977. By Yitzhak Shichor. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 268 pp. \$25.00.

One of the first comprehensive accounts of China's policy in the Middle East. It documents the shift in the 1970s away from support of "liberation movements" to support of opposition to Soviet expansion.

THE GANG AND 900 MILLION: A CHINA DIARY. By S. Nihal Singh. New Delhi: Oxford & IBH, 1979, 118 pp. Rs. 32.

A very straightforward, unpretentious account by an Indian journalist of a two-week visit to China in April 1979. The volume records some interesting conversations the author had on the China-Vietnam conflict and on the future of Chinese-Indian relations.

JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES. Edited by William J. Barnds. New York: New York University Press (a Council on Foreign Relations Book), 1979, 286 pp.

In one of the most valuable recent books on U.S.-Japanese relations, a group of experts identifies the causes of the growing difficulties facing the two

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countries and proposes ways to cope with them. Special attention is devoted to the interplay of domestic politics and foreign policy and to the need for structural change in the economies of both countries.

THE RATIONAL PEASANT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RURAL SOCIETY IN VIETNAM. By Samuel L. Popkin. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, 306 pp. \$15.00. (Paper, \$4.95).

In contrast to some recent bestsellers on Vietnam which contain more fire than depth, this painstakingly researched, marvellously balanced, and theoretically important analysis of Vietnamese rural society from pre-colonial days to the present will stand for years to come as a model of its kind. It is scholarship at its best.

IN DEFENSE OF THE IRRATIONAL PEASANT: INDIAN AGRICULTURE AFTER THE GREEN REVOLUTION. By Kusum Nair. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, 154 pp. \$17.00.

In her consistently vivid style, which combines attention to human beings with equal attention to abstract economic theories, Mrs. Nair explains why the Wheat Revolution worked in the Indian state of Punjab but not in Bihar. The answer is relatively simple. The big farmers in Bihar are conspicuously wasteful and inefficient. The solution? Use monetary incentives so that it is too costly for big landowners not to cultivate efficiently. This book is a very provocative addition to the literature on rural development in Asia; it deserves a wide audience.

INDIRA GANDHI: IN THE CRUCIBLE OF LEADERSHIP. By Mary C. Carras. Boston: Beacon Press, 1979, 289 pp. \$13.95.

A thorough examination of Mrs. Gandhi's complex personality and the situation leading up to the Emergency Rule, this book by an American political scientist provides a good insight into contemporary Indian politics. But the insight is a disturbing one: "The main contenders still vie with one another, seemingly oblivious to the larger forces for change stirring just beneath the political surface. These are moving slowly but unmistakably toward an outlet."

THE SCOPE OF HAPPINESS. By Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit. New York: Crown, 1979, 340 pp. \$12.95.

The sister of Nehru, aunt of Indira Gandhi, and an outstanding world figure in her own right, Madame Pandit offers her own very personal view of the Indian struggle for independence.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

ETHNIC POWER MOBILIZED: CAN SOUTH AFRICA CHANGE? By Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979, 308 pp. \$22.50 (Paper, \$5.95).

A Canadian political scientist and a South African historian fit alternating chapters into a cohesive examination of the way Afrikaner nationalism works to conserve the power and privileges of that ethnic group. Emphasizing the predominance of class over racial, cultural or ideological determinants, the book brilliantly updates contemporary analysis of this subject (and particularly Adam's own *Modernizing Racial Domination*, 1971), while answering the

question posed by the title largely in the negative—federation won't work without drastic economic redistribution.

ONE AZANIA, ONE NATION: THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRICA. By No Sizwe. London: Zed, 1979, 215 pp. (New York: Monthly Review Press, distributor, \$16.95).

While setting out to show that the theory of ethnic pluralism is a capitalist scheme to ensure a captive labor force, a veteran of Robben Island assembles a useful historical record of pronouncements on the nationalities question by South African political leaders across the spectrum. Surprisingly often, according to the examples he quotes, they have accepted a variant of his thesis.

TRANSKEI'S HALF LOAF: RACE SEPARATISM IN SOUTH AFRICA. By Newell M. Stultz. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979, 183 pp. \$16.00.

The author characterizes his perspective as "conservative," and the serious consideration he gives to the value of Transkeian sovereignty does distance this commentary from most non-South African analysis of this issue. On balance, however, Stultz is both highly knowledgeable and determinedly objective. He cites a few modest gains, largely in terms of the abolition of apartheid, for the people within the territory, while emphasizing the unworkability of this form of partition, given the extreme poverty of the black areas vis-à-vis the white.

YEAR OF FIRE, YEAR OF ASH. By Barush Hirson. London: Zed, 1979, 348 pp. (New York: Monthly Review Press, distributor, \$20.00).

This account of the 1976-77 Soweto uprisings by an exiled South African Marxist (and former political prisoner) documents a surprising number of black labor union strike actions during the 1970s. It is less successful in documenting its theses about the student revolts. The author contends—but does not show—that the African National Congress played a significant role therein and disputes the importance of the "black consciousness" movement in changing the apartheid system.

ZAMBIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY AND DEPENDENCE. By Douglas G. Anglin and Timonthy M. Shaw. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 453 pp. \$22.50.

While the authors, both Canadian academics, correctly deny that their book is comprehensive, it is among the best studies yet of a black African state's foreign policy behavior. Most of the chapters have appeared as articles but all have been jointly reworked and improved; one of the new chapters, "Zambia and the Angolan Civil War," makes a major contribution to our understanding of that unhappy international episode.

WAR CLOUDS ON THE HORN OF AFRICA: THE WIDENING STORM (2nd ed.). By Tom J. Farer. New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1979, 183 pp. \$5.00 (Paper).

While updating the vivid history of the Horn in the original edition (noted in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1976) to include the 1977-78 Ogaden War and the concomitant superpower about-face, Farer continues to argue persuasively that the Soviet presence in the Horn and the Indian Ocean is no real threat to U.S. interests. The humanitarian emphasis of his prescriptions for U.S. policy remains the same; explicit recommendations include possible U.S. aid to Eritrea aimed at its federation (to be backed by both the U.S. and Soviet Union) with Ethiopia and Somalia.

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NORTH OF SOUTH. By Shiva Naipaul. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979, 349 pp. \$10.95.

AFRICAN CALLIOPE: A JOURNEY TO THE SUDAN. By Edward Hoagland. New York: Random House, 1979, 239 pp. \$10.00.

Africa arouses strongly contrasting reactions in two recent travelers to East Africa and the Sudan. Naipaul's grim, dessicated landscapes resemble not so much Kenya and Tanzania as a contemporary version of Hades, peopled by pimpled hippies, lost Asians, shabby, querulous whites, and Africans driven mad by their unavailing struggle to become Europeans. Hoagland, on the other hand, depicts his own—a white Westerner's—immersion in several Sudanese cultures: Arab and black, desert, city and bush. He relishes what he learns of local history and tradition and sensitively depicts the strangeness and beauty, the fearfulness, poverty and warmth of the land and people.

Janet Rigney

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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1. Title of publication: FOREIGN AFFAIRS
2. Date of filing: 10/1/79
- 3A. No. of issues published annually: 5
- 3B. Annual subscription price: \$15.00
4. Location of known office of publication (Street, City, County, State and ZIP Code) (Not printers): 428 East Preston Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202
5. Location of the headquarters or general business offices of the publishers (Not printers): 58 East 68th Street, New York, New York 10021
6. Names and complete addresses of publisher, editor, and managing editor: Publisher: Doris Forest, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 58 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021. Editor: William P. Bundy (See #5); Managing editor: James Chace (See #5).
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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